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Abstract 
Selective attention is widely regarded as a crucial component of human perception. 
In the visual domain, attentional mechanisms have been implicated in stimulus 
encoding, implicit recognition, conscious perception and goal-directed behaviour. 
To date, however, the role of attention in face processing has been largely 
overlooked. This is remarkable given the social and biological importance of 
faces, and the wealth of psychological research that has focused on faces as 
stimuli. Moreover, if we are to better understand how the human brain processes 
faces, then this would also require an insight into the interaction between attention 
and face processing. The experiments in this thesis addressed the relation of 
attention and face processing directly by assessing the consequences of various 
attentional manipulations in response-competition and repetition priming tasks. 
The first line of enquiry examined observers' ability to attend selectively to facial 
expression and identity, and whether attention is required for the integration of 
these types of information into a multi-dimensional face percept. Subsequent 
experiments examined capacity limits in face processing and attention biases to 
faces and nonface comparisons. The main findings indicate that face processing is 
capacity limited, such that only a single face can be processed at a time, and that 
faces are particularly efficient at retaining and engaging visual attention in 
comparison to nonface objects. However, while face processing limits appear to 
proceed independent of a general capacity, attention biases to faces may reflect 
processing stages that are shared with other stimuli. These findings are discussed 
in relation to existing research on faces and attention. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
There are a range of selective issues implicated in human perception that come 
under the umbrella term attention (Driver, 2001; Styles, 1997). Thus it is widely 
held that attentional mechanisms afford the selection of information from our 
senses for conscious perception and goal-directed behaviour (e. g. Broadbent, 
1958), but also for implicit recognition (e. g. Lavie, 1995) and for the rudimentary 
encoding of stimuli (e. g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Although a great deal is now 
known about selective attention (e. g. Baddeley & Weiskrantz, 1993; Pashler, 
1998; Styles, 1997), rather little is understood about how visual attention and face 
processing interact. This is remarkable as there is probably no other class of visual 
stimuli that can match the social and biological importance, and that has been 
studied as extensively as the human face (e. g. Bruce & Young, 1998; Young, 
1998). This is also unfortunate as the role of attention may be imperative in 
understanding how the human brain processes faces. Similarly, the study of visual 
attention might benefit from considering stimuli of immense intrinsic significance 
such as faces. 
This thesis explores the interaction of attention and face processing across four 
themes by measuring task-irrelevant processing in response-competition and 
priming tasks. The first theme concerns the ability to attend selectively to different 
types of facial information. The second theme explores the role of attention in 
integrating these types of facial information into multidimensional percepts during 
early visual processing. The third theme concerns the limit of the number of faces 
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that can be processed simultaneously. The final theme focuses on late visual 
processes involved in awareness and response, by examining whether faces are 
particularly efficient in affecting responses to a target in comparison with other 
stimulus classes. I begin by outlining the relevant principles of attention. This is 
followed by a review of what is currently understood about the relation of 
attention and face processing. I end this chapter by describing the general 
methodological approach of the current work. 
1.2 Principles of attention 
1.2.1 SELECTIVITY AND CAPACITY LIMITATION 
Two principles that have dominated the study of visual attention are selectivity and 
capacity limitation. Selectivity is apparent in most human behaviour and refers to 
the observation that we continually assign priority to only a part of our entire 
sensory input. For example, when reading we focus on a small set of words at a 
time even though a page usually contains other words that we could also read. 
Selectivity is closely related to the principle of capacity limitation, which refers to 
the notion that attention is a finite resource that can only be devoted to a subset of 
the total sensory input. Consequently, selectivity and capacity limitation are often 
portrayed as two sides of the same coin, whereby selectivity prioritizes limited 
attentional resources to enhance the processing of important stimuli. 
A long-standing issue within the attention domain has been the locus of selectivity. 
Early selection theorists suggest that some basic physical attributes of all sensory 
inputs are analyzed independent of their attentional status at an early processing 
stage, but only attended stimuli are processed to identification and beyond (e. g. 
Broadbent, 1958). Late selection theorists, on the other hand, propose that 
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selective processing only begins after the analysis of all stimuli is completed. 
Thus, the identity of attended and unattended stimuli is computed alike in a 
capacity-unlimited analysis and selection only occurs after full perception to gain 
access to systems required for awareness, memory, and response (e. g. Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963; Duncan, 1980; Norman, 1968). The issue of early versus late 
selection is therefore a debate about the extent to which unattended stimuli are 
processed. 
In the visual domain, attention researchers have employed many variations of a 
rather modest number of tasks to investigate the locus of selection, such as 
response-competition and distractor-priming tasks. In response-competition, 
subjects are typically instructed to make two-alternative speeded responses to a 
target item while ignoring distractor items in the display. Distractor processing can 
then be assessed via their congruency on target response times (RTs). To the 
extent that the distractors are processed, RTs are slowed when the distractors and 
the target belong to opposite response categories (the incongruent condition) 
relative to when distractors belong to the same response category as the target (the 
congruent condition). Using this type of paradigm, Eriksen & Eriksen (1974) 
asked subjects to classify a central letter while ignoring flanking letter distractors. 
Each response category consisted of two letters (e. g. A and U to be responded to 
with one hand, and M&K with the other hand), and the distractors could belong 
to the same or the opposite response category (e. g. AAUAA or MMUMM). They 
found that the distractor letters influenced target responses, with slower 
classification times in the incongruent condition. This is consistent with the central 
claim of late selection that attended and unattended stimuli are processed to 
identification (see also e. g. Logan, 1980; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Miller, 1987). 
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However, Eriksen & Hoffman (1972,1973) also obtained results with a response- 
competition task that are difficult to integrate into strict late selection accounts. 
They presented circular displays subtending 2° of visual angle in diameter and 
containing 12 letters, one of which was marked as a target by a short arrow-cue. 
As in Eriksen & Eriksen's (1974) study, target RTs were slowed on incongruent 
relative to congruent trials, but these congruency effects were eliminated when the 
distractors appeared more than 1° from the target. In a similar way, Yantis & 
Johnston (1990) found that letter distractors only produced interference when they 
were presented next to the target or separated by one response-neutral item, but not 
for more remote distances. 
In another twist of the selection debate, Tipper and associates first produced 
another measure for the processing of unattended visual stimuli and showed later 
that distractors can still be processed in the absence of response-competition with a 
target. Tipper (1985) presented subjects with superimposed, different-coloured line 
drawings of two objects and asked them to name the object in a specified colour, 
but to ignore the other. Importantly, the relationship between ignored and attended 
objects was manipulated, so that the ignored object on one trial was occasionally 
presented as the target object on a subsequent trial. In these instances, Tipper 
(1985) obtained slower target naming times (a phenomenon that Tipper termed 
`negative priming'), even though subjects were incapable of reporting the identity 
of the unattended stimuli. Moreover, this effect occurred between letters of the 
same identity but a different shape (Tipper & Cranston, 1985) and pictures and 
names of objects sharing a semantic category (e. g. CAT-DOG, Tipper, 1985; 
Tipper & Driver, 1988), showing that the unattended stimuli were subject to 
considerable processing. 
10 
Subsequently, Driver & Tipper (1989) examined whether distractors give rise to 
negative priming even when they do not interfere with target classification. 
Subjects were asked to count the number of red items in a display, while ignoring 
black distractor digits that could be congruent or incongruent with the correct 
counting response. The black digits did not appear to interfere with task-relevant 
processing. However, when this was followed by an interference display in which 
the red target items were congruent with the numerical value of the preceding 
distractors, negative priming was found. It appears then that even non-interfering 
distractors can be processed to identification. 
Nevertheless, some researchers urge caution in interpreting negative priming as an 
unequivocal measure of late selection (Lavie & Tsal, 1994). One possibility, for 
example, is that the distractor may only be subject to `raw' processing on trial n, 
but may then be fully primed by the related target on trial n +1. It is also uncertain 
what negative priming theorists would predict in situations in which only a 
proportion of distractor stimuli produce interference (e. g. Eriksen & Hoffman, 
1972,1973; Yantis & Johnston, 1990). Indeed, Driver (2001) argues that a 
position that is often overlooked in this debate is that many effects do not fit into 
strict early or late selection accounts, but may be driven by only partial processing 
along a continuum between early and late selection. 
1.2.2 PERCEPTUAL LOAD 
Lavie (1995) offered an explanation of how early and late selection theories might 
combine along a continuum. According to her perceptual load theory of selective 
attention, the most important determinant whether stimuli within the visual field 
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are processed is the perceptual load of attended and unattended items. A major 
assumption of this theory is that processing resources cannot be voluntarily 
withheld, but that visual analysis of relevant and irrelevant stimuli proceeds 
automatically until available capacity is exhausted. Consequently, to-be-ignored 
distractor stimuli are only excluded from analysis when the perceptual load of the 
relevant task requires all available capacity. If relevant stimuli do not exhaust this 
capacity, excess processing resources automatically spill over to irrelevant stimuli, 
thus enabling their processing. 
In a review of past findings, Lavie & Tsal (1994) integrate a wealth of existing 
data in support of a perceptual load account, and since then considerable evidence 
has also been accumulated (Lavie, 1995,2000,2001; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & 
Fox, 2000; Rees, Frith & Lavie, 1997). For example, Lavie (1995) showed 
subjects displays consisting of one of two possible target letters and an additional 
task-irrelevant distractor letter, which could be congruent (i. e. the same letter as 
the displayed target) or incongruent (the same letter as the alternative target) with 
the target response. Perceptual load was manipulated by presenting only the target 
and distractor (the low load condition), or by embedding the target in a horizontal 
string of response neutral letters (the high load condition). Lavie (1995) predicted 
that distractor interference would depend on task-relevant load, so that it would be 
reduced in the high-load compared to the low load condition. This was confirmed 
by the results, which showed that distractor congruency effects were only found 
under low load. 
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1.2.3 FEATURE INTEGRATION 
Although Lavie's perceptual load theory suggests a continuum between early and 
late selection, it also implies that perception occurs in an all-or-nothing manner 
such that task-irrelevant distractor stimuli either are or are not processed. In 
contrast, Treisman's feature integration theory (FIT) suggests that task-irrelevant 
stimuli always undergo some processing even if they are not identified by the 
perceptual system (e. g. Treisman, 1988,1993; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; 
Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). According to FIT, different stimulus attributes, such 
as colour, size, or orientation are registered separately by the perceptual system 
without any attentional effort, but are integrated into multidimensional percepts by 
visual attention. Attention is thus portrayed as a type of glue that binds different 
features together. 
One source of support for FIT comes from visual search tasks, in which subjects 
are required to detect a target in an array of distractor items. Target search times 
are seemingly unaffected by increasing the number of distractors in a display, 
provided that all distractors are identical and differ from the target in terms of a 
single dimension such as shape or colour (e. g. Smith, 1962; Treisman & Gelade, 
1982). This pattern of results is often referred to as perceptual `pop-out' and is 
interpreted as capacity-free parallel search. However, search times generally 
increase with display size when targets and distractors consist of feature 
conjunctions, such as colour and shape (e. g. Heathcote & Mewhort, 1993; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980), a serial search pattern that implies that target and 
distractor processing requires focused attention. Thus it seems that feature 
integration, unlike feature perception, is attentionally demanding. 
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This interpretation has not gone unchallenged as visual search for conjunction 
targets seems relatively easy when the distractors can be grouped into a common 
shape (e. g. Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Humphreys, Quinlan & Riddoch, 1989; 
Wolfe, 1994). One can also question the extent to which feature search proceeds 
without attention as subjects are always looking deliberately at search displays to 
locate the target. However, FIT also receives support from reports that conjunction 
information appears sometimes unavailable in unattended stimuli. For example, 
Lavie (1997) showed that response-competition effects with a colour-shape 
conjunction target (e. g. a purple cross) are equivalent for conjunctive distractors, 
in which critical colour and shape information is combined within one of two 
distractors (e. g. a purple cross and a blue triangle, where `blue' and `triangle' are 
response-neutral features), and disjunctive distractors (e. g. a purple triangle and a 
blue cross). In accordance with FIT, this suggests that correct conjunction 
information was unavailable under conditions of inattention. In addition, FIT 
receives some support from neuropsychological patients who can describe the 
colours and shapes of objects quite accurately, but have difficulty in reporting their 
correct conjunctions (Friedman-Hill, Robertson & Treisman, 1995; Humphreys, 
Cinel, Wolfe, Olson & Klempen, 2000). 
1.2.4 ATTENTION BIASES 
The feature integration theory and the perceptual load theory meet on the principle 
that the allocation of attention is vital for full perception. A crucial question then 
concerns the extent to which this allocation can be controlled by an observer. What 
we see often depends on where we choose to attend in our environment, such as a 
task-relevant target in an experiment. Selection of the focus of attention can thus 
undoubtedly occur in a voluntary, goal-directed manner, even if spare attentional 
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capacity may inevitably spill over to other task-irrelevant stimuli (e. g. Lavie, 1995, 
2000). 
Focused attention may also be driven in an involuntary manner so that stimuli 
receive priority even when they oppose an observer's intentions. For example, 
Posner, Snyder & Davidson (1980) showed that responses to a peripheral target 
could be cued by an immediately preceding illumination in one of the possible 
target locations, resulting in faster responses to validly compared to invalidly cued 
targets. Intriguingly, these effects were observed even when the cues were only 
valid on a minor proportion of all trials, so that it would have been advantageous 
to ignore them as most of the time they would have been misleading. This suggests 
that the cues captured attention in an involuntary bottom-up manner, independent 
of the subjects' intentions. 
In addition to abrupt visual onsets (e. g. Posner et al, 1980; Jonides, 1981; 
Remington, Johnston & Yantis, 1992), attentional capture is also invoked by the 
salience of a stimulus. Thus, visual search for a uniquely shaped target is slowed if 
one of the distractors is printed in a salient colour, for example a red item in an 
otherwise green array. Similarly, search for a colour target is disrupted by the 
presence of a differently shaped distractor (e. g. Theeuwes, 1991,1992,1994). 
Consequently, bottom-up capture is held to operate on early visual processing, 
most probably at the level of feature perception in Treisman's feature integration 
theory (Styles, 1997). However, although impossible to eliminate, capture effects 
are reduced when observers are aware of the exact target shape and distractor 
colour prior to the experiment (e. g. Theeuwes, de Vries & Godijn, 2003). This 
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indicates that there are also top-down processes that determine the extent to which 
attention may be retained by a distractor stimulus. 
Comparable attentional effects have also been observed with more meaningful 
stimuli than with colours and simple shapes. Wolford & Morrison (1980) showed 
that responses regarding the parity of two peripheral digits (e. g. both odd or even 
versus one of each) were slowed more when a subject's own name was presented 
as a distractor than by control words. Shapiro, Caldwell & Sorensen (1997) also 
found that own names are detected more often in a rapid stream of visual stimuli 
than words that are of no particular significance to an observer. In addition, Mack 
& Rock (1998) report that visual search times for own names in 1,6, or 12 word 
displays do not increase with display size. In contrast, search slopes for control 
names increased at an average rate of 51 ms/item. Moreover, these search slopes 
rose to 81 ms/item when subjects' own names rather than words were used as 
distractors. Thus, these studies show that task performance is facilitated when own 
names are used as visual targets and impaired when they are presented as 
distractors, indicating that attention is drawn to this stimulus class. 
Note that some reports also challenge this interpretation. For example, Bundesen, 
Kyllingsbaek, Houmann & Jensen (1997) found that own names are no more 
potent as distractors during a matching task than other names, but are reported 
more accurately, which implies that names might not capture attention but are 
simply more recognizable. This receives support from claims that own names are 
reported more quickly in visual search than other targets but not in the capacity- 
free fashion reported by Mack & Rock (1998), and are not particular potent 
distractors (Harris, Pashler & Coburn, 2004; Harris & Pashler, 2004). Nonetheless, 
16 
attentional biases have also been observed with negatively charged emotional 
words, particularly in anxiety-prone individuals (e. g. Broadbent & Broadbent, 
1988; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). 
For example, MacLeod et al (1986) found that anxious individuals detect a dot 
probe faster when its location is validly cued by an emotionally threatening word 
(e. g. PANIC) than a non-emotional word (e. g. FLUTE). Since these studies 
employed a variety of emotionally charged and neutral words, it is improbable that 
these biases can be explained in terms of recognizability. Indeed, similar biases 
have also been observed for substance-related cues such as cigarettes and bottles 
of alcohol in smokers and heavy drinkers (e. g. Jones, Jones, Smith & Copley, 
2003; Waters, Shiffman, Bradley & Mogg, 2003), which are items that are 
generally effortlessly recognizable. This suggests that attentional capture does not 
depend on recognizability but on the meaning that particular stimuli hold for an 
individual. 
A number of studies suggest that some meaningful stimuli are also effective at 
retaining attention, particularly in anxious individuals. For example, Amir, Elias, 
Klump & Przeworski (2003) used threatening or neutral words to cue the locations 
in which a target could appear. Subjects were generally slower to respond to 
invalidly cued than validly cued targets. However, subjects with social phobia 
showed significantly slower response latencies on invalid trials than 
psychologically normal participants, but only when threatening cues were used. 
Others have shown similar biases for threatening words in state-anxious 
individuals (e. g. Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001) and for threatening pictures 
in trait-anxious subjects (Yiend & Mathews, 2001), which implies that these 
groups have difficulty in disengaging attention from threatening material. 
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Attentional capture and disengagement effects by meaningful stimuli are evidently 
dependent on stimulus identification and must therefore build on earlier selection 
processes such as feature integration and perceptual load. Moreover, these 
attention biases are clearly different from distractor interference in response- 
competition tasks (e. g. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972,1973), 
as they do not depend on target-distractor congruency. This suggests that they are 
not located at the level at which task-relevant responses are activated, but reflect a 
stimulus's ability to control action regardless of task demands. The next question 
is how mechanisms such as feature integration, capacity limitation and attention 
biases relate to face processing. Moving from early to late visual processing, I 
begin with the role of attention in holistic face encoding. 
1.3 The role of attention in holistic face encoding 
1.3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLISTIC INFORMATION 
Although faces are often described in terms of the features for which we have 
particular lexical values (e. g. eye, nose, mouth), considerable evidence suggests 
that faces are processed in a holistic fashion that is dependent on the spatial 
configuration of these features, rather than the features themselves. Thus, Harmon 
(1973) showed that configural information is sufficient for person recognition 
when high-frequency information from individual features is disrupted with a 
blurring technique. Others have shown that face parts are recognized more 
accurately in the context of a studied face than when they are presented in 
isolation, a whole-to-part advantage that suggests that faces are not encoded as 
individual features (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Face recognition is also impaired by 
manipulations of configural information, such as stimulus inversion (e. g. Carey & 
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Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Valentine & Bruce, 1986, Yin, 1969) 
and changes in the internal spacing of facial features (e. g. Haig, 1984; Tanaka & 
Sengco, 1997). In addition, Young, Hellawell & Hay (1987) found that subjects 
experienced great difficulty in naming either the top half of one face or the bottom 
half of another, when both halves were closely aligned to form a `chimeric' face 
composite. This composite effect has been attributed to interference from the novel 
configuration of the aligned halves, which does not match the configural 
information of either of the original faces. 
Several researchers have also made the stronger claim that face processing is more 
dependent on holistic processing than other stimulus categories (e. g. Carey & 
Diamond, 1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Tanaka & 
Farah, 1993; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Yarmey, 1971; Yin, 1969,1970). For 
example, Yin (1969,1970) found that the recognition of airplanes, houses, stick 
figures, bridges and costumes is less affected by inversion than the recognition of 
faces. Furthermore, Tanaka & Farah (1993) and Tanaka & Sengco (1997) showed 
that inverted faces and houses are recognized equally well as whole items as from 
isolated parts, a result that contrasts the whole-to-part recognition advantage for 
faces (although a whole-to-part advantage has been reported for some artificially 
generated objects, e. g. Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr & Tanaka, 
1998). 
Some researchers also argue for the existence of face-specific neural mechanisms 
that are responsible for the holistic processing of upright faces. These are held to 
operate to some extent independently of a general-purpose object recognition 
system, which processes inverted faces and nonface objects. Although this issue 
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remains controversial (see e. g. Kanwisher, 2000; Gauthier & Logothetis, 2000), 
evidence for such a division has accrued from brain-imaging studies of normal 
subjects (e. g. Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000; Haxby et al, 1999; Kanwisher, 
McDermott & Chun, 1997), neuropsychological patients with selectively impaired 
face processing abilities (e. g. Farah, Levinson & Klein, 1995; Farah, Wilson, 
Drain & Tanaka, 1995; McNeill & Warrington, 1993; Sergent & Signoret, 1992a) 
or selectively impaired object processing abilities (e. g. Humphreys & Rumiati, 
1998; Moscovitch, Winocur & Behrmann, 1997; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1997), 
and reports that newborn infants prefer intact face stimuli to scrambled faces and 
nonface objects (e. g. Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & Morton, 1991; Morton & 
Johnson, 1991). 
1.3.2 HOW DOES ATTENTION RELATE TO HOLISTIC FACE PROCESSING? 
The importance of holistic information for face processing has led researchers to 
investigate whether facial features are coded into holistic representations by 
focused visual attention, an approach that originates from Treisman's feature 
integration theory. In the first of these studies, Reinitz, Morrissey & Demb (1994) 
asked subjects to study line-drawn faces under full attention or in a divided- 
attention condition, in which they were required to count a rapid sequence of dots 
that were alternating between the top and bottom half of each face. Counting the 
dots affected the ability to remember the study faces at a subsequent test phase so 
that participants classified the original faces and conjunction faces, which were 
constructed by combining an eye-nose set from one studied face with a mouth-hair 
set from another studied face, as old equally often. Moreover, the faces in both 
these conditions were classified as old more frequently than completely new faces 
and conjunction stimuli made from an old and a new face. This led Reinitz et al 
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(1994) to conclude that faces require attention for the holistic encoding of their 
constituent features. 
However, the results of a subsequent study are inconsistent with these conclusions. 
Reinitz, Bartlett & Searcy (1997) employed the same full and divided attention 
conditions as Reinitz et al (1994), but presented participants with a same/different 
test immediately after viewing each study face. At test participants could be shown 
a featurally altered face in which one feature (e. g. nose, mouth or eyes) was 
replaced by a different exemplar of the same type, or a configurally altered face in 
which eye-mouth distance was manipulated, or an identical face. In contrast to 
Reinitz et al (1994), this paradigm produced a greater deficit for featurally altered 
faces than configurally altered faces under divided attention, suggesting that 
holistic processing was now actually less attentionally demanding than feature 
perception. 
While Reinitz et al (1997) argue that attention may affect face encoding differently 
in memory and perception, there might be other reasons for these contradictory 
results. First, Reinitz et al (1997) used images of real colour faces while the earlier 
study employed line-drawn stimuli. However, although the processing of real face 
stimuli is particularly dependent on configuration, this type of information appears 
less important for the processing of artificial face stimuli (Leder, 1996). Second, it 
has been questioned whether it is reasonably possible to manipulate featural and 
configural information independently (e. g. Bruce, 1988; Rhodes, Brake & 
Atkinson, 1993), as replacing one feature with another exemplar will inevitably 
produce a concurrent change to a face's configuration. This problem may be 
compounded by the use of different feature-configuration manipulations in these 
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studies. Lastly, the dot-counting task of the divided attention conditions may have 
affected face encoding by forcing subjects to alternate between the top and bottom 
halves of the study faces. This could potentially disrupt holistic encoding or 
feature perception or even both, by directing attention away from relevant face 
information. 
More recently, Boutet, Gentes-Hawn & Chaudhuri (2002) re-examined the role of 
attention in holistic face encoding with a variation of the composite effect (see 
Young et al, 1987). In one experiment, stimuli were composed of a face 
superimposed on a house and subjects were asked to focus on just one of these 
images during encoding to manipulate attention towards or away from the face. In 
another experiment with an analogous attention manipulation, a stream of letters 
was continuously scrolled across a face and subjects were asked to decipher any 
words within this stream or ignore the letters altogether. Face encoding during 
these tasks was then assessed with stimuli constructed from the top and bottom 
halves of either two attended faces, two unattended faces, or two new faces. These 
halves could be closely aligned to produce a composite face with a novel 
configuration or misaligned to disrupt configuration. If only the facial features 
were encoded under divided attention, then recognition of the face halves should 
have been unaffected by the configuration of the aligned composites. However, 
although Boutet et al (2002) found that attended face composites were recognized 
more accurately than unattended composites, misaligned stimuli produced better 
recognition performance than aligned composites regardless of condition. This 
indicates that dividing attention interfered with the degree to which the study faces 
could be remembered but did not disrupt holistic face encoding. 
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However, this evidence is not entirely persuasive as several studies demonstrate a 
disproportionate effect of inversion for faces in comparison with photographs of 
houses (Scapinello & Yarmey, 1970; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Yarmey, 1971; 
Yin, 1969). Unlike faces, houses are also recognized equally well from individual 
parts as from whole items (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). In 
other words, it appears that houses do not draw on the same (holistic) resources as 
faces. Task-irrelevant face processing also appears unaffected by task-relevant 
word processing (e. g. Jenkins, Burton & Ellis, 2002; Lavie, Ro & Russell, 2003; 
Young, Ellis, Flude, McWeeney & Hay, 1986). This opens the possibility that 
Boutet et al (2002) failed to manipulate relevant processing capacity away from 
the study faces as a consequence of the stimulus set used. 
This notion receives support from another study that investigated holistic face 
encoding. Palermo & Rhodes (2002) asked participants to study a central face 
under full attention, or to match two upright or two inverted flanker faces while 
studying the central target in a divided attention condition. A speeded two-choice 
recognition test followed at the end of each trial, consisting of two intact faces, the 
target and a foil face that differed from the target by one feature (e. g. a pair of 
eyes), or two isolated exemplars of a particular feature, one of which was extracted 
from the target. The results showed a whole-to-part recognition advantage for face 
targets under full attention, indicating that the targets were encoded holistically. 
Intriguingly, matching upright flanker faces eliminated this advantage but 
matching inverted flankers did not, even though the latter was more time- 
consuming. Palermo & Rhodes (2002) concluded that attention is important for 
encoding facial configuration, but that there might be two distinct processing 
systems (for similar claims see e. g. Farah et al, 1995; Moscovitch et al, 1997) 
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perhaps even with their own dedicated attentional capacities. The first reflects an 
object recognition system dedicated to processing individual facial features but 
also inverted faces and nonface objects. The other system is used for holistic face 
processing. Matching the inverted faces thus left sufficient capacity for the holistic 
encoding of the central face target because they did not consume any holistic 
resources. 
1.3.3 OTHER TYPES OF FACIAL INFORMATION 
One aspect that is consistently ignored by the studies reviewed in the previous 
section is that faces convey much more information than just identity, such as sex, 
emotional expression and facial speech. Models of face recognition specify 
functionally independent processing routes for these types of information (e. g. 
Bruce & Young, 1986). Thus it is not necessary, for example, to recognize 
someone as familiar to determine his or her sex or facial expression. In support of 
this architecture, there is now evidence for dissociations between sex and 
expression (Le Gal & Bruce, 2002), sex and identity (Bruce, Ellis, Gibling & 
Young, 1987; Ellis, Young & Flude, 1990), sex and facial speech (Green, Kuhl, 
Meltzoff & Stevens, 1991), facial speech and identity (Campbell, De Gelder & De 
Haan, 1996; Campbell, Landis & Regard, 1986), and identity and expression (e. g. 
Campbell, Brooks, De Haan & Roberts, 1996; Humphreys, Donnelly & Riddoch, 
1993; Sergent, Ohta, MacDonald & Zuck, 1994). Moreover, Calder, Young, 
Keane & Dean (2000) showed that face stimuli that are composed of two different 
emotional expressions, such as the top section of an angry face and the bottom 
section of a happy face, are subject to the composite effect (see Young et al, 1987). 
Thus, subjects were slower in recognizing the separate expressions when both 
sections were closely aligned than when they were misaligned. An analogous but 
24 
independent effect was also found for facial identity when different persons posed 
for these expressions. This indicates that dissociable types of facial information are 
coded by different configural processes. 
The notion that identity and expression are functionally independent has also been 
the subject of some controversy. Schweinberger & Soukup (1998) re-examined the 
extent to which these dimensions could be processed independently, by selectively 
introducing variations in one dimension during the classification of another. They 
found that identity decisions were not influenced by variations in expression, but 
that expression decisions were slowed by variations in identity. Thus, observers 
could not attend selectively to expression without interference from identity 
information. Schweinberger & Soukup (1998) were unable to combine these 
findings with existing research in favour of a bi-directional processing 
independence between identity and expression (e. g. Campbell et al, 1996; 
Humphreys et al, 1993; Sergent et al, 1994). Yet, in subsequent research they 
succeeded in producing further support of an asymmetric relationship 
(Schweinberger, Burton & Kelly, 1999). 
On the whole then, there is evidence that different types of facial information can 
be extracted independently and that at least some of these types, such as 
expression and identity, may also be coded separately in faces. Although this issue 
is convoluted by recent reports of an asymmetric dependency between identity and 
expression, the notion of a functional independence between these dimensions 
raises an intriguing question. If attention is important for holistic face encoding, 
then is it also required to integrate identity and expression information within the 
same face percept during visual processing? 
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1.4 Capacity limits in face processing 
As described above, there is good evidence that (upright) face processing is 
particularly dependent on holistic information (e. g. Carey & Diamond, 1977, 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Valentine & Bruce, 1986; Yin, 1969), and that processing 
upright faces but not inverted faces (Palermo & Rhodes, 2002) or nonface objects 
(Boutet et al, 2002) disrupts the holistic encoding of another face. One implication 
of these results is that face processing may have its own processing limits. There 
are two lines in support of this premise. The first line suggests that people may be 
unable to ignore a solitary face distractor during the classification of a nonface 
target, even under conditions that usually extinguish distractor processing. The 
second line hints that face processing may be subject to capacity limits in multiple 
face displays. 
Several studies have shown that task-irrelevant face distractors are processed 
reliably with a concurrently presented nonface target. Young, Ellis, Flude, 
McWeeney & Hay (1986) examined interference effects with displays composed 
of a printed famous name and a famous face in a response-competition task. 
Participants were required to classify the names as pop-stars or politicians while 
ignoring the face distractor, which could be congruent (e. g. Mick Jagger's name 
and Mick Jagger's face) or incongruent with the correct response (e. g. Neil 
Kinnock's name and Mick Jagger's face). They found reliable distractor 
congruency effects, suggesting that subjects could not prevent semantic 
categorization of the distractor faces. 
Lavie, Ro & Russell (2003) employed a variation of this paradigm to examine the 
effect of perceptual load on distractor processing. The subjects' task was to 
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categorize famous names as pop-stars or politicians while ignoring a flanking face 
distractor. In addition, task-relevant load was manipulated by embedding the name 
targets in displays of one (lowest load condition) to eight letter strings (highest 
load condition). Response times increased with the number of letter strings, 
indicating that task-relevant load was successfully manipulated. Remarkably 
though, the magnitude of face interference was unaffected by variations in relevant 
load. Furthermore, interference from nonface distractors such as photographs of 
fruits and musical instruments was extinguished with increasing task-relevant load 
in a similar task. These results led Lavie et al (2003) to suggest that face 
processing does not depend on any general capacity limits. 
Comparable conclusions can be drawn from another study, in which subjects were 
presented with letter strings that were superimposed on photographs of famous 
face distractors under different load conditions (Jenkins, Burton & Ellis, 2002). 
Under low-load, subjects responded to the colour of the letter string, a task that 
poses minimal attentional demands (e. g. Treisman, 1993). In a high load condition, 
on the other hand, subjects were required to identify a specific letter target in the 
string, a manipulation that has previously been shown to eliminate distractor 
processing (e. g. Lavie, 1995). Distractor processing was then assessed with a 
surprise memory test for the names of the famous faces (e. g. "was Bill Clinton 
presented? ") and with repetition priming, which is a facilitation in identifying an 
item due to prior exposure to that item. Although explicit face memory strongly 
deteriorated under high load, repetition priming was equivalent across conditions. 
In addition, there have been a number of reports of prosopagnosic patients who, 
despite being explicitly unable to recognize familiar faces, nevertheless show the 
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normal pattern of face interference when asked to make semantic classifications of 
names (e. g. de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1987; Sergent & Signoret, 1992b). 
Collectively, these findings suggests that face processing is very robust across 
different manipulations, and even under conditions that should make this difficult, 
as long as only a single face is presented at a time. However, these results do not 
imply that face processing is capacity free. In fact, Lavie et al (2003) cautioned 
that face processing might be subject to its own capacity limits. 
One source of evidence for face processing limits comes from visual search tasks. 
These studies demonstrate that search for a unique face target, such as a particular 
face or facial expression, among inverted or scrambled face distractors or upright 
faces with non-target expressions generates steep search slopes with increasing 
display size (e. g. Brown, Huey & Findlay, 1997; Kuehn & Jolicoeur, 1994; 
Nothdurft, 1993). This suggests that face processing limits are severe enough to 
require sequential identification of the items in these displays. However, what is 
neglected by these studies is that the number of stimuli that can be perceived 
simultaneously also depends on visual acuity, which is highest in the centre of the 
retina (the fovea) but falls off rapidly towards the periphery (see e. g. Anstis, 1974; 
Curcio & Allen, 1990). Subjects may thus have to foveate across different 
locations in visual search displays, in particular when large set sizes reinforce 
small individual items (as in Brown et al, 1997; Kuehn & Jolicoeur, 1994; 
Nothdurft, 1993). In fact, Näsänen & Ojanpää (2004) measured eye movements 
during visual search with faces, and found that only two to four faces can be 
processed during a single eye fixation. Serial search functions for multiple face 
arrays might therefore only reflect the limits of visual acuity. 
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Boutet & Chaudhuri (2001) examined face processing in a paradigm that is 
unlikely to suffer from visual acuity. Observers were shown stimuli composed of 
two overlapping faces, one rotated 45° clockwise and the other 45° 
counterclockwise, and had to indicate whether they could perceive both faces as 
whole and visibly independent entities. This was immediately followed by a test 
display of two rows of four faces, with each row containing one of the targets. 
When upright overlapping faces were used, only one of the faces was subsequently 
recognized. Two inverted faces, on the other hand, were perceived as an 
ambiguous combination of both. These results are logically similar to Palermo & 
Rhodes's (2002) findings, reviewed earlier, that only matching upright but not 
inverted flanker faces impairs the (holistic) processing of a central face target. As 
typical face processes are disrupted by inversion, these studies hint at a processing 
limit for upright faces that is independent of any general processing limits. 
It should be noted that Boutet & Chaudhuri (2001) used a hypothetical situation 
that our face processing system is not usually confronted with. Palermo & Rhodes 
(2002), on the other hand, presented the flanker displays for substantial durations 
of Z 1.5 seconds that may have aided serial face processing. These studies may 
have also used an inappropriate recognition test to examine face processing, as 
stimuli may still undergo considerable processing when explicit memory is poor 
(see e. g. Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Driver, 1988). In fact, a recent priming study 
indicates that distractor faces might still be processed during a face matching task. 
Khurana (2000) asked participants to match the second and fourth face in a row of 
five faces while ignoring the three remaining distractor faces. When the distractors 
were presented as targets on a subsequent trial, negative priming was found. 
However, the three distractors were always identical and subjects were presumably 
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scanning across the central distractor (the third face in a row of five) to match the 
two targets, a situation that is not dissimilar to Palermo & Rhodes's (2002) task. 
Moreover, targets and distractors were always presented until a response was 
registered. Under those conditions the faces could have been processed 
sequentially, again making it difficult to specify any exact face processing limits. 
Jenkins, Lavie & Driver (2003) also examined the processing of multiple face 
distractors, but under better-controlled conditions than Khurana (2000). Subjects 
categorized the printed names of pop-stars or politicians in displays that were only 
presented for 200 ms (i. e. too briefly to permit stimulus-responsive saccades), 
while ignoring a critical famous face distractor that could be congruent or 
incongruent with the target response. An additional response-neutral distractor 
(neither pop-star nor politician) of an upright face, a phase-shifted version, an 
inverted face, or a meaningful nonface object could also be present in the display. 
They found that interference from the critical face distractor could be diluted by a 
response-neutral face distractor, but not by any other stimuli. In other words, the 
processing of a distractor face seemed to be reduced by competition from another 
face, but not by general competition from different classes of stimuli. 
Despite the recurrence of this notion, Jenkins et al (2003) also obtained some 
evidence that face processing does not proceed entirely independent of general 
processing resources. When they repeated this design with object names as targets 
and critical object distractors, they found that distractor interference could be 
diluted by the addition of any visual stimulus, including faces. In turn, it is thus 
possible that face distractors processing is partly determined by task-relevant 
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nonface load, which makes it also difficult to make a direct inference about face 
capacity limits from this study. 
In summary, there is good evidence that faces are processed reliably alongside 
nonface stimuli, provided that only a single face is presented at a time (e. g. Jenkins 
et al, 2002; Lavie et al, 2003; Young et al, 1986), suggesting that face processing 
may proceed largely independent of any general processing limits. There is also a 
growing body of research hinting that face processing is not capacity-free, but may 
be limited in multi-face displays (e. g. Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2002; Jenkins et al, 2003). However, none of these studies were originally 
designed to examine capacity limits in face processing and none have tested such 
limits directly. Hence it is difficult to specify the exact nature of any capacity 
limits in face processing. 
1.5 Attention biases to faces 
Another question of current interest concerns the influence that faces have on an 
observer's focus of attention. Evidence from visual search shows that particular 
faces or facial expression do not pop-out of crowded face arrays (Brown et al, 
1997; Kuehn & Jolicoeur, 1994; Nothdurft, 1993). This suggests that faces do not 
capture attention in multiple face displays. However, there is some evidence that 
faces may capture attention in competition with other classes of stimuli. 
Vuilleumier (2000) studied neuropsychological patients with unilateral visual 
extinction following brain damage to the right parietal lobe. This deficit is 
characterized by impaired report of stimuli in the contralesional (left) hemifield 
when competing stimuli are presented on the ipsilesional side, although neglect 
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patients can still detect stimuli on the contralesional side when they are presented 
alone. Vuilleumier (2000) utilized this deficit to investigate whether face stimuli 
are less affected by visual neglect in comparison with other stimuli. He found that 
visual extinction was reduced for left-sided faces in comparison with meaningless 
shapes, scrambled faces and names when competing stimuli were presented in the 
other hemifield. Consequently, Vuilleumier (2000) suggested that faces might 
possess an advantage in capturing attention and overcoming extinction. 
Mack, Pappas, Silverman & Gay (2002) also provide some evidence that faces 
capture attention. They presented subjects with a stream of visual items presented 
at a rate of 75 ms/item. Subjects had to identify a line drawing of any of five 
primary targets (heart, bell, fish, apple, teardrop) within this stream and detect the 
presence of a closely following secondary target of a happy face icon, an inverted 
happy face icon, or a tree shape. Under these conditions, the face targets were 
detected approximately 90% of the time compared to the inverted faces and trees 
which were only detected on between 40-70% of trials. 
Although the use of rather artificial face stimuli in these studies offers little insight 
into the processing of real faces, which are visually more complex and 
informative, others have reported a similar advantage for photographs of faces. Ro, 
Russel & Lavie (2001) alternated displays that were composed of meaningful 
objects (appliances, clothes, food, musical instruments, and plants) and a solitary 
human face with blank screens, so that the stimulus displays appeared to flicker. 
During these alternations, one of the items could suddenly change into another 
exemplar from the same category. Results indicated that changes were detected 
more rapidly and accurately in faces than in any of the other objects, an advantage 
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that disappeared when all stimuli were inverted. Consequently, Ro et al (2001) 
concluded that real faces also have a special capacity for drawing attention. 
However, Palermo & Rhodes (2003) contested this interpretation, instead 
reasoning that these results might reflect an "odd-one-out" advantage as Ro et al 
(2001) only ever presented one face among a range of nonface objects. In support 
of this idea, they found a similar change detection advantage when a single 
nonface object was embedded among several face stimuli. Intriguingly though, 
they failed to replicate Ro et al's (2001) original findings despite using the same 
method and stimulus set. Nonetheless, these results suggest that faces behave 
similar to other objects in a change detection task. Therefore, despite several 
attempts to demonstrate attention biases to faces, there is no compelling evidence 
that realistic face stimuli capture attention. 
Nonetheless, there is also some mixed evidence that the ability to capture attention 
might depend on the type of face stimuli used. Eastwood, Smilek & Merikle 
(2001) found shallower search slopes for a sad face icon among neutral face 
distractors than for a happy face icon. They concluded that emotion information 
may be perceived outside the focus of attention and can be used to guide that focus 
to a particular face. Angry schematic faces are also detected very efficiently in 
visual search, although they do not pop-out (Fox, Lester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler & 
Dutton, 2000). In addition, it has been shown that trait-anxious subjects respond 
faster to a target probe when its location is correctly cued by an angry face, an 
effect that has been attributed to an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in 
these individuals (e. g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999). 
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Emotional expression may also affect the attentional dwell-time or the 
disengagement of attention from faces. Eastwood, Smilek & Merikle (2003) 
showed that subjects were slower to count upturned and downturned arches in a 
display when these were embedded in faces with negative as opposed to positive 
expressions. Other studies show that trait-anxious or trait-angry individuals also 
have particular difficulty in disengaging attention from threatening faces (e. g. 
Bradley et al, 1998; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 
2002; van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout & Stam, 2001). For example, Fox 
et al (2001) found that responses to a dot probe were delayed in trait-anxious 
individuals compared to normal subjects, but only when a threatening face 
incorrectly cued the probe location. In contrast, response times were evenly 
matched for neutral and happy face cues. Thus, there is evidence that faces may 
have some limited ability to seize attention, depending on their emotional 
connotation and probably also the emotional state of the observer. However, 
although several studies report similar biases with threatening words and pictures 
(e. g. Amir et al, 2003; Fox et al, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), expressive faces 
have never been compared directly with other stimulus classes within the same 
experiment. Hence it is unresolved whether a general disengagement bias exists 
for faces compared to other classes of stimuli, independent of threat-related 
information and observers' emotional traits. 
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the relation between attention and face 
processing across different selection mechanisms. The first experimental chapter 
examined whether observers can selectively respond to facial expression and 
identity, by measuring the effect of systematic variations in one of these 
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dimensions on the classification times of the other dimension (Experiments 1& 2). 
Although there is already substantial evidence for the functional independence of 
these types of facial information, this idea has recently been challenged in a 
similar task (Schweinberger et al, 1999; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). This is 
followed by an attempt to determine whether attention is required to encode 
expression and identity information from the same face into a multi-dimensional 
visual percept (Experiment 3). To assess this, a response-competition task was 
used in which subjects classified face targets according to particular identity- 
expression conjunctions while ignoring two distractor faces. Response-critical 
identity and expression information was either combined in one of these 
distractors (the conjunctive condition) or dispersed across both (the disjunctive 
condition). Distractor congruency effects on target response times were then 
contrasted for these conditions to determine if correct conjunction information was 
available under inattention. 
A response-competition task was used again in Chapter 3, but now to establish 
capacity limits in face processing. This was done by comparing interference from 
face and nonface distractors during the classification of face and nonface targets. 
The first experiment used speeded sex judgements to unfamiliar faces and short 
names (Experiment 4). Subsequent experiments employed semantic judgements to 
famous faces and famous names (Experiment 5), famous faces and pictures of 
national flags (Experiments 6& 7), and a combination of both (Experiment 8). 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to provide a stricter test for face processing limits. It 
has been shown that nonface distractors can still give rise to priming when they do 
not interfere with target classification (Driver & Tipper, 1989). Chapter 4 therefore 
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investigated capacity limits in face processing by measuring distractor priming 
from multiple-item displays. Two experiments assessed the effect of face and flag 
target processing on face distractor priming (Experiments 9& 10). A third priming 
study used face-like and face-unlike nonface targets to explore the visual 
properties that may be responsible for eliciting face processing limits (Experiment 
11). 
The final empirical chapter investigated attention biases for faces in comparison 
with a range of nonface objects in a simple detection task. Over three experiments, 
subjects were required to shift attentional resources from the location of a face or a 
nonface distractor to the location of a peripheral line target (Experiments 12-14). 
Contrasting the effects of different distractor types on target RTs was then used to 
assess attentional disengagement. A final study examined attentional engagement 
by faces and nonface objects. The target and distractor locations were now 
switched so that the subjects were attending to the target at the start of each trial, 
while the distractors were presented in the visual periphery (Experiment 15). 
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Chapter 2 Dissociating and Integrating Facial 
Expression and Identity 
Introduction 
Established models of face recognition postulate separate parallel routes for the 
processing of different categories of facial information, such as sex, emotional 
expression and identity (notably, Bruce & Young, 1986). In particular, the idea 
that identity and expression are dissociable cognitive functions has been supported 
by a number of observations from a range of methodologies. These include 
neurological studies demonstrating double dissociations in brain-injured 
participants (e. g. Humphreys, Donnelly & Riddoch, 1993; Parry, Young, Saul & 
Moss, 1991; Schweinberger, Klos & Sommer, 1995; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, 
Small & Hay, 1993), functional imaging studies showing spatially-dissociable 
areas of brain activation during the processing of expression and identity (George 
et al, 1993; Sergent, Ohta, MacDonald & Zuck, 1994), and cognitive studies of 
neurologically normal participants, which have shown that observers can 
selectively attend to facial expression and identity in time-stressed categorization 
tasks (Bruce, 1986; Calder, Young, Keane & Dean, 2000; Campbell, Brooks, de 
Haan & Roberts, 1996; Young, McWeeney, Hay & Ellis, 1986a). 
Recently, however, the idea that expression and identity processing are 
functionally independent has become the subject of some controversy. Using 
Garner's (1974,1976) selective attention paradigm, Schweinberger & Soukup 
(1998) re-examined whether facial expression and identity can be dissociated in a 
speeded categorization task. Within this paradigm, introduced in detail later, 
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identity information was processed independent of facial expression but 
contributed to expression analysis, an intriguing asymmetric relationship among 
the perception of facial identity and expression. 
In a subsequent study, Schweinberger, Burton & Kelly (1999) examined whether 
such a relationship is related to differences in processing speed. If identity is 
perceived faster than facial expression, then variations in identity may be more 
likely to affect expression processing than vice versa. To manipulate processing 
speeds, Schweinberger et al (1999) employed a morphing technique to create a 
photographic continuum between two faces. Depending on the percentage 
contribution of each original face within any point along this continuum (e. g. 30% 
versus 70%, 20% versus 80%, etc. ), morphs were consistently categorized as the 
facial identity contributing the most. In contrast, classification RTs increased along 
and peaked towards the middle of the continuum (i. e. the point where each of the 
originals contributes 50% to the new image). Thus, when two different person's 
faces with the same expression were morphed, recognition of identity and 
expression remained relatively unaffected but identity classification times reflected 
the decreased perceptual salience of the stimuli. Likewise, if two images of one 
person depicting different expressions were morphed, expression RTs correlated 
with the morphing continuum. In this way, Schweinberger et al (1999) selectively 
manipulated the processing speed of expression and identity. However, despite this 
manipulation the asymmetric relationship first observed by Schweinberger & 
Soukup (1998) persisted, suggesting that differences in processing speed cannot 
account for a functional dependence between these types of facial information. 
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Intriguingly, Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) claims have received little 
support from other face perception studies with Garner's technique. Etcoff (1984) 
measured participants' ability to sort cards depicting different expressions and 
identities, but found that expression and identity were classified without 
interference from the other. Deprived of advanced timing systems, however, 
Etcoff (1984) used a manual stopwatch to record sorting times. According to 
Schweinberger & Soukup (1998), this might account for the discrepancies between 
Etcoff's (1984) results and their own study, in which reaction times were 
measured with millisecond accuracy. However, similarly to Etcoff's (1984) 
findings, Le Gal & Bruce (2002) assessed the independence of sex and expression 
judgements to faces with the Garner technique and found that both dimensions 
were processed independently. As there is evidence that sex classification also 
proceeds independent of identification (e. g. Bruce, Ellis, Gibling & Young, 1987; 
Ellis, Young & Flude, 1990), these findings do not rule out an interaction between 
expression and identity processing. Therefore, they do not provide sufficient 
evidence to dismiss Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) reports. The important 
point, as far as the present study is concerned, is that an asymmetric processing- 
dependence between facial expression and identity has previously not been found 
with other methodologies, nor with Garner's technique, nor have analogous effects 
been observed with other face processing routes within Garner's paradigm. Thus, 
the purpose of Experiments 1&2 was to investigate the validity of Schweinberger 
et al's (1998,1999) claims. Closer examination of these studies suggests that their 
response pattern may have resulted from asymmetric treatment effects within the 
paradigm. In the remainder of the introduction Garner's paradigm is outlined and 
these treatment effects are then discussed in detail. 
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GARNER' S SELECTIVE ATTENTION PARADIGM 
Garner (1974,1976) originally devised this paradigm to examine whether basic 
object properties, such as form and colour, require shared or independent 
processing resources. More specifically, he asked whether selective attention to a 
task-relevant stimulus dimension is possible when variation is added to a second 
task-irrelevant dimension. If both dimensions are separable, then selective 
attention to a relevant dimension should be possible regardless of variations in 
irrelevant information. In a typical Garner experiment, participants are required to 
make speeded two-choice judgements to four types of stimuli, consisting of the 
crossing of two exemplars each of two distinct stimulus dimensions. For example, 
if the dimensions are colour and shape, participants are instructed to classify 
colour while ignoring the shape of a stimulus, or to ignore colour while classifying 
shape. 
During classification, these stimuli are presented in three experimental conditions. 
In the control condition, stimuli vary along the relevant dimension while the 
irrelevant dimension remains constant. To illustrate, in a colour categorization task 
participants may be shown a block of only squares and a second block of only 
circles, and the stimuli in both blocks must be classified as either green or blue. In 
the orthogonal condition, stimuli vary along relevant and irrelevant dimensions. 
So, for example, blue squares, green squares, blue circles, and green circles are 
intermixed within one block. In the correlated condition, relevant and irrelevant 
information is covaried; for example, only green squares and blue circles. 
The influence of the irrelevant dimension on the relevant one is determined by 
contrasting performance across these three conditions. Increased RTs in the 
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orthogonal condition in comparison with the control condition show that task- 
irrelevant information interferes with the classification of the task-relevant 
dimension. This is an indication that both dimensions are processed in an integral 
manner. In contrast, comparable RTs for control and orthogonal condition suggest 
that both dimensions are dissociable and processed separately. Garner also claimed 
that faster RTs in the correlated compared to the control condition can be 
interpreted as evidence for integral processing of two stimulus dimensions, a so- 
called redundancy gain. This advantage apparently arises due to the invariant 
combination of relevant and irrelevant information, which facilitates the 
perception of both dimensions as a unitary event. However, redundancy gains may 
also arise when participants strategically choose to process the easier of two 
correlated dimensions, relevant or irrelevant. Consequently, redundancy may be 
used to support claims for the integral processing of two dimensions, but is not 
sufficient to establish such claims. 
ASYMMETRIC TREATMENT EFFECTS WITHIN THE GARNER PARADIGM 
A major disadvantage of Garner experiments is that they can be sensitive to 
asymmetric treatment effects. Schweinberger et al (1999) eliminated one such 
effect as a possible explanation for an asymmetric dependency between identity 
and expression, that is, relative differences in processing speed of both face 
dimensions. Yet, these studies contain several other potential asymmetric 
treatment effects that merit further examination. 
i) Picture-based response cues versus face-related information 
One criticism of Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) studies is the use of an 
extremely limited stimulus set. Schweinberger & Soukup (1998) used a total of 
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just four faces (2 identities x2 expressions), and Schweinberger et al (1999) used 
the same number of stimuli to create twenty-eight morphed faces. These sets were 
repeated over 600 and 280 trials in the respective studies. As a consequence of 
excessive repetition, subjects might have developed alternative task strategies 
rather than engaging in typical face processes. Pictures of a person may, for 
example, bear superficial similarities such as image brightness and colour 
contrasts (see Figure 2.1 overleaf). Such similarities could result from all images 
of one person being taken under particular lighting conditions on the same day or 
even the same time of day. If such similarities are salient and correlated with 
identity, then participants might learn to distinguish both stimulus identities on the 
basis of these picture-based characteristics. And if such salient cues intrude on the 
classification of expression, even if participants can usually attend selectively to 
expression without interference from identity information, then this might produce 
the orthogonal interference reported by Schweinberger et al (1998,1999). 
Crucially, facial expressions are less likely to correlate with picture-based cues 
because they are displayed by both identities. Thus, by facilitating identity but not 
expression classification, picture-based cues may have contributed to an 
asymmetric response pattern. 
ii) Internal features versus external features 
The use of a limited stimulus set raises another potential problem as faces contain 
a variety of cues to identity. These include the spatial relation of internal features 
(e. g. eyes, nose, mouth), which can communicate very subtle but unique 
differences between people (e. g. Haig, 1984; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Valentine 
& Bruce, 1986), and external features, such as hairstyle and face outline, which 
can change frequently and may be shared by different people. Whereas external 
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cues are insufficient to distinguish between the many faces encountered in 
everyday life, in an experiment with a limited set size they might provide a salient 
and simple strategy to classify identity (see Figure 2.1). Comparable cues for the 
classification of expression would be unavailable. Akin to picture-based cues, 
external feature processing could thus contribute to an asymmetric relationship by 
providing identity-correlated information that may intrude on expression 
perception. 
Schweinberger et al, 1999 
Figure 2.1 Examples of the stimuli used by Scheinberger & Soukup (1998) and 
Schweinberger et al (1999). The photographs reveal a number of picture-based identity 
cues and external features that may have been exacerbated by the use of a small stimulus 
set. These include differences in luminance (2,5), in hairstyle (2,3) and in face outline (for 
example, note the presence and absence of ears; 1,4,6). 
iii) Effects of face familiarity 
The potential contribution of external identity cues within the Garner paradigm 
also draws attention to the role of face familiarity. It is well established that 
different processes are involved in recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces (e. g. 
Burton, Wilson, Cowan & Bruce, 1999; Hancock, Bruce & Burton, 2000). 
Although we may rely on external features, such as hairstyle and face outline, to 
identify well-known people, familiar faces are primarily recognized from internal 
facial features (e. g. Ellis, Shepherd & Davis, 1979; Young, Hay, McWeeney, 
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Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998 
Flude & Ellis, 1985). Unfamiliar person recognition, on the other hand, tends to 
rely more on those prominent external features (Bruce, Henderson, Greenwood, 
Hancock, Burton & Miller, 1999; Ellis et al, 1979; Young et al, 1985). 
Consequently, one might expect external identity cues to influence expression 
classification particularly when unfamiliar faces are used. Alternatively, facial 
identity might only interfere with expression if participants are capable of 
distinguishing between the stimulus identities. Yet, this may not be the case with 
unfamiliar faces even when external identity cues are available. Face familiarity 
might thus play a crucial role in understanding asymmetric interactions between 
identity and expression. Notably, Schweinberger and associates (1998,1999) 
failed to specify face familiarity in their studies. Consequently, it remains 
unresolved whether their findings reflect general face processes or more specific 
processes related to either unfamiliar or familiar face processing. 
iv) Asymmetric increases in task-relevant information 
A fourth problem within the Garner paradigm are asymmetric increases in task- 
relevant information. As alluded to earlier, integrated processing of two task 
dimensions is primarily assessed within this paradigm by increasing the ratio of 
task-irrelevant to relevant information in the orthogonal condition. This is 
achieved by presenting stimuli in this condition that vary along both, the relevant 
and irrelevant task dimension. Although such an increase in information may leave 
the amount of task-relevant information intact when simple shapes and colours are 
used, expression and identity information may be coded by to some extent 
overlapping physical features. In other words, increases in irrelevant information 
in the orthogonal condition may be accompanied by analogous increases in 
relevant information. This is problematic if participants use substantially different 
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strategies for expression and identity classification. For example, if identity is 
classified on the basis of external features or picture-based cues, then this may not 
be overly affected by increasing irrelevant information in the orthogonal condition, 
as the distinctive physical feature remains relatively intact across different images. 
To the contrary, the same expression can show considerable variation within as 
well as between different persons. Unlike identity, increasing irrelevant 
information in the orthogonal condition may thus increase relevant information 
when expression is classified. If this results in an increase in task difficulty, one 
might predict Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) asymmetric response pattern. 
However, this would not reflect orthogonal interference from the task-irrelevant 
dimension, and should not be interpreted as a functional dependency between 
independent processing routes. 
In summary, Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) studies contain several potential 
confounds that may have contributed to an asymmetric response pattern within 
Garner's selective attention methodology. These are: i) a severely limited stimulus 
set, which may have enabled participants to perform identity categorizations on the 
basis of salient picture characteristics; ii) similarly, the use of external features for 
identity classifications; iii) effects of face familiarity; and iv) asymmetric increases 
in task difficulty between identity and expression in the orthogonal condition, 
especially if identity-correlated task strategies were available. The aim of the 
present experiments was to investigate whether an asymmetric relationship 
between expression and identity persist when the potential impact of these 
confounds is reduced. To address these concerns, the current experiments used a 
variation of Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) task. To discourage the use of 
picture-based response cues during the classification of identity, a substantially 
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larger stimulus set was now used, consisting of 120 different images. To diminish 
the influence of external features on identity classification, the stimuli consisted of 
faces photographed from a variety of viewpoints and, on half of all pictures, with a 
cap to disguise hairstyle. Because of this large and varied set - each stimulus was 
only encountered once during the experimental trials of each condition - these 
changes were also designed to eliminate asymmetric increases in task difficulty 
from the control to the orthogonal condition. Finally, to examine the influence of 
face familiarity, identity and expression processing was contrasted across two 
experiments with participants who were unfamiliar (Experiment 1) and familiar 
with the stimulus identities (Experiment 2). 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined whether the processing of facial expression is contingent 
on facial identity information within the Garner paradigm, as was suggested by 
Schweinberger et al (1998,1999). Rather than revealing a novel functional 
architecture of identity and expression processing, these findings might reflect 
asymmetric treatment effects within this paradigm. To address this, the present 
experiment employed a variation of Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) task. Faces 
were classified according to either expression or identity, while ignoring the other 
dimension. However, in order to prevent asymmetric treatment effects, a large and 
varied stimulus set, consisting of 120 digital photographs, was used. In addition, to 
investigate effects of face familiarity all participants were unfamiliar with the 
stimulus identities presented in this experiment. If expression processing is 
affected by task-irrelevant variations of identity in unfamiliar face processing, then 
an asymmetric interaction analogous to the one reported by Schweinberger et al 
(1998,1999) should be found. On the other hand, if previous findings reflect 
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asymmetric treatment effects and if observers can selectively attend to these types 
of facial information, then variations in identity should not interfere with 
expression processing. 
Method 
Subjects Thirty-six undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, whose 
ages ranged from 18-25 years, volunteered to participate in the experiment for a 
small fee. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision and were unfamiliar 
with the faces they were to encounter in the Experiment. 
Stimuli & Apparatus An Apple Macintosh computer presented the stimuli and 
recorded responses using SuperLab 1.74. Digital photographs of two male 
employees from the Psychology department at the University of Glasgow served 
as stimuli. Each model posed for portraits of two emotional expressions (happy & 
angry) from three different viewpoints (full-face, left, right). To add variation, 
head-shifts were performed unrestrained during the recording of these images. In 
addition, both models posed with a cap on half of all photographs to disguise 
hairstyle (see Figure 2.2 overleaf). In total, 120 photographs were taken with a Fuji 
FinePix6800 digital camera, consisting of five images under each level of identity 
(Person A vs. Person B), facial expression (happy vs. angry), viewpoint (full-face, 
left, right), and hairstyle (cap vs. no cap). These images were displayed in 
greyscale at a size of 4.5 cm x 6.0 cm. 
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Figure 2.2 Example displays from Experiment 1. The target set contained two identities, 
Person A and Person B, depicted from a variety of viewpoints and wearing a cap on 50% 
of trials to disguise hairstyle. The faces displayed angry facial expressions (see left two 
columns) and happy facial expressions (right two columns). 
Design The experiment had a2x3 mixed design, with the between-subjects 
variable of group at two levels (identity vs. expression classification) and 
condition at three levels (correlated, control, orthogonal). Dependent measures 
were reaction times (RTs) and error percentages. 
Procedure The procedure for the identity task was as follows. Prior to the main 
task, the 18 participants in this group were shown 3 colour photographs (full-face, 
left, right) of each identity, printed out and mounted on card, for approximately 30 
seconds for familiarisation purposes. Participants were then told that the task 
involved making identity decisions as quickly and as accurately as possible to the 
faces of these persons presented on a computer screen. In addition, subjects were 
emphatically instructed to ignore facial expression. Each trial began with a central 
fixation cross, displayed for 1500 ms. This was replaced by a face stimulus, which 
remained visible until a response had been made. Following a response, the face 
was replaced by the fixation cross, marking the start of the next trial. Subjects 
were requested to respond by pressing the "D" or the "L" key on a standard 
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Person A, angry Person B, happy 
computer keyboard. Button-press latencies were measured from stimulus onset and 
feedback for incorrect responses was given immediately by a short warning tone. 
All subjects underwent 2 consecutive blocks for each of the three conditions. For 
the correlated condition, the 1$` block contained happy faces of Person A and angry 
faces of Person B, and the 2°d block contained angry faces of Person A and happy 
faces of Person B. In the control condition, the 15` block contained happy faces of 
both Persons A and B, and the 2°d block contained angry faces of Persons A and B. 
In the orthogonal condition, all possible combinations of expression and identity 
were presented within both blocks. Each of the six blocks consisted of 20 practice 
and 60 experimental trials. Thus, with a stimulus set of 120 images, each image 
was only encountered once during the experimental trials of each condition. 
However, a third of these images were also encountered during practice. Trial 
order was randomized within each block and the order of conditions was counter- 
balanced across all subjects. Subjects could rest between blocks, initiating the next 
block by pressing the space bar. 
The same procedure was used for the expression classification task, except for the 
following changes. The 18 participants in this group were also familiarized with 
the face identities but were instructed to ignore identity while making two-choice 
expression decisions. In addition, the composition of the correlated and orthogonal 
conditions remained the same, but the control condition now contained happy and 
angry faces of Person A in one block, and happy and angry faces of Person B in 
the other block. 
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Results 
Errors Error rates were generally low. In the identity group, errors were made on 
4.1% of all correlated trials, 5.6% of all control trials, and 3.5% of all orthogonal 
trials. For the expression group, the error rates were 2.4%, 3.2%, and 3.5% 
respectively. Error rates were not analyzed further. 
RTs: Comparisons between classification tasks across conditions. The median 
correct reaction times (RTs) were computed for each level of group (identity vs. 
expression) and condition (correlated, control, orthogonal). The averages of these 
RTs across subjects are shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 Means of the median reaction times (RTs, in msec) as a function of the Garner 
conditions and group in Experiment 1. Vertical bars represent the positive standard errors 
of the means. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.3, classifications times were faster for identity than 
expression decisions. However, neither the identity nor the expression group 
showed an RT advantage in the control condition in comparison with the 
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Expression 
orthogonal condition, indicating that task-irrelevant information did not influence 
task-relevant processing in this experiment. These observations were confirmed by 
a2 (identity vs. expression) x3 (correlated, control, orthogonal) mixed analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), which showed a main effect of group, F(1,34)=7.31, p<. 05, 
reflecting faster responses to identity than to expression, but no main effect of 
condition, F(2,68)=1.49, and no interaction between group and condition, 
F(2,68)<1. 
RTs: Comparisons within each classification task. Separate 3 (correlated, control, 
orthogonal) x2 (happy vs. angry) x2 (Person A vs. Person B) ANOVAs were 
carried out for each level of group for a more detailed analysis within the Garner 
conditions. The RTs for every combination of these factor levels may be seen in 
Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 Means of the median reaction times (RTs) for every combination of each 
relevant and irrelevant dimension for Experiment 1. A= face of Person A; B= face of 
Person B. 
For identity classifications, no main effects of condition, F(2,34)=1.03, or 
expression were found, F(1,17)<1, again indicating that identity processing was 
unaffected by expression. A main effect of identity, F(1,17)=6.73, p<. 05, is 
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interpreted as reflecting slightly slower RTs to Person A than to Person B across 
all identity conditions. No other comparisons were significant. 
For expression classifications no main effects of condition, F(2,34)=1.43, 
expression, F(1,17)<1, or identity, F(1,17)=2.03, were found. However, a 
significant interaction between identity and condition was observed, F(2,34)=6.15, 
p<. 01. Simple main effect analysis revealed similar RTs for both face identities in 
the correlated condition, F(1,17)<1, but significantly faster RTs to Person A than 
Person B in the control condition, F(1,17)=10.12, p<. 01, and the reverse pattern in 
the orthogonal condition, F(1,17)=24.85, p<. 01. Importantly however, no simple 
main effects of condition were found for either identity (Person A, F(2,34)=1.80; 
Person B, F(2,34)=1.78). Thus, expression classification was not systematically 
affected by variations in identity across the Garner conditions. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 examined recent claims of an asymmetric dependency in face 
processing, such that expression perception may be contingent upon identity 
(Schweinberger et al, 1998,1999). Specifically, the aim was to determine whether 
the response pattern of previous studies might have arisen from asymmetric 
treatments effects within the Garner paradigm. Using a modification of 
Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) design, the current experiment sought to 
diminish the contribution of such effects by using a substantially larger and more 
varied stimulus set. The RT data show that identity classifications were faster than 
expression classifications, which indicates that the facial identity may have been 
more discriminable in the present stimulus set. However, the critical comparisons 
for establishing an interaction between identity and expression processing, those 
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between the control and orthogonal conditions, revealed no significant differences 
for the classification of either face dimension. This indicates that participants were 
able to attend to each dimension selectively, and, at least initially, appears to 
contradict claims of an asymmetric interaction. 
However, Experiment 1 only investigated the processing of unfamiliar faces. 
There is considerable evidence that unfamiliar face processing, in comparison with 
familiar face recognition, may rely particularly on external features for person 
identification, such as hairstyle and face-outline (e. g. Bruce et al, 1999). In the 
introduction it was suggested that such information might have contributed to 
Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) findings if unfamiliar face stimuli were used. 
The current results do not support this idea, although the design involved several 
manipulations to diminish the contribution of external identity cues. Even so, since 
external features provide only an unreliable source of identity information, the 
deduction of external identity cues merely serves to underline the validity of the 
present results. 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 provide support for the hypothesis that identity and 
expression perception are dissociable cognitive functions, albeit only when 
unfamiliar faces are processed. However, an objection could be raised as to 
whether the use of unfamiliar face stimuli is appropriate to investigate the relation 
of expression and identity processing. Although the participants in the identity 
condition were able to distinguish the different faces quickly and with few errors, 
the participants in the expression condition may not have learned to do so. Thus it 
is possible that variations in identity did not interfere with expression classification 
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precisely because the participants in this group had not learned to distinguish the 
task-irrelevant face identities. To assess whether the absence of any interference 
may have been due to this, Experiment 2 used participants that were familiar with 
the stimulus identities. If expression processing is also unaffected by identity 
information from familiar faces, this would provide further support for a functional 
independence between expression and identity within this paradigm. On the other 
hand, if expression processing is contingent on face familiarity, this would provide 
some support for Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) functional interaction. 
Method 
Subjects. Stimuli & 
-Procedure 
Thirty-six new subjects, whose ages ranged from 
21-33 years, volunteered to participate in the unpaid experiment. All subjects were 
postgraduate students or research staff from the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Glasgow and reported normal or corrected to normal vision. The 
subjects were familiar with the face identities they were to encounter in the 
experiment and could identify them without delay prior to the task. Apparatus, 
stimuli and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
Results 
Errors As in Experiment 1, error rates were generally low. In the identity group, 
errors were made on 4.2% of all correlated trials, 4.5% of all control trials, and 
4.6% of all orthogonal trials. For the expression group, the error rates were 2.8%, 
4.6%, and 4.5% respectively. Error rates were not analyzed further. 
RTs: Comparions between classification tasks across conditions. The median 
correct reaction times (RTs) were computed for each level of group (identity vs. 
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expression) and condition (correlated, control, orthogonal). The averages of these 
RTs across subjects are shown in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 Means of the median reaction times (RTs, in msec) as a function of the Garner 
conditions and group in Experiment 2. Vertical bars represent the positive standard errors 
of the means. 
A2 (identity vs. expression) x3 (correlated, control, orthogonal) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of group, F(1,34)=5.52, p<. 05, reflecting faster RTs in the 
identity task than in the expression task, a main effect of condition, F(2,68)=4.54, 
p<. 05, and an almost reliable interaction between group and condition, 
F(2,68)=3.10, p=. 052. As can be seen from Figure 2.5, although RTs were 
noticeably faster in the correlated condition than in the control and orthogonal 
conditions of the expression group, RTs were evenly matched across all conditions 
in the identity group. This was confirmed by a simple main effect of condition 
when making expression decisions, F(2,68)=7.57, p<. 01, but not for identity 
decisions, F(2,68)<1. 
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Expression 
RTs: Comparisons within each classification task. Separate 3 (correlated, control, 
orthogonal) x2 (happy, angry) x2 (Person A, Person B) ANOVAs were carried 
out for each level of group to examine variability across every combination of the 
relevant and irrelevant dimension. The RTs for these combinations are in Figure 
2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 Means of the median reaction times (RTs) for every combination of each 
relevant and irrelevant dimension for Experiment 2. A= face of Person A; B= face of 
Person B. 
For identity classifications, no main effects of condition, F(2,34)<1, expression, 
F(1,17)=1.00, or identity were found, F(1,17)<1. An interaction between 
expression and identity, F(1,17)=6.51, p<. 05, reflects slightly slower RTs for 
angry expressions of Person A than for angry expressions of Person B, 
F(1,17)=6.12, p<. 05, while RTs to happy expressions were more evenly matched, 
F(1,17)=1.41, and an almost reliable difference between happy and angry 
expressions for Person B, F(1,17)=3.94, p=. 06. 
For expression classifications, no main effects of expression, F(1,17)=1.35, or 
identity were found, F(1,17)<1. However, an effect of condition was confirmed, 
F(2,32)=5.17, p<. 05. Newman-Keuls comparisons (alpha = . 05) showed that RTs 
in the correlated condition were significantly different from the control and the 
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orthogonal condition. More importantly, no differences were found between these 
latter conditions. The effect of condition was also modified by an interaction of 
expression and condition, F(2,34)=6.62, p<. 01, reflecting faster RTs to angry than 
to happy expressions in the control condition, F(1,17)=4.78, p<. 05, and the reverse 
pattern in the orthogonal condition, F(1,17)=6.87, p<. 05. In addition, happy 
expressions were classified faster in the correlated condition relative to the control 
condition, Tukey's HSD test, p<. 05. 
A second complex interaction was observed between identity and condition, 
F(2,34)=12.73, p<. 01, reflecting faster RTs to Person A than to Person B in the 
control condition, F(1,17)=17.45, p<. 01, and the reverse pattern in the orthogonal 
condition, F(1,17)=10.61, p<. 01. In addition, simple main effects of condition for 
each identity were found (Person A, F(2,34)=3.92, p<. 05; Person B, F(2,34)= 3.71, 
p<. 05). In depth analysis of these effects revealed faster RTs for Person A in the 
correlated condition in comparison with the orthogonal condition, Tukey's HSD, 
p<. 05, and faster RTs for Person B in the correlated condition in comparison with 
the control condition, Tukey's HSD, P<05- No other comparisons were 
significant. 
As in Experiment 1, the comparisons critical for establishing a functional 
interaction - those between the control and orthogonal conditions - were not 
significant for identity or expression decisions. This result therefore further 
contradicts Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) claims of an asymmetric 
dependency between expression and identity processing, and extends the findings 
of Experiment 1 to familiar faces. In addition, there is some support for the idea 
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that identity and expression are not just dissociable functions but are processed in 
parallel (see e. g. Bruce & Young, 1986). This can be seen from a redundancy gain 
during the classification of expression, reflecting significantly faster RTs in the 
correlated than in the control and the orthogonal condition. As was reviewed 
earlier, redundancy gains may be used to support claims of integral processing 
between two stimulus dimensions, provided that reliable orthogonal interference is 
found. However, in the absence of orthogonal interference, as was the case in this 
experiment, redundancy gains most likely arise when participants use correlated 
irrelevant information to enhance performance. Here, identity decisions were 
consistently faster than expression decisions, which would suggest that it was 
indeed possible to use irrelevant identity information to decrease response times to 
correlated expression decisions. Notably, a similar non-significant redundancy 
pattern was observed during unfamiliar face processing in Experiment 1, which 
suggests that the participants in the expression group may have been able to 
distinguish the task-irrelevant identities to some extent. 
The observation of a redundancy gain is interesting in so far as it is an indication 
of participants' proclivity to employ alternative strategies within the Garner 
paradigm. Thus, it provides some tentative support for the hypothesis that 
participants may have developed alternative strategies to produce an asymmetric 
response pattern in Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) studies. In contrast to those 
studies, the present experiments used a substantially larger and more varied 
stimulus set to reduce the contribution of such strategies. Nonetheless, Experiment 
2 revealed several complex interactions, particularly during the classification of 
facial expression, which suggest that some stimulus groupings may have been 
more discriminable than others. However, similar to the overall response pattern, 
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none of the individual stimulus groupings revealed a functional dependency 
between the processing of expression and identity. 
Therefore, the results of Experiment 1 and now also of Experiment 2 suggest that 
facial expression and identity processing are dissociable cognitive functions. 
Observers can selectively attend to each type of information without interference 
from the other, both during the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
Although these findings contradict recent claims of an asymmetric interaction 
between the processing of identity and expression, they support the long-standing 
view that facial expression and identity are perceived independently and in parallel 
(e. g. Bruce & Young, 1986). 
Experiment 3 
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 converge with numerous claims that 
observers can selectively attend to facial expression and identity (for a review see 
Young, 1998). Furthermore, it is thought that these processes occupy spatially 
dissociable brain areas (e. g. George et al, 1993; Sergent et al, 1994), and rely on 
distinct types of visual information (Calder et al, 2000). However, considering this 
wide-ranging dissociation, it is perhaps surprising that, upon encountering a face, 
expression and identity are perceived as belonging to the same face percept. In 
fact, the perceptual experience of these facial dimensions appears remarkably 
integrated: We can accurately extricate a face's identity and expression without 
confusing them with those from another face. This opens the intriguing question as 
to how dissociable types of facial information are accurately combined within the 
same face percept during visual processing. 
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Outside the face domain, visual attention has long been viewed as a crucial 
resource for full, integrated perception. According to one influential account, 
attention acts like glue during visual encoding that binds different types of 
information belonging to the same stimulus (e. g. Treisman, 1988,1993; Treisman 
& Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982; see also Lavie, 1997). Thereby, 
object features such as colour and shape are perceived independently under 
conditions of inattention, but are combined into a multidimensional, conscious 
percept through focused visual attention. 
So far, the role of attention in face encoding has been considered by just a few 
studies and these have concentrated on only one face dimension - the perception of 
identity (Boutet, Gentes-Hawn & Chaudhuri, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; 
Reinitz, Bartlett & Searcy, 1997; Reinitz, Morrissey & Demb, 1994). All of these 
studies examined whether attention integrates featural (or part-based) facial 
information into holistic percepts, in which these features and their spatial relation 
are captured as an inseparable source of information. This was done by 
manipulating attention to or away from faces during learning and by measuring 
whole/part recognition at a subsequent test phase. As face processing is 
particularly dependent on holistic information (e. g. Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka 
& Sengco, 1997), it seems plausible that distinct facial features, similar to 
Treisman's (1988,1993) object features, might be integrated into holistic percepts 
by attention. However, previous studies failed to produce consistent results, with 
some suggesting that holistic processing requires attentional encoding (Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2002; Reinitz et al, 1994), but others reporting that holistic processing 
proceeds without attention (Boutet et al, 2002; Reinitz et al, 1997). 
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As even immediate memory for faces appears remarkably poor, these studies may 
have suffered from possible memory confounds (see e. g. Simons & Levin, 1998). 
The inconsistencies might also reflect the use of facial features, which were either 
defined in terms of local face characteristics corresponding to particular lexical 
values, such as the eyes, nose and mouth (Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; Reinitz et al, 
1994,1997), or particular face regions, for instance the top versus the bottom face 
half (Boutet et al, 2002). However, this may not be compatible with how facial 
features are actually represented by the brain, which might not be spatially distinct 
but perhaps represent different types of configural face information, such as 
expression and identity (see e. g. Calder et al, 2000). Therefore, if attention is a 
crucial resource for feature encoding in face perception, then it is possible that it 
may be involved in the integration of expression and identity information from the 
same face into a complete percept. To examine this, a variation of Lavie's (1997) 
response competition paradigm was used. 
Similar to Garner's (1974,1976) selective attention methodology, Lavie's (1997) 
paradigm was originally applied to basic object attributes, such as colour and 
shape, to assess the visual integration of such features. During Lavie's (1997) task, 
participants were required to respond to a central target, while ignoring two 
flanking distractors. Responses were based on particular conjunctions 
(combinations) of two features. For example, participants pressed one key for a 
purple cross or another for a green circle on a critical trial, but withheld responses 
on non-critical trials when the target consisted of the opposite conjunctions (i. e. a 
green cross or a purple circle). Thus, colour or shape alone was not sufficient for 
correct target classification. 
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Importantly, the unattended distractors were also processed and could influence 
target responses by way of their response congruency. On a congruent trial, the 
distractors would contain the same target features, thus facilitating activation of 
the correct response. On an incongruent trial, on the other hand, response times to 
a particular target conjunction (e. g. a purple cross) were slowed by the presence of 
an incongruent set of target features amongst the distractors (e. g. a green circle). 
The distractors could also influence target classification through the combination 
of their features. Thus, response-associated distractor information (both congruent 
and incongruent) was presented either as a conjunction, in which response-critical 
features were presented within one common distractor, or as a disjunction, in 
which critical features were separated across both distractors. To illustrate, in a 
conjunctive congruent trial participants may have been shown a purple cross target 
flanked by a purple cross distractor on one side and a response-neutral distractor 
on the other side (e. g. a brown triangle). In a disjunctive congruent trial, on the 
other hand, a stimulus display may have consisted of a purple cross target flanked 
by a purple triangle and a brown cross. 
Comparing target-distractor congruency effects between conjunctive and 
disjunctive conditions was critical for establishing the role of attention in colour 
and shape integration. Thus, if colour and shape information are not separately 
accessible from unattended objects, then conjunctive stimuli should have 
interfered more with target classification than disjunctive distractors, which did 
not match the targets accurately. Alternatively, if conjunction information is 
unavailable under inattention, then the colour and shape of unattended conjunctive 
and disjunctive distractors should have interfered equally with target classification, 
because their individual features were equal in terms of target-distractor 
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congruency. This is precisely what Lavie (1997) found, conjunctive and 
disjunctive distractors produced equivalent target-distractor congruency effects. 
The present experiment examined whether these findings can be extended to 
expression and identity information from faces. In order to make Lavie's (1997) 
paradigm relevant for such a task, responses were now based on expression- 
identity conjunctions. On critical trials, which made up two thirds of all trials, 
participants responded to the happy face of one person (Person A) or the angry 
face of another person (Person B). On non-critical trials, on the other hand, 
participants pressed a single response key for the opposite expression-identity 
combinations. Additionally, two irrelevant face distractors were presented to the 
left and right of the target, of which one identity and one expression were either 
congruent or incongruent with the target. In the Conjunctive condition, this 
identity and expression information was conjoined in one of the distractors (e. g. 
happy Person A) with the other distractor displaying two response neutral features 
(e. g. surprised Person Q. In the Disjunctive condition, the same information was 
disjoined across both distractors (e. g. happy Person C, surprised Person A). 
Displays were also included in which distractors were congruent (or incongruent) 
in expression or identity alone to assess their specific contribution to distractor 
congruency effects. It is possible that distractor interference could arise from just 
one face dimension. For example, in the preceding experiments it was found that 
identity information was more discriminative than expression. If the same applies 
here, then distractor interference may predominantly reflect identity information. 
Equivalent congruency effects between the Conjunctive, the Disjunctive and the 
Identity condition, but not for the Expression condition would reveal this. Finally, 
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in one further condition both distractors in a display consisted of features from 
outwith the possible target set (the Neutral condition), for example, a happy face 
target of Person A flanked by surprised Person C on one side and sad Person D on 
the other. This baseline condition was included to examine whether any 
congruency effects reflect interference or facilitation during target classification. 
If identity and expression require attention for visual integration into a single 
multi-dimensional face percept, the following RT pattern may be predicted. The 
Conjunctive and Disjunctive conditions should show reliable target-distractor 
congruency effects, with slower RTs to incongruent than congruent distractors. 
These congruency effects should be equivalent, since under conditions of 
inattention the only way in which these stimuli differ, their conjunctive format, 
should be inaccessible. Furthermore, if these congruency effects arise from both 
types of facial information, then the Identity and Expression conditions should also 
reveal noticeable distractor interference. 
Method 
Subjects Eighteen undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, whose 
ages ranged from 19-24 years, volunteered to participate in the experiment for a 
small fee. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli & Apparatus An Apple Macintosh computer presented the stimuli and 
recorded responses using Superlab 1.74. The stimuli consisted of greyscale 
photographs of four males (person A, B, C, and D) from the Ekman and Friesen 
(1976) pictures of facial affect. Of each person a happy, angry, surprised, and sad 
picture were used. To remove extraneous background, all images were ellipse- 
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shaped and measured 3.5 cm x 4.9 cm (3.4° x 4.7° of visual angle (VA) at a 
viewing distance of 60 cm, fixed by means of a chinrest). These faces were used to 
construct stimulus displays containing a central target with one distractor to the 
left and one to the right. The nearest target-distractor contours were 0.6 cm (0.6° of 
VA) apart. 
There were two main types of stimulus displays, corresponding to the critical and 
non-critical trials of the experiment. In critical trials, the targets consisted of angry 
Person A or happy Person B. These targets were combined with distractors under 
five conditions. In these conditions, with the exception of the Neutral condition, 
some of the distractor features could be either congruent (same response category) 
or incongruent (different response category) with the target. In the Conjunctive 
condition, response-congruent (or incongruent) expression and identity features 
were conjoined within one distractor, with the other distracor containing two 
response-neutral features (i. e. Person C or D, sad or surprised expressions; see 
Figure 2.7 overleaf). In the Disjunctive condition, these features were disjoined 
between both distractors (see Figure 2.7). In the Identity condition, the distractors 
contained just one congruent (or incongruent) identity feature, with the remaining 
three distractor features displaying response-neutral features. Similarly, in the 
Expression condition, the distractors contained just one congruent (or incongruent) 
expression feature while the remaining three distractor features were response 
neutral. 
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Figure 2.7 Example displays from Experiment 3. The critical targets were angry Person A 
(right column) and happy Person B (left column). In the Conjunction and Disjunction 
conditions, one distractor identity and one distractor expression were either congruent 
(same response-category) or incongruent (different response category) with the target. In 
the Identity condition, one of the distractors displayed a response-associated identity 
(Person A or Person B). In the Expression condition, one of the distractor faces displayed 
a response-associated expression (happy or angry). The remaining distractor features were 
always response-neutral (i. e. Person C, Person D, sad, surprised). In the Neutral condition, 
all distractor features were response-neutral (left column, bottom row). Non-critical 
targets consisted of the opposite expression and identity combinations (e. g. happy Person 
A; right column, bottom row). 
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For non-critical displays, the targets consisted of the opposite expression and 
identity conjunctions (i. e. happy Person A and angry Person B; see Figure 2.7), but 
contained exactly the same distractors as the critical trials. As a consequence, 
target-distractor compatibility was ambiguous on non-critical trials. Note, 
however, that the purpose of these trials was singularly to ensure that participants 
were responding to the correct combinations of both target dimensions, expression 
and identity, and response-congruency effects were not analyzed for these 
conditions. Thus, the same distractor combinations were used for non-critical as 
for critical trials to avoid cuing their presence via the distractors. 
Pairing the critical targets (angry Person A, happy Person B) in the Conjunctive, 
Disjunctive, Identity, and Expression conditions, with each of the neutral 
distractors (Person C and D, sad and surprised), and under each level of 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) resulted in a total of 64 stimulus displays. 
For non-critical targets, 64 analogous displays were made. In addition, 16 Neutral 
displays (8 critical, 8 non-critical) were created by pairing critical and non-critical 
targets with only response-neutral distractor features. 
Procedure 
Prior to the main task the participants underwent a training phase to learn the four 
face identities: Participants were shown four arrays of the face identities, each 
array depicting the four faces (Person A, B, C& D) with a different expression 
(angry, happy, sad, surprised). This was followed by 3 blocks of 64 trials (4 
identities x4 expressions x 4) in which the faces had to be classified according to 
identity (Blocks 1& 3) and expression (Block 2). Response accuracy was 
emphasized in the instructions and feedback for incorrect responses was given by a 
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warning tone. Participants had to achieve less than 10% errors for identity 
classifications to proceed to the main task. Of 18 participants, 12 completed the 
training phase twice to meet these criteria. 
In the main task, participants were told that the task involved making speeded 
decisions to expressive face targets, presented at fixation, while ignoring two 
flanking distractor faces. Subjects were requested to respond to angry Person A by 
pressing the "D" key and to happy Person B by pressing the "L" key on a standard 
computer keyboard, and to press the <space> bar to both happy Person A and 
angry Person B. Each trial began with a fixation cross, displayed for 1000 ms, 
followed by a target-distractor display for 200 ms (i. e. too briefly to permit 
stimulus-responsive saccades to distractors), ending with a blank screen until a 
response had been made. All subjects underwent 12 blocks of 54 randomly- 
ordered trials (36 critical & 18 non-critical trials). The experimental conditions 
were randomly intermixed within blocks. Blocks 1 and 2 served as practice and 
were excluded from analysis. 
Results 
Errors Incorrect responses were made on 3.1% of critical trials and were evenly 
matched across all conditions (see Figure 2.8 overleaf). For non-critical displays, 
errors were made on 7.9% of all trials. As critical trials were twice as likely as 
non-critical trials, this difference might reflect anticipatory response strategies. 
Overall, however, participants were accurate. This indicates that responses were 
based on both target features, expression and identity. Errors were not analyzed 
further. 
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RTs The median correct RTs were computed as a function of distractor type 
(Conjunctive, Disjunctive, Identity, Expression, Neutral) and target-distractor 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). The means of these RTs are shown in 
Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8 Means of the median reaction times (RTs, in msec) and percentage errors as a 
function of distractor type and congruency for the critical conditions in Experiment 3. 
Vertical bars represent the standard error (SE) of the means. ' Non-critical trials: mean RT, 
503 ms; error rate, 8%. 
Similar to error rates, RTs were slightly slower for non-critical than critical trials, 
which provides further evidence that participants might have formed expectancies 
to both types of trials. More important, neither the Conjunction nor the Disjunction 
Throughout this thesis, standard error bars for within-subject designs are based on within- 
participant variability (see Loftus & Masson, 1994). This provides identical error terms for all 
conditions by legitimately ignoring between-subject variance. 
69 
Expression Neutral 
condition showed a congruency-based response pattern and the Expression 
condition actually revealed a marginal reverse trend (- 6 ms). In fact, only the 
Identity condition revealed markedly faster RTs to congruent than to incongruent 
displays. However, a2 (congruent vs. incongruent) x4 (Conjunction, Disjunction, 
Identity, Expression) within-subjects ANOVA failed to find an effect of 
congruency, F(1,17)<l, condition F(3,51)<1, or an interaction between both 
factors, F(3,51)<1, indicating that there were no differences between any of these 
conditions. A separate one-factor ANOVA of condition (Conjunction vs. 
Disjunction vs. Identity vs. Expression vs. Neutral) was conducted to compare 
performance in the Neutral condition with all other critical conditions. This did not 
reveal differences between any of the conditions, F(8,136)<1. 
Discussion 
The present study employed a variation of Lavie's (1997) response competition 
paradigm to examine the attentional encoding of facial expression and identity. 
Face encoding was assessed by measuring interference from distractor features 
(i. e. expression and identity) during the classification of a face target, whereby the 
distractors' features could be either congruent (same response category) or 
incongruent (different response category) with the target. Importantly, congruent 
(or incongruent) features were either combined in one of two distractors (the 
Conjunctive condition) or separated across both distractors (the Disjunctive 
condition). According to this design two opposing predictions were made. If 
expression and identity require attention to be integrated into one face percept, 
then the conjunctive format of the unattended distractor faces should have been 
inaccessible. Thus, Conjunctive and Disjunctive conditions should have yielded 
equivalent congruency effects. Conversely, if attention is not required for 
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perceptual integration, then conjunctive distractors should have produced 
larger 
congruency effects than disjunctive distractors by providing exact matches (i. e. the 
correct combinations of expression and identity) for the target set. 
Intriguingly, the RT data do not support either of these predictions, as no 
congruency effects were found in the Conjunctive or the Disjunctive condition. 
Indeed, of all conditions, a slight congruency pattern (of 13 ms) was only observed 
in the Identity condition. However, within this paradigm a congruency effect in the 
Identity condition alone is improbable, as the Conjunctive and Disjunctive 
conditions provide the same amount of potentially distracting identity information. 
This was confirmed by the statistical analysis, which showed that there were no 
reliable congruency effects in any of the distractor conditions. This is even more 
striking in comparison with the Neutral condition, in which the distractors 
consisted exclusively of identities and expressions from outwith the target set. 
Thus, if response-associated distractor features produced any target-distractor 
interference, independent even of congruency, then they should have produced 
dissimilar RTs with the Neutral condition. However, although average RTs were 
marginally faster in the Neutral condition than in the other conditions, none of 
these conditions differed statistically from each other. 
The failure to obtain distractor interference in this experiment means that the role 
of attention in the integration of facial expression and identity information remains 
unresolved. Thus, the present study contributes little in terms of data to the 
existing research concerned with the role of attention in face encoding (Boutet et 
al, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; Reinitz et al, 1994,1997). Nonetheless, the 
current design highlights a number of important issues that have been neglected in 
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previous studies, and that may require consideration in future research. First, 
Reinitz et al (1994,1997) required participants to study novel faces under divided- 
or full-attention, followed by a subsequent face recognition test to examine the 
effects of attention on face encoding. Palermo & Rhodes (2002) and Boutet et al 
(2002) also examined the effects of unfamiliar face encoding under divided or full 
attention with a subsequent recognition test. However, even immediate recognition 
memory for unfamiliar faces appears remarkably poor (Simons & Levin, 1998). 
This implies that previous findings might have been subject to memory confounds. 
By contrast, the present paradigm measured interference from simultaneously 
presented faces, thus minimizing any memory demands. Although this particular 
design was unsuccessful, future studies should also try to separate effects of 
attention and memory in face processing. 
Second, previous studies examined the encoding of facial features into holistic 
faces, whereby features were defined in terms of lexical values (e. g. eyes, nose, 
mouth) or face regions (e. g. top half vs. bottom half), even though this may be 
incompatible with how features are actually presented by the brain (e. g. Ellis et al, 
1997). The current design avoided similar, arbitrary definitions by capturing 
different facial `features' in terms of the distinctive meaning that they convey, 
such as expression and identity. This has the added advantage of focusing on more 
than the recognition of identity, which is just one type of information that can be 
derived from faces. 
In view of these advantages, the complete absence of distractor interference in this 
experiment is surprising. Particularly, since Lavie (1997) obtained reliable colour- 
shape interference in a similar design. Of course, this could be explained in terms 
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of the visual attributes of faces, which are visually more complex than simple 
objects. However, faces were classified quickly and with few errors as targets, and 
one might expect that the distractor faces could have been processed just as easily. 
In fact, as only four different face targets were used in Experiment 3, target- 
distractor interference might have been obtained even just through picture-based 
cues than identity and expression processing, as was suggested previously as a 
potential explanation for Schweinberger et al's (1998,1999) findings (see p. 41). 
Moreover, target-distractor interference is generally very robust and has been 
obtained in letter-letter (e. g. Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), picture-word (e. g. Smith & 
Magee, 1980), and face-name interference tasks (Young, Ellis, Flude, McWeeney 
& Hay, 1986). So, how might the absence of distractor interference in the present 
experiment have been caused? A possible explanation is that the distractor faces 
did not interfere with target classification because they were not processed at all. 
According to the perceptual load theory of selective attention (Lavie, 1995,2000), 
the processing of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information proceeds 
automatically until available processing capacity is exhausted. However, irrelevant 
information is excluded from processing if task-relevant processing consumes all 
available processing capacity. If the same principles apply to face processing, then 
it is possible that a relevant face target could monopolize available resources to the 
detriment of the distractor faces. This would imply a capacity limit for face 
processing, such that only a single face can be processed at a time. This possibility 
is examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Capacity Limits for Face Processing: Face 
Distractor Interference in Sex and Semantic Classification 
Tasks 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the role of attention in facial expression and identity 
processing was assessed in a response-competition experiment (i. e. experiments 
concerning distractor interference with target classification; see Experiment 3), in 
which subjects categorized face targets according to specific expression-identity 
conjunctions while ignoring task-irrelevant distractor faces. Although the target 
faces were classified fast and accurately, the same faces did not interfere with face 
target classification when they were presented as distractors. This could be 
explained by supposing capacity limits in face processing, such that only a single 
face (i. e. the target) may be processed at a time. On their own, however, these 
results provide only a hint at such limits as target and distractor stimuli were 
constrained to faces images. Under these conditions task-irrelevant faces might 
have been processed even if they did not act as distractors, or alternatively, the 
face targets might not have been subject to any distractor interference, from face or 
nonface stimuli. Therefore, the question addressed in the current chapter is 
whether responses to a face target can be affected by irrelevant distractor faces 
under conditions that normally allow for distractor interference. 
Thus far, several studies have shown that face distractors are processed reliably 
with a concurrently presented nonface target. Young, Ellis, Flude, McWeeney & 
Hay (1986) examined interference effects between simultaneously presented 
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photographs of the faces and the printed names of famous people. Using a 
semantic categorization task (pop-star vs. politician), participants were required to 
classify either a face or a name while ignoring the distractor, which could be 
congruent (i. e. same occupation) or incongruent (different occupation) with the 
target. Names reliably interfered with the classification of face targets. Moreover, 
faces also interfered with the classification of name targets. Indeed, faces 
interfered more with names than names interfered with faces. 
Recently, Lavie, Ro & Russell (2003) extended this paradigm to investigate the 
effect of task-relevant load on irrelevant distractor processing. According to 
Lavie's perceptual load theory of selective attention (Lavie, 1995,2000; see 
Chapter 1), the processing of visual information proceeds automatically until 
available capacity is exhausted. Therefore, irrelevant information is excluded from 
processing when task-relevant, attended-to stimuli demand all available capacity. 
To provide a test for this theory with meaningful stimuli, Lavie et al (2003) 
measured interference from a flanking distractor upon the classification of a 
central word or a famous name embedded among several letter strings. Perceptual 
load of the relevant task was manipulated by varying the number of strings in the 
interference displays. In accord with the load theory, increasing relevant load 
eliminated congruency effects from meaningful nonface distractors. Intriguingly 
though, interference from famous face distractors was entirely unaffected by these 
load manipulations, leading Lavie et al (2003) to suggest that face processing may 
proceed automatically (for similar claims see Farah, Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 
1995), independent of target processing. 
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Comparable conclusions can be drawn from a study by Jenkins, Burton & Ellis 
(2002) in which an irrelevant famous face distractor showed equivalent repetition 
priming independent of variations in task-relevant load in a letter-string task, even 
though explicit memory for the faces was markedly affected by this manipulation. 
There have also been a number of reports of prosopagnosic patients who show the 
normal pattern of interference from distractor faces when asked to make semantic 
classifications of names, despite being explicitly unable to recognise familiar faces 
(e. g. de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1987; Sergent & Signoret, 1992b), and these 
findings have been used extensively to inform theories of covert recognition in 
prosopagnosia (Young & Burton, 1999). The findings of all these studies suggest 
that face processing is very robust even across manipulations, which should make 
it difficult. In Experiment 3 one might have therefore expected the normal pattern 
of interference, with face categorization times varying as a function of target- 
distractor congruency. However, unlike Experiment 3 none of these studies 
examined face processing in multi-face displays, and none imply that face 
processing is entirely capacity-free. Indeed, Lavie et al (2003) suggest that face 
processing may be subject to its own capacity limits. 
So far, evidence for face processing limits has been rather indirect and has accrued 
mostly from studies that were not originally motivated by this issue. For example, 
Palermo & Rhodes (2002) asked subjects to remember a centrally presented target 
face while matching two flanker faces. Memory for the central face was assessed 
using a two-alternative recognition test, consisting of either two intact faces, the 
target and a foil image that differed from the target by one feature (e. g. a pair of 
eyes), or two exemplars of a particular feature, one of which was extracted from 
the target. Successfully matching the flanker faces resulted in better memory for 
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intact targets than individual features, but only when the flanker faces were 
presented inverted. Conversely, matching upright flanker faces eliminated this 
advantage, suggesting a processing limit for upright, intact 
faces that is 
independent of any general processing limits. Using a different technique, Boutet 
& Chaudhuri (2001) observed perceptual rivalry of two upright overlapping faces, 
one rotated 45° and the other 45° counterclockwise, whereby only one of the 
faces 
could be retrieved at a subsequent recognition test. Two inverted faces, on the 
other hand, were perceived as an ambiguous combination of both, again 
suggesting upright face processing limits. Finally, Jenkins, Lavie & Driver (2003) 
examined dilution of congruency effects in a famous name categorization task. 
They found that interference from a famous face distractor could be diluted by the 
presence of another (response-neutral) face, but not by phase-shifted faces, 
inverted faces, or meaningful nonface objects. In other words, processing of the 
distractor face seemed to be reduced by competition from an additional face, but 
not by general competition from different classes of stimuli. 
If limits on face processing do apply, then it is possible that a distractor face might 
not influence responses to a target face, as the resources needed to process the 
distractor would already be engaged in processing the target. This could provide 
an explanation for the absence of face-face interference in Experiment 3. Note 
however, that target-distractor interference is a highly robust effect, which has 
been demonstrated with various classes of stimulus pairs (e. g. letter-letter, Eriksen 
& Eriksen, 1974; picture-word, Smith & Magee, 1980; face-name, Young et al, 
1986). Given this remarkable generality, the absence of any face-face interference, 
at least under conditions that normally produce target-distractor interference, 
seems a somewhat counterintuitive prediction. The present chapter provides a 
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direct test for this prediction, by assessing interference from faces and nonface 
comparisons over a series of five experiments. 
The first experiment examined capacity limits in face processing with unfamiliar 
faces in a sex classification task. Most previous studies that hint at capacity limits 
for face processing rely on memory for previously unfamiliar faces (e. g. Boutet & 
Chaudhuri, 2001; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002). However, memory for unfamiliar 
faces appears remarkably poor, even over a very short time interval (see e. g. 
Simons & Levin, 1998), and this may have contributed to previous findings. Sex 
judgements, on the other hand, can be performed very quickly and without 
difficulty on unfamiliar faces (e. g. Bruce, Ellis, Gibling & Young, 1987). 
Moreover, faces usually contain some salient external sex-cues such as hairstyle. 
These face-related cues might produce interference even when subtler types of 
facial information, such as expression (as for the expression-identity decisions in 
Experiment 3), do not. On the other hand, it should be noted that previous studies 
reporting face-nonface interference used semantic decisions, which require access 
to facial identity but can be made independent of a person's sex (see e. g. Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990; Burton, Bruce & Hancock, 1999). 
Subsequent experiments in this chapter therefore examined face-face interference 
with semantic decisions to provide a closer analogue to previous face-nonface 
interference tasks (e. g. Jenkins et al, 2003; Lavie et al, 2003; Young et al, 1986), 
and to generalize the findings of Experiment 4 from unfamiliar faces in a sex 
decision to known faces in semantic tasks. 
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Experiment 4 
In this experiment capacity limits in face processing were assessed with unfamiliar 
faces in a sex classification task. Subjects were asked to classify stimuli presented 
at fixation as being male or female. These target stimuli were either unfamiliar 
faces or printed four-letter forenames, and they were flanked by the distractor 
images of faces and names. Processing of the distractor was assessed via its 
congruency effects on target RTs (i. e. same sex vs. different sex). However, in 
contrast to previous studies, which only examined face-name interference (e. g. 
Jenkins et al, 2003; Lavie et al, 2003; Young et al, 1986), additional conditions 
were included to assess within category interference of face and nonface stimuli. 
In total, congruency effects were measured under four conditions. These 
conditions involved combining a face target and a face distractor (in the FACE- 
face condition), combining a face target and a name distractor (the FACE-name 
condition), combining a name target and a face distractor (the NAME face 
condition), and combining two names (the NAME-name condition). If face 
processing is capacity limited, one might expect measurable congruency effects 
with this paradigm, even in the absence of any within-category interference in the 
FACE face condition. Alternatively, if several faces can be processed 
simultaneously, then face distractors should also interfere with the classification of 
face targets. 
Method 
Subjects Thirty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, whose 
ages ranged from 19-25 years, participated in the experiment in return for a small 
payment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
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Design & Stimuli An Apple Macintosh computer was used to present stimuli and 
record responses, using PsyScope 1.2.5. Photographs of four unfamiliar female 
and four unfamiliar male models served as face stimuli. These images were 
cropped to remove extraneous background, but the outlines of all faces including 
differences in hairstyle were preserved. In addition, 4 four-letter printed female 
forenames (Anne, Kate, Lisa & Mary) and 4 male forenames (Hugh, John, Paul & 
Tony), shown in 36-point Times font, served as name stimuli. All faces were 
greyscale on a black background and measured 3.6 cm x 4.5 cm (subtending 3.4° x 
4.3° of VA at a viewing distance of 60 cm). The names were printed white on 
black and were between 2.4 cm (the shortest name) and 3.1 cm (the longest name) 
in width (2. Y-3.0' of VA). These sixteen images were used to construct stimulus 
displays containing a central target image (face or name), flanked by a distractor 
image (face or name) that could be congruent (same sex) or incongruent (different 
sex) with the target (see Figure 3.1 overleaf). The nearest target-distractor contours 
were 1.25 cm apart (1.2° of VA). Distractors were equally likely to appear on the 
left or right of the target (this manipulation produced no reliable effects or 
interactions and is therefore not reported further below). 
Pairing each of the 16 target stimuli with each class of distractor (face or name) 
under each level of congruency (same or different sex) resulted in a total of 64 
displays. For displays in which target and distractor were of the same sex (e. g. two 
male faces, or two male names), stimuli of two different persons were used (see 
Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Example displays from Experiment 4. The target could be a face or a four- 
letter forename, and was accompanied by a face or a name distractor, which could be 
either congruent (same sex) or incongruent (different sex) with the target. 
Procedure 
Subjects viewed the displays at a distance of 60 cm, which was kept constant by 
means of a chin-rest. Each trial began with a fixation cross for 750 ms, followed 
by the target-distractor display for 200 ms (i. e. too briefly to permit a stimulus- 
responsive saccade to the distractor), and ended with a blank interval until a 
response was made. Subjects were instructed to classify the target image as a male 
by pressing the "D" key or as a female by pressing the "L" key on a standard 
computer keyboard, as quickly and as accurately as possible, while ignoring the 
distractors. Feedback for errors was given immediately by a short warning tone. 
Button-press response latencies were measured from stimulus onset. Subjects 
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completed one practice block of 32 trials and 6 experimental blocks of 64 
randomly ordered trials, and could take short breaks between blocks. 
Results 
Figure 3.2 shows the means of the median correct RTs for all conditions. A2 (face 
vs. name target) x2 (face vs. name distractor) x2 (congruent vs. incongruent) 
within-subjects ANOVA showed a main effect of congruency, F(1,29)=23.31, 
p<. 01, with slower responses to incongruent displays, and a main effect of target 
type, F(1,29)=32.51, p<. 01, with faster responses to face targets than to name 
targets. No main effect of distractor type was found, F(1,29)<1. 
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Figure 3.2 Mean reaction times (in msec) across subjects (n=30) as a function of distractor 
congruency and target-distractor pairings in Experiment 4. Vertical bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
The effect of target type was modified by an interaction with distractor type, 
F(1,29)=6.02, p<. 05, an interaction with congruency, F(1,29)=7.73, p<. 01, and a 
three-way interaction between all three factors, F(1,29)=5.48, p<. 05. As Figure 3.2 
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suggests, analysis of simple main effects revealed significant congruency effects in 
the FACE-name condition, F(1,29)=4.52, p<. 05, the NAME face condition, 
F(1,29)=16.06, p<. 01, and the NAME-name condition, F(1,29)=9.62, p<. 01. By 
contrast, there was no effect in the FACE face condition, F(1,29)<1. 
Error rates were analyzed as the RT data. Incongruent displays resulted in a slight 
increase in errors in the NAME face condition (incongruent 8.0%, congruent 4.0%) 
and the NAME-name condition (5.7% vs. 5.1%), but no corresponding increase in 
the FACE face (2.7% vs. 2.8%) or the FACE-name conditions (3.8% vs. 3.8%). 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,29)=9.91, p<. 01, a 
main effect of target type, F(1,29)=23.03, p<. 01, and an interaction of target type 
with distractor type, F(1,29)=6.67, p<. 05. In addition, a significant congruency 
effect was found in the NAME face condition, F(1,29)=32.56, p<. 01. No other 
comparisons were significant. 
Discussion 
Similar to Experiment 3, no distractor congruency effects were observed when a 
face distractor flanked a face target. However, in the current design reliable 
congruency effects in the NAME-face and the FACE-name condition contrasted 
this. Moreover, the observed distractor extinction in the FACE face condition does 
not seem to be a generalized within-category phenomenon, as distractor names 
also exerted congruency effects onto name targets in the NAME-name condition. 
This pattern of results implies that processing a target face may indeed prevent the 
processing of a distractor face, and converges with previous findings hinting at 
capacity limits for face processing (Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; Jenkins et al, 2003; 
Palermo & Rhodes, 2002). However, the absence of face-face interference in a sex 
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classification task is nonetheless surprising, as the face stimuli preserved salient 
external sex-cues such as hairstyle. On the basis of such cues irrelevant faces could 
have been classified even without processing actual face information. Thus, these 
data suggest that the processing of an attended-to face target prevents the 
processing of all sex-related information from an additional irrelevant face, 
including even salient external features. 
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was designed to replicate the findings of the previous experiment 
with familiar faces in a semantic classification task. The retrieval of semantic 
information, such as occupation and nationality, requires access to a person's 
identity, which is not necessary for a sex judgement to be made (see e. g. Bruce, 
1986; Bruce, Ellis, Gibling & Young, 1987; but see also Rossion, 2002). 
Consequently, the possibility exists that the results of Experiment 4 will not 
generalize to tasks that require the identification of familiar faces. Note also that 
previous studies examining face interference have used semantic judgements, 
rather than sex or expression decisions, to face-name pairings (Jenkins et al, 2003; 
Lavie et al, 2003; Young et al, 1986). Experiment 5 thus provides a closer 
analogue to existing designs that have produced face distractor interference. 
Method 
Subjects Thirty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, whose 
ages ranged from 19-25 years, participated in the experiment in return for a small 
payment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
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Stimuli & Procedure The procedure was identical to Experiment 4, except that the 
decision to be made was whether the targets were pop-stars or politicians. The 
surnames and faces of four male pop-stars (Kurt Cobain, Eminem, Michael 
Jackson & Elvis Presley) and four male politicians (George Bush, Bill Clinton, 
Colin Powell & Donald Rumsfeld) served as stimuli. The faces were manipulated 
as in Experiment 4. The surnames were shown in 18-point Arial font, measuring 
between 1.7 cm and 2.9 cm in width (1.6° - 2.8° of VA). As before, these images 
were used to construct 64 stimulus displays containing a central face or name 
target, flanked by a face or a name distractor, which could be either congruent or 
incongruent (same or different occupation) with the target (see Figure 3.3). 
Congruent 
FACE- 
face 
FACE- 
name 
Incongruent 
NAME 
face 
NAME 
name, 
Figure 3.3 Example displays from Experiment S. The target could be a famous face or a 
famous name, and was accompanied by a face or name distractor, which could be either 
congruent (same occupation) or incongruent (different occupation) with the target. 
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Results 
Figure 3.4 shows the means of the median correct RTs for all conditions. As 
before, a2 (face vs. name target) x2 (face vs. name distractor) x2 (congruent vs. 
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA showed a main effect of congruency, 
F(1,29)=42.36, p<. 01, with slower responses to incongruent versus congruent 
displays, and a main effect of target type, F(1,29)=26.02, p<. 01, with faster 
responses to face targets. 
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Figure 3.4 Mean reaction times (in msec) across subjects (n=30) as a function of distractor 
congruency and target-distractor pairings in Experiment 5. Vertical bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
In addition, a main effect of distractor type was found, F(1,29)=4.89, p<. 05, 
reflecting slower responses to displays containing face distractors than displays 
with name distractors. These main effects were modified by two-way interactions 
between each of the factors [target type x distractor type, F(1,29)=13.96, p<. 01; 
target type x congruency, F(1,29)=33.47, p<. 01; and distractor type x congruency, 
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F(1,29)=8.09, p<. 01], and a three-way interaction between all factors, 
F(1,29)=17.53, p<. 01. Simple main effect analysis revealed significant congruency 
effects in the NAME face condition, F(1,29)=74.32, p<. 01, and the NAME-name 
condition, F(1,29)=7.19, p<. 05. However, there were no congruency effects in the 
FACE face, F(1,29)<1, or the FACE-name condition, F(1,29)=1.47. 
An analogous analysis of the error rates was carried out. Incongruent displays 
resulted in an increase in errors in the FACE-name condition (incongruent 5.2%, 
congruent 3.3%), the NAME face (13.3% vs. 6.0%), and the NAME-name 
condition (6.5% vs. 5.6%). However, no corresponding increase was observed in 
the FACE face condition (3.9% vs. 3.7%). ANOVA revealed main effects of 
congruency, F(1,29)=33.39, p<. 01, target type, F(1,29)=28.01, p<. 01, and 
distractor type, F(1,29)=7.01, p<. 05. As for the RTs, there were also interactions 
between each of the factors [target type x distractor type, F(1,29)=20.41, p<. 01; 
target type x congruency, F(1,29)=15.27, p<. 01; and distractor type x congruency, 
F(1,29)=6.22, p<. 05], and a three-way interaction between all factors, 
F(1,29)=22.28, p<. 01. Significant congruency effects were found in the FACE- 
name, F(1,29)=4.45, p<. 05, and NAME face conditions, F(1,29)=67.22, p<. 01. No 
other comparisons were significant. 
Discussion 
This experiment replicates some of the important aspects of Experiment 4 with a 
semantic decision, which, unlike a sex decision, requires the identification of the 
face stimuli. As before, the FACE face condition failed to yield a congruency 
effect. This was contrasted by a reliable congruency effect in the NAME face 
condition, which indicates that irrelevant faces can nonetheless act as distractors 
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when a semantic task is used. However, unlike the sex classification task of 
Experiment 4, the RT data failed to yield a reliable interference effect when a face 
target was flanked by a name distractor (a 9 ms trend in this direction did not 
approach significance). While the RTs failed to show reliable distractor 
interference in the FACE-name condition, a significant congruency effect in error 
rates was found. This alone, however, does not support parallel processing of face 
target and name distractor. Alternatively, it might represent attentional shifts to the 
distractor locations, which may have enhanced distractor processing to the 
detriment of accurate target classification. 
Note that previous studies also obtained less, albeit significant, interference from 
name distractors during face classification than from face distractors during name 
classification (Young et al, 1986). In contrast to Young et al (1986), who presented 
target and distractor centrally, the distractors always appeared in the periphery in 
this experiment, clearly separated from the target. Although this arrangement was 
designed to avoid target-distractor confusion, numerous studies have shown that 
interference can be significantly reduced by increasing spatial separation between 
a target and a distractor (e. g. Gatti & Egeth, 1978; Merikle & Gorewich, 1979; 
Hagenaar & Van der Heijden, 1986). Therefore, a possible explanation for the 
absence of any FACE-name interference could to some extent lie in the spatial 
arrangement of the target-distractor pairings. Nonetheless, the absence of reliable 
distractor interference in the FACE-name condition is potentially problematic, as it 
raises the possibility that the extinction of FACE face interference does not reflect 
capacity limits in face processing, but rather that the famous face targets may not 
have been subject to any distractor interference in the present task. This is 
explored more thoroughly in the next experiment. 
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Experiment 6 
The purpose of Experiment 6 was two-fold. The first aim was to replicate the 
interference pattern of the within-category conditions of Experiment 5, and 
specifically to produce distractor congruency effects in both between-category 
conditions (i. e. the NONFACE-face and the FACE-nonface conditions). As was 
discussed in the preceding experiment, the comparison between these latter 
conditions and the FACE face condition is vital in establishing capacity limits for 
face processing. The second aim was to examine whether nonface stimuli other 
than names are subject to interference within this paradigm. To provide an 
analogue to the semantic task of Experiment 5, images of national flags were used 
as nonface comparisons and subjects were asked to classify the face and flag 
targets as being American or British. 
Method 
Subjects Twenty undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, whose 
ages ranged from 18-24 years, participated in the experiment in return for a small 
payment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli & Procedure The procedure was the same as for Experiment 5, except as 
follows. Subjects were now instructed to classify the targets as American or 
British. Three different images each of Tony Blair (British Prime Minister), 
George Bush (American President), the Union Jack (British flag), and the Stars 
and Stripes (American flag) served as stimuli. The faces and flags were cropped to 
rectangular shapes to produce a closer resemblance but this resulted in the loss of 
some external features, such as stimulus outline. Faces and flags were then 
converted to greyscale and sized to 2.2 cm x 3.0 cm (2.1° x 3.9° of VA). These 
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images were used to construct the stimulus displays as in Experiment 5 (see Figure 
3.5). Pairing each of the 12 stimuli with each class of distractor (face or flag) 
under each level of congruency (same or different nationality) resulted in 48 
displays. Subjects completed a practice and 8 experimental blocks of 48 
randomized trials. 
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Figure 3.5 Example displays from Experiment 6. The target could be a famous face or a 
national flag, and was accompanied by a face or a flag distractor, which could be either 
congruent (same nationality) or incongruent (different nationality) with the target. 
Results 
As for Experiment 4, the means of the median correct RTs were calculated for all 
conditions and are shown in Figure 3.6. A2 (face vs. flag target) x2 (face vs. Flag 
distractor) x2 (congruent vs. incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA showed a 
main effect of congruency, F(1,19)=21.29, p<. 01, with slower RTs to incongruent 
displays, but no main effect of target type, F(1,19)<1, or distractor type, 
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F(1,19)=1.09. The effect of congruency was modified by an interaction with target 
type, F(1,19)=6.94, p<. 05. As Figure 3.6 suggests, significant congruency effects 
were found in the FACE flag condition, F(1,19)=5.21, p<. 05, the FLAG face 
condition, F(1,19)=27.71, p<. 01, and the FLAG flag condition, F(1,19)=4.82, 
p<. 05. By contrast, there was no effect in the FACE face condition, F(1,19)<1. 
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Figure 3.6 Mean reaction times (in msec) across subjects (n=20) as a function of distractor 
congruency and target-distractor pairings in Experiment 6. Vertical bars represent the 
standard error of the means. 
Error rates mirrored the RT data. Incongruent displays resulted in an increase in 
errors in the FACE flag condition (incongruent 7.0%, congruent 5.1%), the FLAG- 
face condition (8.5% vs. 5.1%), and the FLAG flag condition (6.9% vs. 4.0%), but 
no corresponding increase in the FACE face condition (4.4% vs. 4.6%). ANOVA 
showed a significant main effect of congruency, F(1,19)=4.60, p<. 05, and an 
interaction between target type and distractor type, F(1,19)=6.70, p<. 05. No other 
comparisons were significant. 
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Discussion 
The results show an intriguing pattern. As in Experiment 5, no evidence of 
distractor processing was found in the FACE face condition. In contrast, however, 
the present data shows that face targets can be subject to congruency effects in a 
semantic classification task, as exerted here by the flag distractors. Faces also 
functioned as distractors. In fact, the largest congruency effect was observed again 
in the condition in which a nonface target was flanked by a distractor face. In 
addition, within-category congruency effects were observed for images of flags, 
suggesting that they are not subject to analogous capacity limits to faces. Thus, 
these results replicate the pattern that was observed in Experiment 4, and of 
Experiment 5 with the addition of a reliable congruency effect in the FACE- 
nonface condition, and extend those findings to images of flags in a nationality 
task. 
Experiment 7 
Experiments 4-6 provide converging support for the hypothesis that face 
processing may be capacity limited, such that a face distractor does not influence 
target face processing. In nonface paradigms, however, target-distractor 
interference is seemingly boosted by presenting several congruent (or incongruent) 
distractors (e. g. letter-letter, Eriksen & Hoffman, 1973). Therefore, to provide a 
stronger test of the claim that face distractors do not influence target face 
processing, the number of distractors was increased to four in this experiment, thus 
increasing fourfold the total amount of congruent and incongruent information in 
each display. If multiple faces can be processed simultaneously, one might expect 
this manipulation to boost any influence of the distractors. This might lead to 
measurable congruency effects even in the FACE face condition, where none were 
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previously found. On the other hand, if target face processing is unaffected by 
adding further distractors, this would provide additional support for the face 
processing limits that were observed in the preceding experiments. 
Method 
Subic Twenty-two undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, 
whose ages ranged from 18-26 years, participated in the experiment in return for a 
small payment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli & Procedure These were the same as in Experiment 6, except for the 
following changes. The former single distractors were replaced by four distractors, 
positioned around the central target to form a "+" configuration (see Figure 3.7 
overleaf). The nearest distractor contours were approximately 1.0 cm (1.00 of VA) 
horizontally, and 0.9 cm (0.9° of VA) vertically from the target. Twenty 
celebrities' faces (10 British, 10 American, see Appendix A) and 20 flags (10 
British, 10 American) were used as stimuli. In each flanker display, all four 
distractors were of the same nationality (e. g. four American faces). To avoid 
confounding semantic information during target classification, the faces were 
drawn from five occupational categories (pop-star, politician, sports-star, 
comedian, movie-star), so that no occupation occurred more than once in any face 
display. Faces were presented with their external features (i. e. hair, face outline) 
and the flags were cropped to elliptical shapes in order to produce a closer 
resemblance between the flag and face outlines (see Figure 3.7). Faces and objects 
measured between 2.1-2.4 cm horizontally and 2.5-3.2 cm vertically (2.0°-2.3° x 
2.4°-3.1° of VA). 
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Figure 3.7 Example displays from the FACE face condition (left display) and the FACE- 
flag condition (right display) in Experiment 7. Clockwise from top, the face distractors 
here are: Tom Cruise, Andre Agassi, Elvis Presley, and Groucho Marx. Target face: Bill 
Clinton. 
Combining each of the 40 targets with congruent and incongruent distractors, 
under two levels of distractor type, resulted in a total of 160 stimuli. Each subject 
completed a practice block of 40 trials, followed by eight experimental blocks of 
80 trials. Therefore, over the eight experimental blocks each stimulus display was 
encountered a total of four times. Each condition was equally likely to occur in 
each block and trial order was randomized in all blocks. 
Results 
Figure 3.8 shows the means of the median correct RTs for all conditions. A2 (face 
vs. flag targets) x2 (face vs. flag distractors) x2 (congruent vs. incongruent) 
within-subjects ANOVA of the RT data revealed a significant main effect of 
congruency, F(1,21)=26.00, p<. 01, with slower responses to incongruent displays, 
and a main effect of target type, F(1,21)=56.39, p<. 01, with faster responses to 
flag targets. These effects were modified by interactions between target type and 
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congruency, F(1,21)=4.87, p<. 05, and between distractor type and congruency, 
F(1,21)=8.77, p<. 01. As Figure 3.8 suggests, significant congruency effects were 
found in the FACE flag condition, F(1,21)=30.54, p<. 01, and the FLAG flag 
conditions, F(1,21)=9.35, p<. 01, but not in the FLAG face condition, F(1,21)<1, or 
the FACE face condition, F(1,21)=1.72. 
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Figure 3.8 Mean reaction times (in msec) across subjects (n=22) as a function of 
distractor congruency and target-distractor pairings in Experiment 7. Vertical bars 
represent the standard error of the means. 
Error rates followed a similar pattern. Incongruent displays showed increased 
errors in the FACE flag (incongruent 7.8%, congruent 5.2%), and the FLAG-flag 
conditions (5.5% vs. 3.8%), but not in the FACE face (5.8% vs. 6.4%) or the 
FLAG face conditions (5.9% vs. 6.6%). Main effects of target type, F(1,21)=3.99, 
p=. 06, and distractor type, F(1,21)=3.78, p=. 07, were not statistically reliable but 
approached significance. In addition, a target type x distractor type interaction, 
F(1,21)=7.18, p<. 05, and a distractor type x congruency interaction, F(1,21)=8.32, 
p<. 01, were found. However, only one congruency effect, in the FACE-flag 
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condition, reached significance, F(1,21)=6.57, p<. 05. No other comparisons were 
significant. 
Discussion 
To provide a stronger test for face processing limits, the number of task-irrelevant 
distractor stimuli was increased to four in this study. However, despite a fourfold 
increase in the amount of potentially distracting information, distractor faces were 
still unable to influence responses to target faces. In fact, multiple face distractors 
even failed to produce congruency effects onto the nonface targets, images of 
flags. This diverges from Experiments 4-6, in which a solitary face distractor 
interfered strongly with nonface comparison targets. Indeed, the largest 
congruency effects were observed in the NAME face and the FLAG face 
conditions in those experiments. Contrary to multiple face distractors, however, 
and analogous to the solitary distractor flags of Experiment 6, multiple flag 
distractors exerted congruency effects upon flag targets and face targets alike. 
The absence of interference from face distractors onto nonface targets under 
conditions in which multiple flag distractors produce congruency effects is perhaps 
surprising, in particular as the processing of just a single of the four distractor 
faces could have been used to produce the same, strong face-nonface interference 
of previous experiments. A possible explanation for this finding is that multiple 
faces may compete for limited processing resources (see e. g. Vuilleumier, 2000; 
Ro, Russell & Lavie, 2001, for such claims), whereby competition may remain 
unresolved between several equally task-irrelevant competitors. This suggestion 
will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter. Before then, however, it is 
worth considering other potential explanations for these results. 
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Experiment 7 used a substantially larger number of stimuli than the preceding 
experiments. It is therefore possible that the particular stimuli chosen were not 
sufficiently highly associated with the response category (nationality) to produce 
interference. However, the face images consisted of well-known celebrities and as 
targets these faces were classified quickly according to their nationality and with 
few errors. Moreover, although target RTs were slightly faster to flags than to 
faces in this experiment, this overall difference cannot explain the complete 
absence of interference from multiple distractor faces, since multiple flag 
distractors exerted congruency effects upon both fast flag targets and slow face 
targets. Indeed, Young et al (1986) also found that slow name targets interfere 
with fast face distractors during semantic classification. Of course, whenever one 
is using nonface and face stimuli within the same experiment, it is always possible 
that effects can be explained in terms of visual complexity or other physical 
attributes. Although this is always possible, the results of Experiments 4-6, 
specifically the fact that solitary face distractors interfered more with nonface 
classification than nonface comparisons interfered with both face and nonface 
classification, provides at least suggestive evidence that these results might require 
explanation in terms of competition from multiple face distractors. 
Experiment 8 
Experiments 4-7 demonstrate that irrelevant face distractors do not interfere with 
face target classification when two or more faces are presented simultaneously. 
This indicates that face processing may be capacity limited under these conditions, 
such that no more than a single face can be processed at a time. This experiment 
raises a different question than the preceding experiments. A few studies have 
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shown that faces can be recognized after very short exposure durations of less than 
70 ms (Ellis, Young & Koenken, 1993; Morrison, Bruce & Burton, 2000), which 
is considerably less than the 200 ms display time of the present interference 
paradigms. This opens the possibility that the extinguished (non-interfering) face 
distractors of Experiments 4-7 may have been processed alongside the face targets, 
although too late to affect response times, even if they were not processed in 
parallel. However, despite previous studies reporting face recognition thresholds 
of less than 70 ms, participants were given ample time to provide a face 
identification response in the shape of a name or some unambiguous semantic 
information (Ellis et al, 1993; Morrison et al, 2000). Moreover, Bentin, Deouell & 
Soroker (1999) showed that ERP markers sensitive to face familiarity occur 
usually 250 to 500 ms after stimulus onset. Thus, face processing continues 
considerably beyond the acquisition of a face stimulus from the visual field. This 
raises the question whether the ongoing processing of a face stimulus is sufficient 
to extinguish distractor face interference in a subsequent display, or whether face 
processing limits are only observed in situations in which two faces are displayed 
simultaneously. 
The present study examined this by manipulating the temporal conditions under 
which face targets and distractor faces were presented. To this end, a cue 
consisting of either a famous face or a flag was displayed at fixation, followed by a 
famous name target in the same spatial location and a flanking famous face 
distractor. As in the preceding experiments, face distractor processing was 
assessed via its congruency effects on (name) target classification times. However, 
name classification was contingent upon cue type, such that subjects were 
instructed to respond to targets that were preceded by a British stimulus (e. g. the 
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face of Prince Charles or a picture of the Union Jack), but to withhold a response 
following non-British stimuli. Importantly, cues were presented either for a short 
duration (67 ms) or a long duration (500 ms), followed by a 50 ms inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI), followed by a face-name interference display of 200 ms. Thus, face 
cues and face distractors were presented in the same spatial arrangement as targets 
and distractors in Experiments 4-6 and both relevant face and irrelevant face 
processing was assessed, but the temporal relationship between these stimuli was 
changed. If cue and distractor faces can be processed in quick succession, then a 
face distractor should interfere with a name target following an immediately 
preceding, briefly presented face cue. Alternatively, distractor processing may be 
extinguished by the ongoing processing of a briefly presented face cue, relative to 
when it is displayed for longer. 
Method 
Subjects Twenty-seven undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, 
whose ages ranged from 20-25 years, participated in the experiment in return for a 
small payment. All had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Design & Stimuli An Apple Macintosh computer equipped with PsyScope 1.2.5 
software presented the stimuli and recorded responses. For the cue displays, 
photographs of four famous British people (Richard Branson, Prince Charles, 
Lawrence Lwellelyn-Bohen & Jamie Oliver) and of four non-British people 
(Woody Allen, Jean Reno, Arnold Schwarzenegger & Jerry Springer) served as 
face stimuli, and images of four Union Jacks (British flag) and the national flags of 
four other countries (Greece, South Africa, Switzerland & the USA) served as 
nonface comparisons. Faces and flags were presented in greyscale on a black 
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background, and with their outline intact, and measured maximally 3.6 cm x 4.5 
cm (subtending 3.4° x 4.3° of VA). For the interference displays, the full names 
and faces of six male politicians (Tony Blair, George Bush, Bill Clinton, John 
Major, Colin Powell & Jack Straw) and of six male pop-stars (Kurt Cobain, Gareth 
Gates, Mick Jagger, Elton John, Elvis Presley & Justin Timberlake) were used. 
Names acted as central targets and were shown white on black in 18-point Arial 
font, measuring between 2.8 cm (the shortest name) and 4.9 cm (the longest name) 
in width (2.7°-4.7° of VA). The faces served as flanking distractors to the left or 
right of the name target, and were presented in greyscale at a size of 3.6 cm x 4.5 
cm (subtending 3.4° x 4.3° of VA) on a black background. Target-distractor 
distance varied between 0.6 cm (0.6° of VA, for the longest name target) and 1.6 
cm (1.6° of VA, for the shortest name target). 
Overall, there were two main types of trials: no-go trials, for which the cue was 
always a non-British face or flag, and go trials, for which the cues consisted of 
British faces or flags. This distinction was included to ensure that participants 
were processing the cue stimuli, for which no direct response requirement was 
incorporated. In addition to the go/no-go distinction, the cues and the name-face 
displays were combined in four conditions under each level of target-distractor 
congruency (i. e. name-face: same vs. different occupation). These conditions 
involved presenting a face for 67 ms followed by a name-face display (in the Short 
Face condition), presenting a face for 500 ms followed by a name-face display 
(the Long Face condition), or presenting a flag for 67 ms followed by a name-face 
display (the Short Flag condition), and a flag for 500 ms followed by a name-face 
display (the Long Flag condition). Thus, the interference phase was identical 
100 
across all conditions, which varied only in cue type (face vs. flag) and SOA (500 
ms vs. 67 ms). 
The specific stimulus pairings for all conditions were created online during the 
experiment via a PsyScope Factor Table, which was programmed so that each 
possible combination was equally likely to occur for each participant. The only 
exceptions were no-go trials, which were only half as likely to occur as go trials. 
Due to the use of a Factor table for trial generation, for some interference displays 
the name target and the face distractor were of the same person. The probability of 
this event was 1/24. Such trials may produce larger congruency effects, than trials 
in which the name and face of different persons are paired under congruent 
conditions (see Young et al, 1986). In contrast to Experiments 4-6, however, in 
which targets and distractors were never taken from the same person to avoid 
perceptual matching of targets and distractors in the within-category conditions, 
such strategies cannot account for name-face interference. 
Procedure Each trial began with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, followed by a cue 
item. This was displayed at fixation for 67 ms or 500 ms, and was replaced by a 
blank ISI for 50 ms, which was in turn replaced by a name-face display for 200 
ms, and a final blank interval until a response was registered (see Figure 3.9 
overleaf). Subjects were instructed to classify the name target as belonging to a 
pop-star or a politician as quickly and as accurately as possible while ignoring the 
face distractors, but only provided that it was preceded by a British face or a 
British flag. For non-British cues, subjects were instructed to press the space bar 
following the presentation of the interference displays (to initiate the next trial). A 
short warning tone again gave feedback for errors. Button-press latencies were 
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measured from the onset of the name-face displays. Subjects completed one 
practice block of 36 trials and three experimental blocks of 120 randomly ordered 
trials. Subjects were given breaks between blocks, and initiated each block by 
pressing the space bar. 
Fixation Cross, 
1000 ms 
Face (or Flag) C 
67 or 500 ms 
Interstimulus 
Interval, 50 ms 
Name-Face Into 
Display, 200 rr 
Figure 3.9 Example of a go-trial from Experiment 8. After a 1000 msec fixation, the cue 
displays were presented for 67 msec (on Short trials) or 500 msec (on Long trials), 
followed by a blank screen for 50 msec. The response-competition displays were then 
presented for 200 msec, followed by a further blank screen until a response was made. 
The cue could be a face or a flag. Subjects were asked to make an occupational 
categorization response (pop-star vs. politician) to the name target of the interference 
displays, but only if it was preceded by a British face or a British flag. 
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Results 
The data from two subjects with overall error rates of 28% and 49% were excluded 
from the analysis. Accuracy was high for go and no-go face conditions (errors, 
4.2% and 2.7%), which confirms that responses were based on information from 
the cue as well as the interference displays. For go conditions, the means of the 
median correct RTs and percentage error rates were computed for each level of 
cue type (face vs. flag), SOA (500 ms vs. 67 ms), and for each level of target- 
distractor congruency (congruent vs. incongruent occupation). The mean RTs of 
these conditions are shown in Figure 3.10. 
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V 
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Short 
Flag 
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  Incongruent 
Figure 3.10 Mean reaction times across subjects as a function of distractor congruency, 
cue type (Face vs. Flag) and SOA (Long vs. Short) in Experiment 8. Vertical bars 
represent the standard error of the means. 
A2 (face vs. flag) x2 (67 ms vs. 500 ms) x2 (congruent vs. incongruent) within- 
subjects ANOVA of the RT data revealed a main effect of cue type, 
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Short Long 
Face Flag 
F(1,25)=41.74, p<. 01, with slower responses following the presentation of face 
cue, a main effect of SOA, F(1,24)=211.38, p<. 01, with slower responses 
following short cues, and a main effect of congruency, F(1,24)=22.79, p<. 01, with 
slower responses to incongruent name-face displays. The effect of cue type was 
modified by interactions with SOA, F(1,24)=8.50, p<. 01, and congruency, 
F(1,24)=7.02, p<. 01. Simple main effect analysis revealed congruency effects in 
the Short Flag condition, F(1,24)=9.96, p<. 01, in the Long Flag condition, 
F(1,24)=12.85, p<. 01, and in the Long Face condition, F(1,24)=5.12, p<. 05, but no 
congruency effect was found in the Short Face condition, F(1,24)<1. 
Equivalent analysis was conducted for the error data. Incongruent name-face 
displays resulted in a small increase in errors in the Short Flag condition 
(incongruent 5.7% vs. congruent 5.3%), in the Long Flag condition (3.7% vs. 
2.8%), and in the Long Face condition (5.1% vs. 4.1%). However, the reverse 
pattern was found in the Short Face condition (incongruent 5.8% vs. congruent 
6.7%). ANOVA showed a main effect of SOA, F(1,24)=9.60, p<. 01, with higher 
errors following short cues. Although marginally higher errors were observed for 
the face cue conditions, no main effect of cue type was found, F(1,24)=1.43. No 
other comparisons were significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment 7 examined the temporal conditions under which interference from 
task-irrelevant face distractors is eliminated. The results show that processing the 
flags had little effect on subsequent name-face interference: for both short and 
long flag cues, irrelevant face distractors interfered reliably with name 
classification. A different response pattern was observed following the 
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presentation of the face cues. Reliable name-face interference was only found 
following Long Face displays. By contrast, face distractor interference was 
eliminated following immediately preceding, briefly presented faces. This suggests 
that the ongoing processing of a face is sufficient to prevent the processing of 
another, subsequently presented face distractor. 
However, note that face-cue processing also resulted in longer name categorization 
RTs in comparison with the flag conditions, which suggests that the face 
conditions were more difficult in this experiment. Moreover, name RTs increased 
by almost 200 ms from long face to short face displays. What seems to be 
happening here is that the ongoing processing of a face's identity was not only 
extinguishing face distractor interference but also affecting name categorization in 
a subsequent display. This dramatic decline in performance clearly needs an 
explanation. The architecture of the IAC model of person recognition (Burton, 
1998; Burton et al, 1990,1999; Burton, Young, Bruce, Johnston & Ellis, 1991; 
Burton & Bruce, 1993) provides one possible explanation for this effect. 
According to the IAC model, known faces are recognized by Face Recognition 
Units (FRUs), one of which exists for each known face. This leads to activation at 
Person Identity Node (PIN) corresponding to the classification of a person rather 
than a face. It is at this stage that people can state whether they recognize a person 
as familiar. Crucially, PINs can also receive activation from persons' names (via 
Name Recognition Units), and it is held that activation of one PIN leads to the 
inhibition of others. One possibility is then that activation of a known person's 
face, the cue item in the case of the present experiment, excites a corresponding 
person identity node (PIN) in the brain. This not only elicits face processing limits, 
thus eliminating distractor face processing, but also inhibits person recognition at a 
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general level, resulting in a dramatic increase of name categorization times. 
However, two findings suggest that this is not a likely explanation. First, although 
name RTs were slower in the face conditions, erroneous responses to the name 
targets were reasonably low in all of the conditions. This suggests that face cues 
did not prevent the processing but only affected the classification of the 
subsequent name targets. Second, it is difficult to reconcile an explanation in terms 
of PIN inhibition with the results of Experiment 5, in which face-name and name- 
name interference for famous persons was found. 
An alternative explanation could be that face cues were particularly effective at 
retaining attentional resources necessary for response to the detriment of the 
succeeding name targets, even though they did not affect whether the names were 
actually processed. At present, there is only some indirect evidence that faces have 
this ability, and this has mostly been obtained with emotionally expressive faces in 
anxious individuals (e. g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998; Fox, Russo, 
Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002). These studies show that 
classification of a simple perceptual target is slowed when a threatening face in a 
task-irrelevant location precedes it. I return to this issue in Chapter 5 to investigate 
whether faces are generally particularly effective at retaining attention in a 
classification task, in comparison with other stimulus classes. 
Overall, the results of Experiment 8 converge with the main claim of Experiments 
4-7 that face processing is capacity limited in an interference task such that only a 
single face can be processed at a time, and extend these findings to the processing 
of temporally distinct faces. A number of previous studies have already suggested 
capacity limits for face processing (Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; Jenkins et al, 2003; 
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Palermo & Rhodes, 2002). However, these studies used very different approaches 
to the experiments reported here. Boutet & Chaudhuri (2001) used overlapping 
faces, a hypothetical situation that our face processing system is not confronted 
with outside the laboratory, while the present experiments measured the 
processing of spatially distinct faces. Palermo & Rhodes (2002) used displays of 
three faces presented substantially longer (? 1.5 s) than the faces in the present 
experiments (i. e. 200 ms), and required participants to match two peripheral faces 
before encoding a central target. Under those conditions it is likely, that the three 
faces were processed sequentially and, consequently, an exact limit in face 
processing is difficult to specify. Additionally, both these studies tested 
(immediate) memory for unfamiliar faces, rather than providing a direct test for 
face processing. Finally, Jenkins et al. (2003) only measured task-irrelevant face 
processing in a name-face interference paradigm. Without taking resources 
attributed to task-relevant processing into account, this also makes it difficult to 
make a direct inference about capacity limits. Thus, the experiments in this chapter 
add a novel set of data in support of the notion that face processing may be 
capacity limited. 
Previous studies suggesting capacity limits for face processing also observed 
different patterns for upright and inverted faces (Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; 
Jenkins et al, 2003; Palermo & Rhodes, 2001), suggesting a limit specifically for 
upright face processing. Similarly, others report that the processing of an irrelevant 
face seems unaffected by variations in task-relevant processing load of nonface 
stimuli (Jenkins et al, 2002; Lavie et al, 2003), again suggesting a face processing 
capacity. Although the present experiments were not intended to examine face- 
specificity, the results also converge with these suggestions by demonstrating 
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capacity limits in face processing under conditions that allow the processing of 
multiple stimuli: single face distractors were processed alongside nonface targets 
in Experiments 4-6 and subsequent to nonface stimuli in Experiment 8, and none 
of the nonface comparisons (forenames, famous names, images of national flags) 
in Experiments 4-7 displayed analogous processing limits. 
Alternatively, it is conceivable that the processing of faces, which are a visually 
complex and homogeneous category of stimuli, is simply more demanding of 
general resources than processing printed names or images of flags. Thus, two 
faces might exceed general processing capacity, even when two flags or two 
names, or a face and a flag/name do not. Therefore, some nonface stimuli may be 
subject to corresponding processing limits. Likewise, some face-specific 
phenomena have repeatedly been attributed to the fact that we possess a great level 
of expertise in face processing (see e. g. Gauthier & Logothetis, 2000), which is 
required to discriminate between highly similar exemplars of a particular class. 
One might thus expect that other visual stimuli, for which we possess a high level 
of expertise, may be subject to such processing limits. However, target RTs were 
as fast or faster for face targets than for nonface targets in Experiments 4-6, which 
suggests that face processing was no more difficult than the processing of the 
comparison stimuli, and the error data support this impression. In addition, Jenkins 
et al (2003) report that an intact, irrelevant face produces no more dilution of 
object-word interference than a phase-shifted face. If faces are simply a 
disproportionate drain on general resources, it is hard to see why this should be so; 
one would expect them to produce disproportionate dilution in that situation. 
Although many theories of attention already propose separate modality-specific 
processing limits (see e. g. Pashler, 1998; Schmitt, Postma & de Haan, 2000, 
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2001), the present results might thus reflect finer, domain-specific subdivisions of 
processing limits, acting to constrain processing of a particular range of stimuli 
within the same modality. 
Several other aspects of the present findings merit further discussion. First, in 
Experiments 4-6, face distractors interfered more with the categorization of names 
and flags than these stimuli interfered with faces. This replicates Young et al 
(1986) who observed the same pattern in a semantic categorization task. Young et 
al (1986) suggested that this pattern emerges from the encoding of visual 
information, whereby faces may be encoded into a form that particularly suits 
categorization tasks in contrast to names, which may be encoded for naming tasks. 
In fact, in naming tasks names do seem to interfere more with faces than vice versa 
(Young et al, 1986). However, according to this explanation it is difficult to see 
why faces should interfere more with flags in the nationality task of Experiment 5 
than flags interfered with faces. If anything, flags should have been coded more 
readily into a nationality than faces, which are more visually complex than the 
salient flag patterns and code much more information than a person's nationality 
(e. g. sex, emotional expression, occupation). 
Second, in Experiment 7 multiple face distractors not only failed to interfere with 
the classification of the face targets but also the nonface targets, images of flags. It 
is conceivable that multiple face distractors do not interfere with nonface targets 
for the same reason that a single face distractor produces more interference than a 
nonface stimulus, with the notable exception of when a face target is paired with a 
face distractor. There have been numerous recent claims that faces are amongst a 
class of stimuli capable of capturing attention, even under conditions that deem 
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this unlikely. For example, Vuilleumier (2000) observed that line-drawn faces are 
detected more frequently in the neglected field of patients suffering from unilateral 
neglect than written names, meaningless shapes, or scrambled faces. Similarly, 
faces may have an advantage in capturing attention in neurological normal 
participants. Thus, normal participants detect an intact schematic face more 
quickly amongst an array of scrambled faces than a scrambled face amongst intact 
face distractors (Mack, Pappas, Silvermann & Gay, 2002). Schematic faces are 
also detected more often in a stream of visual stimuli than inverted faces or 
nonface comparisons (Mack et al, 2002). In addition, Ro, Russell & Lavie (2001) 
showed that participants noticed changes concerning pictures of real faces more 
accurately and more quickly than for other objects in a change detection paradigm 
(but see Palermo & Rhodes, 2003). 
If faces do capture attention, one might expect solitary face distractors to interfere 
strongly with relevant nonface processing by drawing processing resources to the 
distractor location (as in Experiments 4-6). And if face processing involved limited 
resources, one might expect it to fail when confronted with several simultaneously 
presented competing inputs of equal status, such as the four task-irrelevant face 
distractors in Experiment 7. In contrast, if competition between simultaneously 
presented faces can be resolved, for example, by deliberate attention to one of 
them (e. g. a fixated target face), that privileged face could plausibly monopolize 
the limited resources, to the detriment of other faces present (i. e. the distractor 
faces in Experiments 4-8). 
The final chapter of this thesis provides a fuller discussion of the question whether 
the conditions in which faces tend to capture attention are related to those in which 
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capacity limits seem to apply. For the moment, the exact locus of any `bottleneck' 
in face processing remains difficult to specify. The present results only imply that 
face distractor processing, under conditions capable of elucidating capacity limits, 
stops short of full semantic analysis. Yet, it seems unlikely that these processing 
limits are located at a semantic level, as faces interfered with names and national 
flags during semantic classification. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that 
capacity limits in face processing occur at an earlier, perceptual stage, since even 
salient face-related sex information was unavailable in face-face displays. 
However, sex and identity are dissociable face dimensions (Bruce et al, 1987; Ellis 
et al, 1990), and a processing limit for one of these does not imply the same limit 
for the other. Moreover, extinguished distractor faces presumably undergo some 
superficial processing. At the very least they must register as faces at some level, 
otherwise multiple distractor faces would not compete for processing resources. 
Therefore, the aim of the next chapter is to examine whether the present face 
processing limits apply prior to semantics. 
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Chapter 4 Capacity Limits for Face Processing: 
Repetition Priming of Distractor Faces from Two-item 
Displays 
Introduction 
The experiments in Chapter 3 examined whether responses to face targets can be 
affected by concurrently presented distractor faces in interference paradigms. In 
the first study, Experiment 4, participants were required to classify the sex of 
unfamiliar faces or short forenames, while ignoring a face or name distractor in the 
display. Subsequent experiments repeated this design with famous faces and 
famous names (Experiment 5), famous faces and images of national flags 
(Experiment 6& 7), or a combination of both (Experiment 8), and with a single 
distractor stimulus (Experiments 4-6 & 8) or multiple distractors (Experiment 7) in 
semantic classification tasks. These experiments demonstrated that interference 
from distractor faces is extinguished by processing a face, but not by processing 
nonface stimuli (e. g. names, flags). This distractor extinction effect occurred in a 
context in which faces interfered with nonface targets, and nonface distractors 
interfered with the classification of both face and nonface targets. Collectively, 
these findings suggest that face processing may be capacity-limited, such that only 
a single face can be processed at a time. 
The question that is addressed in this chapter is whether these processing limits are 
still observed in tasks that do not require semantic or sex processing. According to 
established models of person recognition, the retrieval of personal semantic 
information is relatively deep and follows face identification (e. g. Bruce & Young, 
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1986; Burton, Bruce & Hancock, 1999; Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990). Several 
lines of evidence also indicate that sex and identity information from faces are 
processed independently and in parallel (e. g. Bruce, 1986; Bruce, Ellis, Gibling & 
Young, 1987). Consequently, the possibility remains that extinguished distractor 
faces were processed at some level during face target classification. Indeed, in 
Chapter 3 it was already suggested that these distractors might at least undergo 
some superficial processing to compete for limited processing resources. Such 
processing could extend beyond that minimum, perhaps involving access to face 
identity. 
One established method of assessing whether a visual stimulus has been processed 
is repetition priming. This is a facilitation in processing an item due to prior 
exposure to that item. In the face domain, such tasks typically consist of a prime 
phase during which participants are exposed to famous faces, followed by an 
interval of a few minutes and an unexpected test phase involving familiarity 
judgements (famous/unfamiliar) to primed and unprimed famous faces and some 
unfamiliar filler faces. The reliable finding here is that responses to primed faces 
are faster than to unprimed famous faces and unfamiliar faces (e. g. Bruce & 
Valentine, 1985; Ellis, Young, Flude & Hay, 1987) 
Repetition priming is a robust and long lasting effect, that is even found when 
different images of the same person's face are used (e. g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985; 
Ellis, Flude, Young & Burton, 1996), across changes in context (e. g. location, task, 
Bruce, Carson, Burton & Kelly, 1998), and persists over radically altered but still 
recognizable representations of a face (e. g. part-face to whole-face, Brunas, Young 
& Ellis, 1990). However, although repetition priming proceeds independent of the 
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judgement being made at prime phase (Ellis, Young & Flude, 1990), and even 
when no explicit judgement is required (Jenkins, Burton & Ellis, 2002), it is 
usually not observed onto sex or expression decisions at test (Ellis et al, 1990; but 
see Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000, who obtained priming using part-faces), or 
onto familiarity decisions when priming of unfamiliar faces is measured (Ellis et 
al, 1990). In addition, repetition priming is domain-specific when the typical 
familiarity decision is used. Thus, faces prime faces and names prime names, but 
one type of stimulus does not prime the other (e. g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985; 
Burton, Kelly & Bruce, 1998; Ellis et al, 1996). Consequently, it is held that 
repetition priming operates within the system that responds to facial identity (e. g. 
Burton et al, 1990,1999; Ellis et al, 1990), which becomes activated automatically 
by any recognizable view of a known person's face. Note that this type of priming 
can be dissociated from cross-domain repetition priming which occurs when 
semantic judgements are used at prime and test (Burton et al, 1998; McNeill, 
Burton & Ellis, 2003), reflecting shared semantic access to faces and names 
following person recognition. Unlike the interference paradigms of the preceding 
chapter, domain-specific priming can therefore be used to assess face identity 
processing directly, independent of subsequent semantic processing. 
The following experiments utilized this characteristic to provide a further test for 
face processing limits. Of specific interest was whether repetition priming would 
reveal any evidence of face distractor processing when it is presented alongside a 
task-relevant face target, in comparison with the extinction of face-face 
interference in Chapter 3. Jenkins, Burton & Ellis (2002) report that irrelevant 
famous face distractors are primed automatically during nonface target processing, 
even under conditions of high relevant processing load and when participants have 
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no recollection of seeing these faces at prime phase. If several 
faces can be 
processed simultaneously, one might thus also expect some repetition priming 
from task-irrelevant famous distractor faces during task-relevant face processing. 
Experiment 9 
Experiment 9 examined capacity limits in face processing by measuring repetition 
priming from two-item displays. To provide an analogue to the interference 
displays of Chapter 3, the subjects' task was to classify famous face targets or 
nonface comparisons, in this case images of national flags, as American or British 
while ignoring a flanking famous face distractor. Within these displays faces could 
be primed under three conditions: i) as task-relevant face targets (the Target Face 
condition), ii) as irrelevant face distractors that were presented alongside these 
face targets (the Face-Face condition), and iii) as irrelevant face distractors 
presented alongside flag targets (the Flag-Face condition). The extent to which 
these faces were processed was then assessed in a surprise test phase via speeded 
familiarity judgements (famous/unfamiliar) to primed famous faces, unprimed 
famous faces and some unfamiliar filler faces. The unprimed famous faces were 
included as a baseline (the Unprimed condition) to determine whether face 
distractors were subject to any repetition priming. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, repetition priming can usually be 
seen even when different images of the same person's face are used at prime and 
test, reflecting repeated processing within the face recognition system. The present 
experiment therefore measured cross-image priming to determine whether 
irrelevant face distractors can be processed to recognition. Face targets should 
produce the standard pattern of repetition priming, and comparisons with this 
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condition and the Unprimed condition should indicate the extent of any distractor 
priming effects. If identity information from two faces can be processed 
simultaneously, then face distractors should show repetition priming regardless of 
target type. Alternatively, if such processing is limited to just a single face, then 
distractor priming should be eliminated in the Face-Face condition. However, 
since face distractors interfered strongly with nonface target classification in the 
preceding chapter, the Flag-Face condition should allow for reliable distractor 
priming. 
Method 
Subjects Thirty-two British undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow, aged 20-28 years, were paid a small fee to participate in the experiment. 
All reported normal or correct vision. 
Design & Stimuli For the prime phase, photographs of forty British and of forty 
American celebrities (see Appendix B), and of twenty national flags (10 Stars & 
Stripes, 10 Union Jacks) served as stimuli. All images were greyscale and 
measured 3.6 cm x 4.5 cm (3.4° x 4.3° of VA at a viewing distance of 60 cm). 
Faces were presented with their external features intact (i. e. hair, face outline) and 
the flags were manually cropped to roughly elliptical shapes to produce a closer 
resemblance with the face stimuli. These images were used to construct displays 
consisting of a central target, which could be either a face or a flag, and a flanking 
face distractor (see Figure 4.1 overleaf). Distractors were equally likely to appear 
left or right of the target, 1.0 cm (1.0° of VA) from the nearest target contours, and 
were counterbalanced so that target and distractor were of the same nationality and 
of the same sex (face-face pairings only) in half of the displays. Combining each 
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of the 20 flag targets and the same number of face targets with a face distractor 
resulted in 40 stimulus displays. Overall, this involved 60 of the 80 face stimuli. 
The 20 remaining face identities were reserved as unprimed controls for the 
second phase. The 80 face images were rotated around these conditions so that 
over the course of the whole experiment, each famous face appeared in each 
condition an equal number of times. 
Prime Phase Displays: 
1.1 . 
{- 
Unfamiliar 
Figure 4.1 Illustration of the experimental conditions in Experiment 9. At prime phase, 
displays consisting of a face or flag target and a flanking face distractor were shown for 
200 msec in an American/British categorization task. At test phase, repetition priming of 
these faces was assessed via familiarity judgements (famous versus unfamiliar) to 
different photographs of the primed face targets (the Target Face condition) and the 
distractors (in the Face-Face and Flag-Face conditions), and to photographs of unseen 
famous faces (the Unprimed baseline condition) and some unfamiliar filler faces. The 
famous faces here are, from left to right at test phase: Rowan Atkinson, Harrison Ford, 
Britney Spears, and Keanu Reaves. 
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Test 
Phases Conditinns: " 
Face-Face Tarqet Face Flag-Face Unprlrned 
Different (unseen) images of the same 80 celebrities' faces, intermixed with 80 
unfamiliar faces, were used in the test phase in a speeded familiarity task 
(see 
Figure 4.1). The unfamiliar faces were photographs of anonymous male and 
female models, which provided a close match for the famous faces in terms of 
image quality, approximate age and good looks. All images were presented in 
greyscale at fixation, one at a time, at a size of 6.0 cm x 7.5 cm (5.7° x 7.3° of VA) 
on a dark background. An Apple Macintosh computer was used to present stimuli 
and record responses using PsyScope 1.2.5. Viewing distance was fixed at 60 cm 
by means of a chinrest. 
Procedure In the prime phase, each trial began with a fixation cross for 750 ms, 
followed by a target-distractor display for 200 ms (i. e. too briefly to permit 
stimulus-responsive saccades), and a blank screen which remained on until a 
response was registered. Subjects made speeded judgements concerning whether 
the central target was American or British by pressing one of two buttons ("D" and 
"L") on a standard computer keyboard, but were emphatically instructed to ignore 
the task-irrelevant distractors. Subjects were encouraged to guess if they were 
uncertain regarding the correct answer. If no response was made within 2.5 
seconds of stimulus onset, the next trial was initiated. All subjects underwent a 
short practice block of 16 trials, consisting of an additional 4 flags and 12 famous 
face images. Each of these images was displayed twice during practice and none 
were encountered subsequently. An experimental block of 40 randomly intermixed 
trials followed the practice block. 
Upon completion of the prime phase subjects were instructed to remain seated at 
the computer by an onscreen message. The experimenter then entered the 
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laboratory and initiated the (unexpected) test phase. In this phase, each trial 
consisted of a fixation cross for 750 ms, followed by a single face image, which 
was displayed at fixation until a response had been made. Subjects were told to 
make famous/unfamiliar judgements to these faces as quickly and as accurately as 
possible via a two-choice keypress response ("C" vs. ". "). Subjects underwent 4 
blocks consisting of 20 famous and 20 unfamiliar trials presented in random order. 
They were able to rest between blocks, initiating the next block by pressing the 
space bar. 
Results 
Priming Phase Accuracy in the prime phase was important for confirming that 
subjects were focussing on the target stimuli. Incorrect responses were discarded 
and mean RTs and error rates were calculated for responses to face and flag 
targets. The cross-subject averages of these means were: face targets 915 msec 
(error rates 19.4%), flag targets 715 msec (error rates 7.8%). Prime phase data was 
not analyzed further. 
Test Phase The data of principal interest were the responses to primed and 
unprimed famous faces at test phase. Incorrect responses and RTs exceeding 2 
seconds (less than 1% of correct responses) were excluded from analysis. The 
mean RTs and error rates, averaged across subjects, are shown in Figure 4.2 as a 
function of experimental condition. 
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Figure 4.2 Mean correct responses (n=32) to famous faces in the surprise test phase of 
Experiment 9. Performance is shown as a function of prime type; Target Face, Flag-Face, 
Face-Face, and Unprimed. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA (Target Face versus Face-Face versus 
Flag-Face versus Unprimed) showed an effect of prime type, F(3,93)=19.64 
p<. 01. Post hoc comparisons with Tukey's HSD test (p<. 05) revealed more 
repetition priming in the Target Face condition in comparison with each of the 
other conditions (Face-Face, Flag-Face, and Unprimed), indicating greatest 
repetition priming for task-relevant faces. More importantly, the Flag-Face 
condition also showed significant repetition priming in comparison with both the 
Face-Face and the Unprimed conditions (p<. 05). However, there was no 
difference between the Face-Face condition and the Unprimed condition. 
Errors were made on 11.4% of Target Face trials, 13.6% of Flag-Face trials, 
16.3% of Face-Face trials, and on 14.7% of Unprimed trials. Error rates were 
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analysed using a one-factor (Target Face versus Face-Face versus Flag-Face 
versus Unprimed) ANOVA, which showed a main effect of prime type, 
F(3,93)=3.33, p<. 05, reflecting higher errors for Face-Face primes than Target 
Face primes (Tukey's HSD, p<. 05). No other comparisons were significant. 
Discussion 
The results show maximal repetition priming for face targets, reflecting the task- 
relevance of these images at prime phase. Irrelevant face distractors also showed 
repetition priming when presented with flag targets. Although this priming effect 
was smaller than for the face targets, this processing evidently involved access to 
the distractors' identities since it survived a change in image between prime and 
test. By contrast, no priming was found for face distractors during face target 
processing. Given that face priming has previously been shown to be unaffected 
by relevant nonface processing, even under conditions of high processing load 
(Jenkins et al, 2002), the absence of any reliable priming effects in this condition is 
striking. Overall however, the present data are analogous to the findings of 
Chapter 3, where face distractor interference was consistently extinguished by 
relevant face but not by relevant nonface processing. Thus the results further 
support the claim that face processing is capacity limited. In contrast to Chapter 3, 
face processing was now measured prior to personal semantic information and 
independent of facial sex. The present findings therefore exclude the possibility 
that the previously observed extinction of face-face interference reflects 
processing limits only for sex information or at a semantic level, and extends these 
limits to facial identity. 
121 
Experiment 10 
The preceding experiment showed that face target processing eliminates cross- 
image repetition priming of a simultaneously presented face distractor. Although 
these findings converge with the idea that face processing is capacity limited, they 
are nonetheless surprising as repetition priming onto familiarity decisions usually 
proceeds automatically at prime phase, thus greatly minimizing any face 
processing demands (see e. g. Ellis et al, 1990; Jenkins et al, 2002). The basis for 
the next experiment is the observation that greatest repetition priming is observed 
when identical images are used at prime and test (e. g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985; 
Ellis et al, 1987). In this way, it might thus be possible to further optimize the 
conditions for face distractor priming. 
Intriguingly, same-image repetition priming has never been found under 
conditions that do not allow cross-image priming. However, the possibility exists 
that a same-image priming advantage might arise to some extent independent of 
the face recognition system. Some researchers propose that this effect could be 
attributed to facilitation at a separate "pictorial" memory stage (e. g. Jacoby, 1983; 
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) or from a processing overlap in the visual system between 
prime and test phase (e. g. Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, 1990; for a possible 
explanation see also Ellis, Burton, Young & Flude, 1997). Such "episodic" 
accounts emphasize the retrieval of stored event memories, whereby repetition 
priming is optimized when the processing requirements of prime and test phase are 
most similar. On their own, these accounts are not sufficient to explain repetition 
priming of familiar faces. For instance, repetition priming across radically 
different images of the same person (e. g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Brunas et al, 
1990), cross-domain priming from faces to names (Burton et al, 1998), and reports 
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that repetition priming is not observed onto sex or expression judgements when the 
same faces and the same decisions to these faces are used at prime and test (Ellis et 
al, 1990) all resist effortless accommodation into purely episodic accounts. 
Nonetheless, several studies have also reported priming for unfamiliar faces, 
effects that are unlikely to arise within the face recognition system. In one study, 
Khurana (2000) asked participants to match the second and the fourth face in a 
row of five unfamiliar faces while ignoring the three remaining distractor faces. 
Negative priming was found when the face targets consisted of the to-be-ignored 
distractors of the preceding trials. In addition, repetition priming was found when 
distractors were disrupted with high frequency noise or contrast inverted2. Others 
also report some long term negative priming effects with unfamiliar faces in more 
conventional priming designs (Ellis et al, 1990, Experiment 2; Young, McWeeney, 
Hay & Ellis, 1986b, Experiment 4), which provides further evidence that 
information from unfamiliar faces is represented at some level in the visual 
system. Moreover, negative priming and repetition priming have recently been 
observed with novel object shapes, for which subjects could not possess stored, 
pre-existing representations (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996). This provides at 
least some suggestive evidence that same-image priming might occur at a general 
processing stage, operating independent of the face recognition system. Even if 
face distractors are not subject to cross-image priming during face target 
processing, they might therefore still produce some same-image priming. This was 
the focus of the present experiment. As before, subjects performed a nationality 
2 Note that these results do not contradict present claims for face processing limits, as displays 
were presented for a substantial duration, until a response was made. Under those conditions, the 
faces may have been processed sequentially. 
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categorization task onto famous faces and images of flags while trying to ignore a 
flanking famous face distractor, and any face processing at this stage was then 
assessed via speeded familiarity judgements to primed and unprimed faces. In 
contrast to Experiment 9, identical face sets were now used at prime and at test 
phase. 
Method 
Subjects Thirty-six British undergraduate students from the University of 
Glasgow, aged 18-30 years, were paid a small fee to participate in the experiment. 
All reported normal or corrected vision and had not participated in the previous 
experiment. 
Stimuli& Procedure Apparatus, stimuli and procedure were the same as those in 
Experiment 9, except that the face images used in the prime phase were now the 
same as those used in the test phase. As in Experiment 1, the participants 
completed a practice block of 16 trials and an experimental block of 40 trials in the 
priming phase. This was followed by an unexpected test phase consisting of 4 
blocks of 40 familiarity judgements. 
Priming Phase Incorrect responses to face targets were discarded and mean correct 
RTs and error rates were then calculated for responses to face and flag targets. The 
average of these means across subjects for each target type were: face targets 959 
msec (error rates 16.6%), flag targets 811 msec (error rates 10.4%). 
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Test Phase Incorrect responses and RTs exceeding 2 seconds were excluded from 
analysis (less than 1% of all correct `famous' responses). The mean RTs and error 
rates across subjects are shown in Figure 4.3 as a function of experimental 
condition. 
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Figure 4.3 Mean correct responses (n=36) to famous faces in the test phase of Experiment 
10. Performance is shown as a function of prime type; Target Face, Flag-Face, Face- 
Face, and Unprimed. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA (Target Face versus Face-Face versus 
Flag-Face versus Unprimed) showed an effect of prime type, F(3,105)=30.46, 
p<. 01. As in Experiment 9, Tukey's HSD test (p<. 01) showed more priming in the 
Target Face condition than in the Face-Face condition, the Flag-Face condition 
and the Unprimed condition. This time however, peripheral faces produced 
significant repetition priming whether presented with a flag target or a face target 
(Flag-Face versus Unprimed, p<. 01; Face-Face versus Unprimed, p<. 05). As 
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expected, these priming effects were numerically larger in the Flag-Face 
condition, but this difference (of 10 msec) did not reach significance. 
Error rates were analysed as for the M. Incorrect responses were made on 6.0% 
of Target Face trials, 9.9% of Flag-Face trials, 10.3% of Face-Face trials, and on 
11.3% of Unprimed trials. ANOVA showed a main effect of prime type, 
F(3,105)=6.05, p<. 01, reflecting fewer errors in the Target Face condition in 
comparison with each of the other conditions (versus Flag-Face, p<. 05; versus 
Face-Face, p<. 01; versus Unprimed, p<. 01). No other comparisons were 
significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment 9 sought to determine whether famous face distractors are subject to 
cross-image repetition priming while a fixated target is classified. The results 
showed that distractor faces produce priming, but only during nonface target 
processing. By contrast, distractor priming was eliminated during face target 
processing. Experiment 10 repeated this design with identical stimuli at prime and 
test. As before, repetition priming was obtained for face targets. However, unlike 
Experiment 9 reliable repetition priming was now also observed for face 
distractors regardless of target type. These results have several implications. 
Although repetition priming is a well-researched area, these experiments 
demonstrate a dissociation between cross-image and same-image repetition 
priming of distractor faces. Moreover, despite converging claims from 
Experiments 4-9 that face processing is capacity limited to just a single face, from 
the present data it appears that a second face in a display, in the form of a task- 
irrelevant distractor, is nonetheless processed by the visual system during face 
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target processing. How can these different results be reconciled? The finding that 
repetition priming survives changes in image has repeatedly been attributed to 
changes within the system that processes the perceptual identity of a face. This 
system is clearly capable of a great degree of generalization, since familiar faces 
are recognized even under difficult conditions (see e. g. Bruce, Henderson, 
Newman & Cowan, 2001). Therefore, the absence of cross-image distractor 
priming during face target processing in Experiment 9, suggests that the distractor 
faces were not recognized. As the same design was applied in the present 
experiment, one can assume that the face distractors of this condition were not 
recognized here either. However, since these faces did show same-image priming, 
the question remains to what extent they were processed. 
Repetition priming is consistently greatest when identical face images are used. In 
the introduction to this experiment, it was suggested that a same-image priming 
advantage might at least partially arise from additional facilitation at a general 
processing stage prior to face recognition. However, the existence of such a stage 
is a contentious issue. On the one side, negative priming effects have been 
observed for unfamiliar faces (Khurana, 2000; Ellis et al, 1990; Young et al, 
1986b), and for novel object shapes (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996). Because 
subjects could not have maintained stored representations of these stimuli prior to 
the experiments, it seems unlikely that these effects occurred within the 
recognition system. Yet, if the face distractors of the Face-Face condition were 
processed similarly to unfamiliar faces and novel objects, then should they not also 
have produced negative rather than repetition priming? Crucially, Khurana (2000) 
found that unfamiliar faces produce repetition priming when the face stimuli are 
contrast-inverted or disrupted with high frequency noise between prime and test. 
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DeSchepper & Treisman (1996) also observed facilitation when the size of novel 
object shapes was changed between prime and test. Moreover, these priming 
effects were long-lived, indicating that they did not simply reflect transient 
activation patterns within early visual pathways, but that shape information was 
stored long term. Note that stimulus size was also manipulated in the present 
experiments (3.6 x 4.5 cm at prime versus 6.0 x 7.5 cm at test), and that the same- 
image priming effects survived across a considerable number of intervening trials 
between the presentation of the faces at prime and at test phase. The observation of 
repetition priming in the Face-Face condition in Experiment 10 therefore appears 
consistent with previous experiments using unfamiliar faces and novel shapes, and 
suggests that these effects might be located at a general processing stage, perhaps 
akin to a pictorial memory store outside the face recognition system. 
A potential problem for this explanation is the observation that repetition priming 
is not observed onto sex or expression decisions when the same faces are used at 
prime and test (Ellis et al, 1990). However, since repetition priming enhances the 
speed at which stimuli are processed over successive presentations, visual stimuli 
that are frequently encountered should operate closer to the limit at which a 
stimulus can be processed. Sex and expression decisions to faces are categorical, 
and the number of these categories is extremely limited in comparison to the 
seemingly infinite number of faces encountered in everyday life (e. g. Etcoff & 
Magee, 1992). Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of faces, expression 
judgements may be made with much greater frequency than identity and sex 
decisions. Thus one might expect less priming for expression than for sex 
information, and less priming for both these types of information than for face 
identity. In line with this reasoning, sex and expression judgements are already 
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relatively fast, and although repetition priming is usually not found onto these 
decisions (but see Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000; McNeill & Burton, 2003), 
more often than not sex decisions show small non-significant priming patterns 
(Ellis et al, 1990; McNeill & Burton, 2003). Consequently, the absence of 
repetition priming onto sex and expression decisions does not rule out the 
existence of a general processing component in same-image priming. The 
experiments in this chapter indicate that such same-image priming might be 
dissociable from priming within the face recognition system. However, at present 
Experiment 9 provides the only evidence that processing a face eliminates cross- 
image repetition priming of another face. Therefore, before reaching this strong 
conclusion it is necessary to replicate the key findings from Experiment 9, in 
particular the absence of cross-image repetition priming in the Face-Face 
condition. This is the purpose of the next experiment. 
Experiment 11 
The purpose of the final experiment of this chapter was two-fold. The first aim 
was to replicate the extinction of cross-image distractor priming that was observed 
during face target processing in Experiment 9. The second aim was to explore the 
visual properties that may be required to elicit face processing limits. A striking 
aspect of the preceding experiments, including Chapter 3, is that classifying 
nonface targets was never sufficient for eliminating distractor processing at and 
beyond the level at which faces are recognized. However, although the preceding 
experiments used nonface targets for which an equivalent face classification task 
could be made, none of these stimuli resembled any of the physical attributes of 
faces. Therefore, these findings do not imply that other `face-like' visual stimuli 
are not capable of eliciting face processing limits. 
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A number of researchers have shown that even simple face-like schema may 
automatically activate face processing. For example, Suzuki & Cavanagh (1995) 
observed a cost in feature search for a single up-turned arc among down-turned 
arcs, when the arcs were arranged in sets of three in a face-like configuration. 
Similarly, Mack, Pappas, Silverman & Gay (2002) found that a happy face icon, 
consisting of an outer circle and two round dots above an upwards-arched line, is 
detected more frequently in a crowded display than a scrambled stimulus 
consisting of the same features. If these properties are sufficient for engaging face 
processes, then face-like stimuli might also be capable of eliminating cross-image 
face distractor priming. As a consequence, it might be possible to isolate some of 
the visual properties that determine face processing limits. 
To examine this possibility, the current experiment used images of frontal and 
three-quarter rear and full rear view photographs of American and British cars as 
targets. Human faces have two horizontally separated eyes positioned vertically 
above a wide central mouth, in the context of a general left-right symmetry. 
Similarly, car fronts possess two horizontally separate and often circular 
headlamps above a wide central grille, again in the context of a general left-right 
symmetry. Like the schematic stimuli of previous studies (e. g. Mack et al, 2002; 
Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1995), these features occasionally provide a striking 
resemblance to faces. Therefore, similar to photographs of genuine face targets, 
cross-image priming of distractor faces could be greatly reduced or extinguished 
by photographs of car fronts. On the other side, three-quarter rear views and full 
back views of cars often possess similar features to car fronts, such as rear-lights, 
and full car backs also exhibit a great degree of symmetry, but these views usually 
do not appear to resemble faces to the same extent. Thus, car fronts might engage 
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face processing limits when car backs do not. Experiment 11 addressed this 
possibility by measuring cross-image face priming under four conditions: i) from 
task-relevant face targets (the Face Target condition); ii) from face distractors 
presented alongside a relevant face target (the Face-Face condition); iii) from face 
distractors presented alongside images of car fronts (the Front-Face condition); 
and iv) from face distractors presented alongside images of three-quarter and full 
rear views of cars (the Back-Face condition). As before, an Unprimed condition 
was also included as a baseline. 
Method 
pilot Study Before describing the main experiment, the perceived nationality and 
the perceived faceness of car images was examined directly in two rating tasks. 
One aim of this preliminary study was to ensure that the car images provided an 
intuitive analogue in terms of nationality to the famous face stimuli at prime phase, 
even for participants with limited knowledge about cars. The second more 
important aim was to verify the hypothesis that the perceived faceness of car fronts 
is greater than car backs. In the nationality rating tasks, 10 participants (all 
undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow) were instructed to sort 
decks of 40 car images into two piles. These images consisted of 20 typical 
American cars and 20 typical British cars, exactly half of which depicted car fronts 
with the other half depicting cars from three-quarter and full rear view (see Figure 
4.4 overleaf). 
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Figure 4.4 Example displays of the car stimuli used in Experiment 11. The stimuli 
consisted of photographs of face-like car fronts and photographs of face-unlike three- 
quarter and full back views of American and British automobiles. 
The sorting criterion was whether cars looked American or British. As a 
classification strategy, participants were encouraged to guess when uncertain 
regarding the correct answer, but were told that American cars generally look 
bulkier and had big chrome grills and tail fins, in comparison to the more modest, 
sportier looking British cars. These instructions proved successful as 85% of all 
cars fronts (American, 85.3% versus British, 83.8%) and 73% of other car images 
(American 73.5% versus British, 73.3%) were categorized correctly. 
Subsequently, these images were ranked according to faceness, with a rank of 1 
given to the most and 40 to the least face-like looking car. Results were consistent 
with the hypothesis that car fronts possess greater faceness than other car images, 
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American Cars British Cars 
Fronts Backs Frnnts Big cks 
with average rankings of 10.6 for car fronts (std 3.9) and of 30.1 (std 3.9) for the 
remaining images. 
ub'ec In the main experiment, 45 British students from the University of 
Glasgow, aged 18-30 years, volunteered to participate for a small fee. All subjects 
reported normal or corrected vision and had not participated in any of the previous 
experiments. 
Design & Stimuli In the prime phase, the 40 car images and photographs of 100 
celebrities (50 American & 50 British, see Appendix C) were used to construct 
stimulus displays consisting of a central target and a flanking face distractor, 
presented 1.0 cm (1.0° of VA) to the left or right of the nearest target contours. All 
images were presented in greyscale on a black background at a size of 3.6 cm x 4.5 
cm (3.4° x 4.3° of VA). Target-distractor pairings were counterbalanced so that 
they were equally likely to be of same or different nationality. Combining 20 car 
fronts, 20 car backs, and 20 famous faces with a famous face distractor resulted in 
60 target-distractor displays. Overall, this involved 80 of the 100 face images. The 
remaining celebrities' faces were reserved as unprimed controls for the test phase. 
As before, all faces were rotated across these conditions over the course of the 
experiment, so that each face appeared in each of the conditions an equal number 
of times. 
At test phase, 100 novel images of the same celebrities' faces and 100 unfamiliar 
faces were used in a familiarity task (famous vs. unfamiliar). Images were 
presented at a size of 6.0 cm x 7.5 cm (5.7° x 7.3° of VA), one at a time, on a black 
background. The experiment was run and responses were recorded on an Apple 
133 
Macintosh computer using PsyScope 1.2.5 software. Viewing distance was fixed 
at 60 cm by a chinrest. 
Procedure The procedure for the prime phase was almost identical to the preceding 
experiments, with each trial consisting of a fixation cross for 750 ms, a target- 
distractor display for 200 ms, and a blank screen until a response was registered. 
Subjects again made speeded judgements concerning the targets' nationality by 
pressing the "D" key for American targets or the "L" key for British targets. If no 
response was made within 2.5 seconds of stimulus onset, the next trial was 
initiated. For car targets, participants were not expected to possess particular car 
expertise, but were instructed to classify bulky-looking models with large chrome 
grills or tail fins as American and more modest, sportier looking cars as British. 
Subjects were encouraged to guess if they were uncertain regarding the correct 
answer. All subjects underwent a short example block of 18 trials, made up from 
an additional 6 car and 12 face images, which were not encountered in the 
experimental block. This was followed by a critical block of 60 randomly 
intermixed trials. 
The test phase was the same as for the preceding experiments, except that each 
subject now completed four blocks of 50 randomly intermixed trials. Thus, each 
block consisted of 10 more faces (5 famous, 5 unfamiliar), to accommodate the 
face stimuli from the additional priming condition. 
Results 
riming Phase Incorrect responses were discarded and the mean correct RTs and 
error rates were then calculated for responses to face and car targets. The averages 
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of these means across subjects for each target type were: face targets 946 msec 
(error rates 10.1%), car-fronts 882 msec (error rates 17.7%), and car-backs 906 
msec (error rates 21.9%). 
Test Phase Incorrect responses and RTs exceeding 2 seconds were excluded from 
the analysis (less than 1% of all correct responses). The mean RTs and error rates 
across subjects are shown in Figure 4.5 as a function of experimental condition. 
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Figure 4.5 Mean correct responses (n=45) to famous faces in the test phase of Experiment 
11. Performance is shown as a function of prime type; Target Face, Back-Face, Front- 
Face, Face-Face, and Unprimed. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA of these conditions (Face Target versus 
Back-Face versus Front-Face versus Face-Face versus Unprimed) showed an 
effect of prime type, F(4,176)=13.60, p<. 01. Target Faces showed significant 
repetition priming in comparison with the Front-Face condition, the Face-Face 
condition, and the Unprimed condition (all Tukey's HSD, p<. O1). Although RTs to 
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Target Faces were also faster than to Back-Face primes, this difference did not 
reach significance. Face distractors in the Back-Face condition also showed 
reliable priming in comparison with the Front-Face and the Face-Face condition 
and the Unprimed faces (Tukey's HSD, p<. 05). However, the Front-Face 
condition and the Face-Face condition showed no repetition priming in 
comparison with the Unprimed condition. 
Error rates were analyzed in the same way as the RTs. Errors were made on 10.8% 
of Target Face trials, 17.2% of Back-Face trials, 13.9% of Front-Face trials, 
17.0% of Face-Face trials, and on 16.3% of Unprimed trials. A one-factor within- 
subjects ANOVA showed an effect of prime type, F(4,176)=5.58. p<. 01, reflecting 
lower percentage errors to Face Target primes than to Back-Face primes, Face- 
Face primes and Unprimed faces (Tukey's HSD, p<. 05). No other comparisons 
were significant. 
Discussion 
Significant repetition priming was obtained from target faces and from distractor 
faces that flanked a car back. Since the prime phase and the test phase presented 
different images of the famous faces, these effects imply that the faces were 
processed to the point of identification in these conditions. In contrast, peripheral 
faces presented alongside a face target did not give rise to repetition priming. This 
replicates the main finding of Experiment 9, again indicating that processing the 
target face blocks identification of the accompanying flanker face, and also 
provides a further conceptual replication of the face processing limits that were 
first specified in Chapter 3. However, the most important finding of this 
experiment is that priming from a peripheral face was also eliminated when the 
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target was a car front. In other words, the car fronts, which were rated as face-like 
by observers, behaved like face targets in blocking identification of a peripheral 
face. In contrast, the car backs, which did not resemble faces, behaved like the flag 
targets in Experiment 9, allowing processing of the distractor faces to proceed 
unfettered. Thus this pattern appears consistent with the notion that any 
sufficiently face-like stimulus engages limited face processing resources, whether 
it is a genuine face or a `false positive'. 
However, there might be alternative explanations for these results. For example, 
although car fronts and car backs presumably possessed similar levels of visual 
complexity and homogeneity, they were not matched for low-level image 
characteristics, such as their component spatial frequencies. Yet, given the sheer 
number of car stimuli used, it would seem extraordinary if low-level features could 
account for this dissociation. Another possibility is that subjects perceive transient 
displays of car fronts as an oncoming threat. Threatening words, pictures, and 
faces have all been shown to capture processing resources in trait- and state- 
anxious individuals to the detriment of other stimuli, in comparison to their non- 
threatening counterparts (e. g. Amir, Elias, Klump & Przeworski, 2003; Fox, 
Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). If images of oncoming 
cars are perceived as equally threatening, this might contribute to distractor face 
extinction. However, the car stimuli did not contain motion cues and it seems 
unlikely that the participants, all undergraduate volunteers, were clinically 
anxious. Moreover, there is now considerable evidence that task-relevant nonface 
processing does not affect the perception of irrelevant face distractors (e. g. Boutet 
et al, 2002; Jenkins et al, 2003; Lavie et al, 2003). Consequently, it seems most 
plausible that the present findings require an explanation in terms of the perceived 
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faceness of the car stimuli. In addition to the interference data from Chapter 3, 
where analogous capacity limits were never observed for nonface comparisons 
(forenames, famous names, flags) or for any of the face-nonface pairings, 
Experiment 11 thus provides some further, innovative support for a unique role of 
faceness in the processing limits described in this thesis. 
Overall, the results of Chapter 4 are consistent with the notion of a limited face 
processing capacity, such that only a single face can be processed. When face 
processing resources are loaded by a task-relevant face target, identification of a 
task-irrelevant distractor face, as indicated by cross-image repetition priming, is 
prevented. Access to these limited resources is only granted to distractor faces 
during the processing of nonface targets, provided that they are sufficiently face- 
unlike to leave face processing resources relatively intact. In fact, the present 
findings suggest that even seemingly artificial face stimuli, such as car-fronts 
possess the ability to elucidate face processing limits. Although the data provide 
no clues to the specific nature of the face information portrayed by car fronts, it 
seems implausible that it consists of more than a general "eye-mouth" 
configuration. Future variations of this paradigm, such as manipulations of the 
visual attributes of the target stimulus, have the potential to further clarify the fate 
of face-like stimuli in the visual system, and hence the selectivity of the face 
processing system. Finally, Chapter 4 also found same-image priming of 
distractors faces when they were alongside a face target, which suggests that these 
distractors were still subject to early image processing. Note that this could still 
include processes such as face detection, which appears to be dissociable from 
face recognition (de Gelder & Rouw, 2001). This possibility is not ruled out by the 
present experiments and is another subject for future research. For now, I turn to 
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an issue that may be implicated in the results of Chapters 3&4, namely attention 
biases to faces. 
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Chapter 5 Disengagement and Engagement of 
Attention from Faces and Nonface Objects 
Introduction 
This final empirical chapter continues from face processing limits to a related 
theme, namely factors that might influence face processing in multiple-item 
displays. The experiments in Chapters 3&4 found that while distractor face 
processing was eliminated during the classification of a face target, the same face 
distractors seemed to be unaffected by nonface targets. In fact, whenever a solitary 
distractor was used in Chapter 3, the largest interference effects were consistently 
observed in the condition in which a nonface target was flanked by a face 
distractor (Experiments 4-6). Moreover, although nonface distractors interfered 
with face and nonface targets alike, these effects were generally smaller in the 
face-nonface condition. Thus, faces seemed to interfere more with task-relevant 
processing than other stimuli in these experiments, but were also subject to less 
interference. The question addressed in the current chapter is whether these 
differences could be attributed to an attentional bias for faces, which might allow 
faces to maintain a processing advantage in comparison with other visual stimuli. 
Attention researchers have identified at least two processes during which a face 
bias could arise, disengagement of attention from one stimulus and engagement of 
attention by another (see e. g. Posner, 1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, 
Snyder & Davidson, 1990; Theeuwes, 1991; Theeuwes, de Vries & Godijn, 2003). 
A disengagement bias refers to the ability of a focused-on stimulus to retain or to 
hold attentive resources. This occurs after the initial orienting to that stimulus and 
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is characterized by less efficient processing of other stimuli within the visual field. 
Engagement, on the other hand, increases alertness to the spatial location of 
another stimulus and enhances its processing. This distinction between the ability 
to retain and to engage attention certainly seems consistent with Experiments 4-6, 
where faces appeared to have an advantage as both relevant targets and irrelevant 
distractors whenever they were paired with a nonface object, but has not always 
been applied to the face domain. Studies that have ignored this distinction 
generally argue that faces may have a propensity to engage or to capture attention 
(e. g. Mack, Pappas, Silverman & Gay, 2002; Ro, Russell & Lavie, 2001; 
Vuilleumier, 2000), whereas others have attributed attention biases to a difficulty 
in disengagement, although this may only occur under specific conditions (e. g. 
Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001). 
A variety of sources have suggested that faces may have an advantage in capturing 
or engaging attention. For example, Vuilleumier (2000) reports three 
neuropsychological patients suffering from left-sided spatial neglect following 
brain damage to the right hemisphere, who were presented with line-drawn faces, 
scrambled faces, names, and meaningless shapes in either the left or the right or 
both visual hemifields. Remarkably, patients were less likely to report left-sided 
shapes, scrambles, and names when they were accompanied by a face stimulus in 
the right hemifield. Moreover, left-sided faces were reported more frequently than 
any other type of stimuli, suggesting that faces not only have an advantage in 
capturing attention when competing with other stimuli, but also in overcoming 
visual extinction. However, because Vuilleumier's (2000) findings are based on 
just three visual neglect patients and on fairly artificial face stimuli, the 
generalizability of these results is somewhat limited. In a study of neurologically 
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normal patients but with similarly unrealistic stimuli, Mack et al (2002) also 
found 
that happy face icons are reported more often from a stream of visual stimuli, 
presented at a rate of 75ms/item, than outlines of Christmas trees and inverted 
faces (see also Mack & Rock, 1998). Notably, Ro et al (2001) also observed a 
detection advantage for photographs of real faces, with a flicker paradigm. In such 
tasks, participants are typically shown displays containing several stimuli, 
alternating with blank screens, and are asked to detect a change in one of them. Ro 
et al (2001) found that changes were detected more quickly in faces than in 
nonface objects from a range of categories (food, clothes, musical instruments, 
appliances and plants), which indicates that real faces may also have a special 
capacity to attract attention. 
However, these findings have not gone unchallenged. Palermo & Rhodes (2003) 
re-examined Ro et al's (2001) claims, to determine whether their results could be 
explained in terms of an "odd-one-out" rather than a face processing advantage. 
This was based on the observation that Ro et al (2001) only ever presented one 
face among a range of nonface objects, which could have differed from faces in a 
number of ways (e. g. living versus non-living stimuli). In support of this line of 
reasoning, Palermo & Rhodes (2003) found a similar change-detection advantage 
for a single nonface target when embedded among several faces, leading them to 
suggest that uniqueness may be more important than faceness in change detection. 
However, Palermo & Rhodes (2003) were unable to produce a clear replication of 
the change detection advantage for faces reported by Ro et al (2001), even under 
seemingly identical conditions. Either way, these results suggest that faces are no 
more able to attract attentional resources in a change detection task than other 
objects. 
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An "odd-one-out" explanation could also account for Mack et al's (2002) findings 
with happy face schema, as these were presented in a stream of nonface objects 
with little social or biological meaning (e. g. line-drawn sailing boats, heart shapes, 
telephones). Indeed, in a separate experiment Mack et al (2002) found that 
observers were also more likely to detect their own name in a stream of letter 
strings than words, leading them to suggest that the ability to capture attention 
might actually depend on meaningfulness, rather than faceness. In line with this 
reasoning, several other studies indicate that people may be particularly slow to 
disengage from a range of visual stimuli, including faces, depending on their 
emotional connotation and the emotional state of the observer. In one such study, 
Fox et al (2001) asked subjects to detect a dot probe, the onscreen location of 
which could be correctly or incorrectly cued by emotionally threatening or neutral 
stimuli, consisting of either faces or words. While cue validity influenced 
responses in normal subjects, with slower responses on incorrectly-cued trials, 
threat value had no effect on dot probe detection times. However, responses were 
markedly slowed in highly anxious people on invalidly-cued threatening trials, 
suggesting a disengagement bias to threatening material. Others have shown 
similar attention biases for negatively charged emotional faces in normal 
individuals (e. g. Eastwood, Smilek & Merikle, 2003) and anxious individuals (see 
e. g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998; Fox et al, 2002; Van Honk, Tuiten, 
Van den Hout, De Haan & Stam, 2001), but also for threatening pictures (Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001) and threatening words (Amir, Elias, Klumpp & Przeworski, 
2003). Overall, these findings are at least partially consistent with claims that an 
attentional bias might depend on the meaning of a stimulus. However, it should be 
noted that none of these studies can address whether a general attentional bias for 
143 
faces still exists, independent of any emotional connotations, as faces were never 
compared with other classes of stimuli within the same experiment. 
In all, existing evidence that faces may be particularly strong competitors for 
attention is not convincing. Moreover, it is unclear whether any advantage might 
reflect an ability to engage or to maintain attentional resources, or even both. In 
order to address these issues, I devised a simple classification task in which 
subjects were required to attend to the colour of a central go/no-go signal before 
responding to the location of a vertical line target (i. e. left versus right of fixation) 
within the display. In the first three studies (Experiments 12-14) the go/no-go 
signal was either presented on a blank background, or superimposed on to-be- 
ignored face images or nonface distractors, and the line targets were positioned in 
the periphery of the displays, clearly separated from fixation. Note that identifying 
the colour of the go/no-go signal is a task thought to place minimal demands on 
attention (e. g. Treisman, 1993), which should make it impossible not to process 
other information presented at fixation (e. g. Lavie, 1995,2000). Therefore, if faces 
are capable of retaining attention then this should result in an increase in target 
classification times on trials in which a face is presented in comparison with trials 
on which other stimuli are shown. In addition, if faces are also proficient at 
engaging attention then they should increase classification times even when they 
never appear in a task-relevant location. This was examined in a fourth study 
(Experiment 15), in which the line targets were moved within close proximity of 
fixation, and the to-be-ignored face and nonface objects now appeared clearly 
separated from the targets within the periphery of the displays. 
144 
Experiment 12 
In Experiment 12, subjects were shown displays consisting of a coloured central 
go/no-go signal and two black lines, a vertical and a horizontal line, which were 
presented in the periphery, one to the left and one to the right of fixation. The 
subjects' task was to classify the position of the vertical line (left or right) on go 
trials, in which a green fixation dot appeared. These trials were complemented 
with occasional no-go trials, designated by a red fixation dot, in which a target- 
neutral response was required (to initiate the next trial). This go/no-go distinction 
was included to confirm that subjects were attending to the centre of the displays. 
Response times were measured under four conditions. In the Blank condition, the 
lines and fixation dot were presented alone on an otherwise blank background. In 
addition, these displays could contain to-be-ignored photographs of (1) upright 
faces, presented in the centre of screen behind the go/no-go signal (the Upright 
Face condition), (2) inverted faces (the Inverted Face condition), or (3) 
meaningful nonface objects, in this case items of fruits (the Object condition). The 
latter two conditions were intended to serve as nonface controls for the upright 
face stimuli. Inverted faces provide a perfect match for their upright equivalents in 
terms of spatial frequency, complexity, and stimulus homogeneity, but are 
perceived and recognized so poorly in comparison that it has repeatedly been 
suggested that they may be processed more similarly to objects than to face stimuli. 
(see e. g. Farah, Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 1995; Moscovitch, Winocur & 
Behrmann, 1997). In contrast to inverted faces, the fruit stimuli were not equated 
to the low-level visual properties of the face stimuli, but were included to provide 
a meaningful object comparison. If faces are particularly proficient at retaining 
attention, orienting attentive resources from the central go/no-go signal to the 
peripheral line targets should be less efficient on Upright Face trials, as should be 
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seen from an increase in target classification times. On the other hand, if it is no 
more difficult to disengage from faces than from other stimuli, target classification 
times should be equivalent regardless of stimulus type. 
Method 
b'ec Ten postgraduates from the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, 
volunteered to participate for free in this experiment, and a further ten students 
from the University of Glasgow took part in exchange for course credits or 
volunteered for free. Participants' ages ranged from 18-27 years, and all had 
normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Design & Stimuli The experimental displays contained a central go/no-go signal in 
the shape of fixation dot of either green or red colour, which measured 0.2 cm in 
diameter (0.2° of VA at a viewing distance of 60 cm) and was flanked by a vertical 
and a horizontal line. These lines were presented in black at a size of 0.1 cm x 0.4 
cm (0.1° x 0.4° of VA), and were positioned 4.8 cm (4.6° of VA) to the left and 
right of fixation (see Figure 5.1 overleaf). The position of these lines was 
counterbalanced throughout the experiment, so that each line occurred equally 
often in each location. Apart from the fixation dot and the line targets, these 
displays either remained blank or could contain one of three types of stimuli 
within the centre: upright faces, inverted faces, and images of fruits. The upright 
face stimuli consisted of high quality digital photographs of three female 
celebrities (Pamela Anderson, Marilyn Monroe, and Britney Spears), which were 
cropped to remove any extraneous background, rendered in greyscale and sized to 
2.4 cm x 3.0 cm (2.3° x 2.9° of VA) using graphics software. These images were 
then duplicated and turned upside-down to produce a matching set of inverted 
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faces. The fruit images consisted of three photographs of an apple, grapes, and a 
plum, which were manipulated in the same way as the upright face stimuli (see 
Figure 5.1). 
Including the blank displays, combining each of these nine stimuli under each 
level of target location (left or right of fixation) and for go/no-go signals resulted 
in a total of 40 different stimulus displays. These displays were presented on an 
Apple Macintosh on a white background and responses were recorded using 
PsyScope 1.2.5 software. 
Go Trials No-go Trials 
Blank I-1- 
Object ýý-ýý- 
Inverted 
Face S 
Upright 
Face 
Figure 5.1 Example displays from the conditions of Experiment 1. On go trials, 
designated by a green fixation dot, the task was to classify whether the vertical line target 
appeared on the left or right side of the display. On no-go trials (red fixation dot), subjects 
were to ignore the target and press <space> to initiate the next trial. To assess attention 
biases from faces, the go/no-go displays could be Blank, or could contain a meaningful 
nonface item (the Object condition), an upside-down face (the Inverted Face condition), 
or a matching upright face (the Upright Face condition). 
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Procedure Subjects were seated at a viewing distance of 60 cm from the screen, 
which was kept constant by means of a chinrest. Each trial began with a black 
fixation dot for 750 ms, followed by a stimulus display, which appeared for 200 
ms (i. e. too briefly to permit a stimulus-responsive eye-saccade), and a blank 
screen until a response registered. Subjects were instructed to focus on the centre 
of the screen at the start of each trial, and if the experimental display contained a 
green fixation dot (on go trials) to make speeded judgements regarding the 
location of the vertical line. Responses were made by pressing the "D" key on a 
standard computer keyboard to indicate when the target appeared on the left and 
the "K" key when it appeared on the right side of the display. For no-go displays, 
designated by a red fixation dot, subjects were told to ignore the line stimuli and to 
press <SPACE> bar to initiate the next trial. Subjects were requested to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible throughout the experiment. In addition, they 
were emphatically instructed to ignore any stimuli that might appear at fixation. 
Following a practice block of 36 blank trials (i. e. with no face/nonface image 
present), each subject underwent one critical block of 36 trials of each of the four 
conditions. Trial order was randomized within each block, but go trials were twice 
as likely to occur as no-go trials. Subjects were able to rest between blocks, and 
could initiate the next block by pressing the "Enter" key. To counterbalance 
presentation of the experimental conditions, the order of the critical blocks was 
rotated across subjects over the course of the experiment. 
Results 
Incorrect responses were discarded and the median correct response times and 
error rates were calculated for all subjects. Performance for go/no-go trials was 
important to confirm that subjects were attending to the centre of the displays. 
148 
Overall accuracy was high (97.0% for go trials versus 92.9% for no-go trials), 
indicating that subjects had complied with these task demands. Data from no-go 
trials was not analyzed further. For go trials, the median correct RTs and error 
rates were computed as a function of the experimental conditions (Blank, Object, 
Inverted Face, and Upright Face). The intersubject means of these RTs are shown 
in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Mean correct responses (n=20) to line targets on go trials in Experiment 12. 
Performance is shown as a function of experimental condition; Blank, Object, Inverted 
Face, and Upright Face. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA (Blank versus Object versus Inverted Face 
versus Upright Face) revealed a main effect of experimental condition, 
F(3,57)=16.58, p<. 01. Tukey's HSD test showed that RTs were significantly faster 
in the Blank condition, in which no additional stimulus was present, in comparison 
with each of the other conditions (p<. 01). More importantly, RTs were also 
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significantly faster in the Object condition and in the Inverted Face condition than 
in the Upright Face condition (p<. 05). In addition, no difference between the 
Object condition and the Inverted Face condition was found. Thus, upright faces 
delayed target classification most, followed by inverted faces and objects. 
Errors were made on 1.3% of Blank trials, 3.5% of Object trials, 4.2% of Inverted 
Face trials, and 3.1% of Upright Face trials. In contrast to the RT data, a one- 
factor within-subjects ANOVA of the percentage errors showed that these were 
evenly matched across the experimental conditions, F(3,57)=2.16. Errors were not 
analyzed further. 
Discussion 
Responses to the peripheral targets were fastest in the Blank condition in 
comparison with each of the other conditions. More important, responses were 
evenly matched on trials on which inverted faces and objects (in this case images 
of fruits) were shown, but were slowest when upright faces were displayed. This 
pattern does not appear to reflect a speed-accuracy trade off, as error rates were 
evenly matched across all conditions. Indeed, the error pattern indicates that 
presenting upright faces, inverted faces, and fruits did not affect whether the line 
targets were processed (see e. g. Lavie, 1995,2000), but only delayed responses to 
these targets. There are two potential explanations for these results. First, it is 
conceivable that the increase in RTs might reflect the reduced salience of the 
coloured go/no-go signal, when it is superimposed on a more complex visual 
image than a plain background. Although this is possible, it cannot explain why 
responses were slowest for upright faces, which matched their inverted 
counterparts in almost every aspect except orientation. A more plausible 
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explanation is that subjects took longer to disengage attention from these stimuli, 
which in turn delayed target classification, but particularly so from images of 
upright faces. This latter interpretation would not only be consistent with previous 
findings suggesting an attentional bias to faces (Mack et al, 2002; Ro et al, 2001; 
Vuilleumier, 2000), but also with claims that inverted faces are subject to object 
rather than typical face processes (e. g. Farah et al, 1995; Haxby et al, 1999; 
Moscovitch et al, 1997). However, at present these findings provide only initial 
evidence of a general face bias, as only famous faces were used. In addition to 
low-level physiognomic face information, known faces also provide higher-level 
information such as identity and semantic knowledge about a person to an 
observer. If this contributes to attentional retainment then the present face bias 
might only reflect face familiarity. This possibility was examined in the next 
experiment. 
Experiment 13 
The main finding of Experiment 12 is that response times to a peripheral target 
increase when faces are presented at fixation. This increase cannot simply be due 
to the low-level properties of face stimuli, as equivalent increases were not found 
when these faces were inverted. Similarly, target classification was less affected 
by meaningful objects than by upright faces. In addition to existing claims that 
threatening face stimuli hold attention in highly anxious people (e. g. Fox et al, 
2001,2002), these findings provide some initial evidence that it might also be 
generally difficult to disengage from faces. To provide a further test for this claim, 
the next experiment examined whether these effects are still observed when 
unfamiliar faces are used, which, unlike the famous face stimuli of Experiment 12, 
rule out any possible influence of higher-level identity and semantic information. 
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Method 
Subjects Stimuli & Procedure Eight postgraduate students from the University of 
Utrecht, The Netherlands, and twenty-one students from the University of 
Glasgow, whose ages ranged from 19 to 31 years, participated in the experiment 
on a voluntary basis or for course credits. All had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. The famous face stimuli from Experiment 11 were replaced with 
equivalently prepared face stimuli of three unfamiliar female models (see Figure 
5.3). In all other respects, the design and procedure were identical to the previous 
experiment. 
Go Trials No-go Trials 
Blank -- 
Object 
Inverted 
Face -I- 
Upright 
- Face 
Figure 5.3 Example displays from the four experimental conditions (Blank, Object, 
Inverted Face, and Upright Face) and for go and no-go trials in Experiment 13. 
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Results 
Incorrect responses and data from one subject whose response latencies were 
exceptionally slow (3.3 SD from the group mean) were discarded from analysis. 
Go/no-go accuracy was high (93.8% for go trials vs. 90.0% for no-go trials), 
which confirms that subjects were attending to the centre of the displays. For go 
trials, the median correct RTs and error rates were computed for each of the 
experimental conditions (Blank, Object, Inverted Face, and Upright Face). The 
averages of the median RTs across subjects are shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Mean correct responses (n=28) to line targets on go trials in Experiment 13. 
Performance is shown as a function of experimental condition; Blank, Object, Inverted 
Face, and Upright Face. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA on the RT data revealed an effect of 
condition, F(3,81)=33.16, p<. 01. As before, Tukey's HSD test showed 
significantly faster RTs in the Blank condition than in any of the other conditions 
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(p<. 01). More important, target RTs were again significantly faster in both the 
Object condition and in the Inverted Face condition than in the Upright Face 
condition (p<. 05), but there was no difference between the Object and the Inverted 
Face condition. 
Errors were made on 3.7% of Blank trials, 9.4% of Object trial, 5.7% of Inverted 
Face trials, and 6.3% of Upright Face trials. A one-factor ANOVA of the error 
data revealed a main effect of condition, F(3,81)=4.06, p<. 05, reflecting higher 
percentage errors in the Object condition than in the Blank condition. No other 
differences were significant. 
Discussion 
The results are strikingly similar to Experiment 12. As before, response times were 
fastest in the condition in which a blank background was used, slower when 
inverted faces or objects were added at fixation, but slowest when upright faces 
were displayed. This pattern is consistent with the notion of a general attentional 
bias such that it may be particularly difficult to disengage from upright face 
stimuli, and extends the results of Experiment 12 from famous to unfamiliar faces. 
Therefore, these findings rule out the possibility that a face bias reflects processes 
that can only be engaged by familiar faces. 
Experiment 14 
To strengthen the claim that it may be particularly difficult to disengage from 
faces, Experiment 14 examined whether a face bias is still observed when the 
inverted famous faces and fruits of Experiment 12 are replaced with famous names 
and images of flags. Peoples' names provide virtually no resemblance to their 
154 
faces but just like them are recognised with little difficulty. Moreover, names give 
the same status as persons as faces. If famous faces are more proficient at 
maintaining attention than the same person's names, this would therefore provide 
further evidence that faces maintain attention more effectively than other classes 
of stimuli. In addition to substituting famous names for inverted famous faces, the 
fruit distractors were also replaced with images of national flags. One particular 
reason for choosing flags in addition to names was to provide an analogue to the 
face-nonface conditions of Experiments 4-6, where faces were subject to less 
distractor interference than flag and name targets. If faces' ability to hold attention 
surpasses that of names and flags, then this could provide one conceivable 
explanation for these effects. 
Method 
Subjects Eight postgraduates from the University of Utrecht and a further sixteen 
undergraduate students from the University of Glasgow, aged 18-28, participated 
in the experiment on a voluntary basis or for course credits. All had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. 
Stimuli & Procedure The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, 
except as follows. The inverted famous faces were replaced by the names of the 
same celebrities (Pamela Anderson, Marilyn Monroe, and Britney Spears). These 
were printed in black 18-point Arial font, with forenames printed above and 
surnames below the go/no-go signal, and measured between 1.3 cm and 1.8 cm 
(1.3°-1.7° of VA) in width. In addition, the images of fruits were replaced with a 
set of national flags (the Greek flag, the South African flag, and the Swiss flag). 
The flag stimuli were derived from photographs, which were rendered to 
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greyscale, cropped to remove extraneous background, and sized to 2.4 cm x 3.0 
cm (2.3° x 2.9° of VA). As before, the names and flags were then copied onto the 
go/no-go displays, behind the fixation dot, for the Name and Object conditions 
(see Figure 5.5). 
Blank I 
Object I 
Name I 
Face I 
Go Trials 
Ma'Jyn 
Monson 
T- 
No-go Trials 
Manly, 
" 
Monroe 
Figure 5.5 Example displays from the four experimental conditions (Blank, Object, Name, 
and Face) and for go and no-go displays in Experiment 14. 
Results As for the previous experiments, incorrect responses were discarded from 
analysis. Accuracy for go/no-go trials was high once again, averaging at 93.7% for 
go trials and 86.7% for no-go trials. The means of the median correct RTs for the 
go conditions are shown in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6 Mean correct responses (n=24) to line targets on go trials in Experiment 14. 
Performance is shown as a function of experimental condition; Blank, Object, Name, and 
Face. Standard error bars are shown. 
A one-factor within-subjects ANOVA (Blank versus Object versus Name versus 
Face) of the mean RT data revealed a main effect of condition, F(3,69)=33.48, 
p<. 01. Comparisons on this effect with Tukey's HSD test showed significantly 
faster classification times for the Blank condition in comparison with each of the 
other three conditions (p<. 01). In addition, RTs were significantly faster for the 
Object condition and the Name condition than for the Face condition (p<. 05). 
However, the Object and the Name condition did not differ from each other. 
Errors were made on 3.1% of Blank trials, 8.0% of Object trial, 6.9% of Name 
trials, and 7.3% of Face trials. An analogous one-factor ANOVA of the error data 
revealed an effect of condition, F(3,69)=4.76, p<. 01, reflecting fewer errors in the 
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Blank condition than in the Object, the Name, and the Face conditions (p<. 05). No 
other comparisons were significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment 14 reveals several important findings. First, a person's face again 
appeared more potent in delaying target classification than other classes of stimuli, 
in this case famous names and images of flags. This provides further evidence that 
faces are particularly persistent in holding attention. In addition to the findings 
from Experiments 12 & 13, these results also suggest that the interference effects 
of Experiments 4-6, specifically the observation that faces were subject to less 
interference than name and flag targets, might at least partially reflect an 
attentional bias for faces. There are, of course, a number of differences between 
those experiments and the present studies. Perhaps most important, the target 
stimuli in Experiments 4-6 were always task-relevant, whereas the faces and object 
comparisons here were presented in a task-relevant location but were not explicitly 
implicated in target classification. To determine the relationship between attention 
and face processing, however, this has the advantage of diminishing the potential 
influence of any ongoing task-demands. 
The present results may also serve to resolve one recurring aspect of Experiments 
12-14, namely that target RTs were still significantly slowed by inverted faces and 
nonface stimuli, albeit less so than by upright faces, in comparison with trials in 
which a blank background was presented. In Experiment 12 it was already 
suggested that this might reflect the reduced salience of the coloured go/no-go 
signal, when it is superimposed on complex visual stimuli. However, the present 
effects with name stimuli do not favour this explanation, as the names were 
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presented above and below the go/no-go signal, thus leaving its salience relatively 
intact (see Figure 5.5). Rather, these findings suggest that names, inverted faces, 
and images of fruits and flags also retain attention in this design, but less so than 
faces. 
Experiment 15 
The previous experiments show that participants are slower to classify a peripheral 
target, when a face is displayed at fixation in the location of a task-relevant go/no- 
go signal, but are less affected by inverted faces, names, or meaningful objects. 
These findings appear consistent with the hypothesis that it may be particularly 
difficult to disengage attention from faces. The purpose of the next experiment 
was to examine whether a similar face bias still exists when the targets are 
presented in close proximity to the go/no-go signal and the faces and nonface 
distractors appear clearly separated, to the side of the target. Thus, the face and 
nonface stimuli always appeared in a task-irrelevant location in this design. If 
faces disrupt target classification more than printed names and images of flags 
here, then this would support the idea that they are also particularly adept at 
engaging attentive resources (e. g. Mack et al, 2002; Ro et al, 2001; Vuilleumier, 
2000). 
Method 
Subjects The thirty-two subjects were postgraduates and undergraduates from the 
University of Glasgow whose ages ranged from 18-25 years. All reported normal 
or corrected to normal vision and volunteered to participate for free or for course 
credits. 
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Stimuli & Procedure The stimuli and procedure were the same as for Experiment 
14, except that the line targets were now positioned just 0.7 cm (0.7° of VA) from 
the centre of the display, and the face and nonface stimuli were presented in the 
periphery to the left or right of fixation, with a horizontal distance of 1.0 cm (1.0° 
of VA) between the nearest line (horizontal or vertical) and the face/nonface 
stimuli (see Figure 5.7). As before, subjects completed a practice block of Blank 
trials, followed by an experimental blocks of each of the four conditions (Blank, 
Name, Object, and Face). Each of these blocks consisted of 36 randomly ordered 
trials, and block order was counterbalanced across the experiment. 
Go Trials No-go Trials 
Blank 10-I"- 
Object "-0- 
Name 
Marilyn 
1"- 
Manlyn 
ý"- Moavon Moawos 
Face ý"-_ 
Figure 5.7 Example display from Experiment 15. The vertical line (the target) and the 
horizontal line were now presented in the centre of the display, and the faces and nonface 
comparisons were moved to a task-irrelevant, peripheral location. 
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Results 
Incorrect responses were excluded from analysis and overall accuracy for go/no-go 
trials was computed by pooling the number of correct responses across the 
experimental conditions. As in all of the preceding experiments, accuracy was 
high for go trials (97.2% correct) and no-go trials (88.3% correct), indicating that 
subjects were attending to the go/no-go signals. For go trials, the median correct 
RTs and error rates were computed separately for the experimental conditions 
(Blank, Name, Object, and Face). The intersubject means of the medians RTs are 
displayed in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8 Mean correct responses (n=32) to line targets in the go displays of Experiment 
15. Performance is shown as a function of experimental condition; Blank, Object, Name, 
and Face. Standard error bars are shown. 
Comparisons across the experimental conditions A one-factor within-subjects 
ANOVA (Blank versus Object versus Name versus Face) on the mean RT data 
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showed the usual main effect of condition, F(3,93)=11.48, p<. 01. Comparisons 
between each of these conditions with Tukey's HSD test revealed significantly 
faster RTs in the Blank condition than in each of the other conditions (p<. 05). 
More important, RTs were evenly matched in the Name condition and the Object 
condition, but significantly slower in the Face condition than in the Blank, Name, 
and Object conditions (p<. 01). Errors were made on 2.9% of Blank trials, 3.3% of 
Name trials, 3.0% of Object trials, and 2.9% of Face trials. ANOVA showed no 
effect of condition, F(3,93)<1, and errors were not analyzed further. 
Comparisons of spatial congruency effects within conditions A separate 3 (Object 
versus Name versus Face) x2 (congruent versus incongruent) ANOVA was 
conducted to compare performance on trials on which face and nonface stimuli 
were presented on the same side as the vertical line target (spatially congruent 
trials) in comparison to when these images were presented on the opposite side of 
the display (on spatially incongruent trials), closer to the horizontal line and 
further from the vertical line target. The RTs for these conditions are shown in 
Figure 5.9 (see overleaf). If face and nonface images engage visual attention, as 
was indicated by significant comparisons with the Blank condition, then RTs 
should also vary as a function of spatial congruence, with slower responses on 
incongruent compared to congruent trials. This was confirmed by the statistical 
analysis, which showed a main effect of condition, F(2,62)=9.027, p<. 01, again 
reflecting slower RTs for the Face condition than the Name and Object conditions, 
and a main effect of spatial congruency, F(1,31)=25.74, p<. 01, reflecting slower 
responses on incongruent than congruent trials. 
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Figure 5.9 Means of the median reaction times for the Object, Name and Face conditions 
as a function of spatial congruency with the line target. Standard error bars are shown. 
As Figure 5.9 suggests, analysis of simple main effects revealed significant 
congruency effects for each of the three conditions: Name condition, 
F(1,32)=12.37, p<. 01, Object condition, F(1,32)=5.01, p<. 05, and Face condition, 
F(1,32)=9.19, p<. 01. However, no interaction between condition and spatial 
congruency was found, F(2,62)<1, indicating that these congruency effects were 
equivalent across the experimental conditions. 
The results of Experiment 15 show that classification of a centrally presented 
target, which occurred either just to the left or right of fixation, was affected by the 
peripheral presentation of simultaneously presented names and images of flags, 
but even more so by images of faces. These results converge with those of the 
preceding experiments, in which target classification was also more affected by 
faces than a range of other stimuli. However, in contrast to those experiments, 
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where participants were required to attend to the location of these stimuli, the face 
and nonface objects here were never presented in a task-relevant location. Thus, 
whereas Experiments 12-14 provide a measure of disengagement from one spatial 
location, the present study suggests that faces are also particularly efficient at 
engaging attention at another. 
Both of these processes may of course be influenced by the same mechanisms. 
Given the relative simplicity of the target classification task, it seemed inevitable 
that any spare processing capacity would spill over to the peripheral face and 
nonface objects (e. g. Lavie, 1995,2000). In addition, because of their sudden onset 
these stimuli may have acted as exogenous cues, immune to any higher cognitive 
influences and capable of reflexively attracting attentive resources (e. g. Briand & 
Klein, 1987; Posner, 1980), and other stimuli might have done so too. The 
engagement bias for faces that was observed in this experiment thus most likely 
reflects an increase in attentional dwell time, not unlike that observed in 
Experiments 12-14, rather than an initial orienting bias towards faces. Whether 
faces are particularly likely to attract attentive resources to themselves in the first 
place or can do so very rapidly needs to be resolved in future research. To this 
point, it should be noted that there is some evidence that threat-related information 
from emotional stimuli, such as faces, might be detected pre-attentively through a 
process implicating the amygdala, and could contribute to an orienting bias for 
some emotional faces (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2001). Nonetheless, 
Vuilleumier and associates also report that subsequent face processing requires 
attention (Vuilleumier et al, 2001; Holmes, Vuilleumier & Eimer, 2003). This is 
consistent with the results of Chapters 3&4, which indicate that faces are not 
processed automatically or even mandatory (for such claims see e. g. Farah, 1995; 
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Lavie, Ro & Russell, 2003), but are subject to capacity limits just like other classes 
of stimuli. Any attention bias for faces might therefore depend on similar variables 
as the processing of other objects. In line with this reasoning, it is worth recording 
that attentional biases have now been observed for many types of stimuli, 
including substance related pictorial cues in smokers and cannabis and alcohol 
users (e. g. Jones, Jones, Smith & Copley, 2003; Waters, Shiffman, Bradley & 
Mogg, 2003). 
However, those findings do by no means contradict the current evidence for a 
general attention bias for faces. The present results indicate that this bias reflects 
both faces' ability to retain attention at locations of task-relevance but also to 
engage attentional resources at irrelevant locations, and when it might actually be 
beneficial to ignore them. Although the comparison stimuli displayed similar 
patterns, none of them were capable of matching or outperforming faces in any of 
the experiments. This is particularly striking as the comparisons included inverted 
faces with identical low-level image characteristics to these faces (Experiments 12 
& 13), famous names giving the same status as persons as faces (Experiments 14 
& 15), and meaningful nonface objects (Experiments 12-15). In addition, virtually 
identical results were obtained for unfamiliar faces, for which participants could 
not possess any higher-level identity or semantic knowledge, and for famous faces 
(cf. Experiments 12 & 13). Note also that previous studies investigating attention 
biases to faces may be criticized for using artificial face stimuli (e. g. Vuilleumier, 
2000; Mack et al, 2002), and for presenting only a single face alongside several 
nonface objects (Ro et al, 2001) or within a visual stream of nonface objects 
(Mack et al, 2002), which may have produced an "odd-one-out" effect rather than 
a face advantage (see Palermo & Rhodes, 2003). By contrast, the current 
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experiments used high quality photographs of real faces and were designed to 
eliminate odd-one-out effects by grouping stimuli from the same category (i. e. 
faces, names, flags) into blocks. The present findings thus provide perhaps the 
strongest evidence yet of a general attentional bias for faces. 
Such a bias might provide a plausible explanation for some of the interference 
effects that were observed in Experiments 4-6. In these experiments, faces 
interfered more with nonface targets, which could be names (Experiment 4), 
famous names (Experiment 5), or flags (Experiment 6), than nonface distractors, 
but were generally also subject to less interference as targets. This could be 
explained in terms of a disengagement bias for face targets and an engagement 
bias for face distractors, whereby the processing of these stimuli was enhanced in 
each case to the detriment of the nonface comparisons. However, target-distractor 
interference tasks provide a more complex scenario than the current experiments, 
as the explicit processing demands of these stimuli must also be considered. Thus, 
Young et al (1986) found that names actually interfere more with faces than faces 
with names in target naming tasks. Although this accentuates the potentially 
intricate relationship between attention and other ongoing task demands, it also 
illustrates the benefit of the relative simplicity of the present paradigm, where 
subjects did not have to produce a response to the face and nonface stimuli. 
Finally, in preceding chapters it has already been discussed whether faces and 
other objects might have their own specific processing resources. Although some 
attention biases appear strikingly similar across different stimulus categories, 
including faces (cf. Ro et al, 2001 versus Palermo & Rhodes; Fox et al, 2001 
versus Yiend & Mathews, 2001), a face bias might arise at least partly from such a 
division. All these points are considered further in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusions 
The research carried out in this thesis investigated the relation of attention and face 
processing with emphasis on face encoding, capacity limitation, and attention 
biases. The introduction reviewed previous studies that are of relevance to these 
topics and identified a number of shortcomings. The first of these was a failure to 
examine the influence of attention on the encoding of different types of facial 
information, such as identity and expression. Although several studies have 
investigated the role of attention in face encoding, these have focused exclusively 
on identity information (Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; 
Reinitz, Bartlett & Searcy, 1997; Reinitz, Morrissey & Demb, 1994). This issue 
was complicated further by controversial reports of an asymmetric processing 
dependency between identity and expression (Schweinberger, Burton & Kelly, 
1999; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). Another shortcoming concerned the 
number of faces that can be processed simultaneously. There is good evidence that 
faces are processed even under conditions that should make this difficult, provided 
that only a single face is presented at a time. Consequently, it has been argued that 
face processing proceeds independent of general capacity limits, but that it may be 
subject to its own processing limits (e. g. Jenkins, Lavie & Driver, 2003; Lavie, Ro 
& Russell, 2003). However, even though a considerable number of studies have 
examined face processing in multiple-face displays, none of these apply a direct 
test for such limits (e. g. Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; 
Jenkins et al, 2003). The final shortcoming that was targeted in this thesis 
concerned attention biases in visual processing. It has repeatedly been suggested 
that faces may have an advantage in capturing processing resources over other 
stimulus categories. This evidence is not completely compelling as it is based on 
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artificial stimuli (e. g. Mack, Pappas, Silverman & Gay, 2002; Vuilleumier, 2000) 
and paradigms that are open to alternative explanations (e. g. Ro, Russell & Lavie, 
2001; see Palermo & Rhodes, 2003). Moreover, although some classes of stimuli, 
including faces, appear particularly adept at retaining attention, often depending on 
their emotional connotation and the emotional state of the observer (e. g. Amir, 
Elias, Klump & Przeworski, 2003; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001), it is presently unknown whether a general disengagement bias for 
faces exists relative to other classes of stimuli. This thesis offered novel 
approaches to each of these topics over a series of 15 experiments, by measuring 
task-relevant and irrelevant face processing in response-competition and priming 
tasks. 
Chapter 2 began by examining the functional independence of facial identity and 
expression information. Previous work provides substantial evidence for this 
independence (e. g. Bruce, 1986; Calder, Young, Keane & Dean, 2000; Campbell, 
Brooks, de Haan & Roberts, 1996; Etcoff, 1984; Young, McWeeney, Hay & Ellis, 
1986a). Recently however, this idea has been challenged by two studies reporting 
an asymmetric dependency in a Garner paradigm, such that expression decisions 
are influenced by task-irrelevant variations in identity information but not vice 
versa (Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998; Schweinberger et al, 1999). In Chapter 2, a 
number of asymmetric treatment effects 'were identified that could have accounted 
for this pattern. These included picture-based strategies and the use of unreliable 
facial cues for decision-making, and effects of face familiarity. 
Picture-based effects could have resulted from superficial image similarities such 
as brightness or colour contrasts, perhaps reflecting the conditions under which 
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different stimuli were produced. Unreliable facial cues, on the other hand, could 
reflect the use of external features, such as hairstyle, which in many instances 
provide only a vague means of person identification. Both of these are less likely 
to correlate with expression than identity, but could have affected expression 
decisions even if these can usually be made without interference from identity. 
The influence of such cues might have been enforced particularly by the use of an 
extremely small stimulus set and a great number of trial repetitions (as in 
Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998; Schweinberger et al, 1999). Face familiarity, not 
explicitly specified by Schweinberger and associates (1998,1999), might also 
relate to the potential influence of external features, which tend to contribute more 
to the recognition of unfamiliar than familiar faces. Alternatively, identity might 
not interfere with expression classification of unfamiliar faces if participants are 
incapable of distinguishing different stimulus identities. Thus, an asymmetric 
relationship might reflect only specific processes associated with either familiar or 
unfamiliar face processing. 
To address these concerns, I used a variation of Schweinberger et al's (1998, 
1999) task but with a substantially larger and more varied stimulus set, and by 
using participants who were unfamiliar (Experiment 1) and personally familiar 
(Experiment 2) with the stimulus identities. Both experiments generated virtually 
identical results: Identity decisions were completely unaffected by facial 
expression. Although expression decisions were generally slower than identity 
decisions, they were also unaffected by facial identity information. These results 
therefore contradict claims of an asymmetric dependency between expression and 
identity processing. Furthermore, expression classification times were faster when 
identity and expression information was correlated, than when both dimensions 
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varied independently of each other. This suggests that, when possible, participants 
were making use of task-irrelevant identity information to facilitate the expression 
task. The results are therefore not only consistent with the idea that identity 
processing and expression processing are dissociable cognitive functions, but also 
support the view that they are processed in parallel (see e. g. Bruce & Young, 
1986). 
While Experiments 1&2 examined how expression and identity are deciphered 
from faces, rather little is known about how these different types of facial 
information are integrated within the same face percept during visual encoding. A 
few studies have implicated visual attention in the holistic encoding of facial 
identity (Palermo & Rhodes, 2002; Reinitz et al, 1994). Experiment 3 therefore 
examined whether attention is required to encode expression and identity within 
the same face. This was done by measuring response-competition from two 
distractor faces during the categorization of a face target, which was classified 
according to particular expression-identity conjunctions. The distractors were 
composed so that they contained expression and identity information from the 
same or the opposite response category as the target. These two types of facial 
information were either combined in one of the distractors (with the second 
distractor composed of response-neutral expression and identity information) or 
distributed across both. It was hypothesized that distractor interference should be 
equivalent for these conditions if information about the correct expression-identity 
conjunctions is unavailable from the distractors. Additionally, a few conditions 
were included in which the distractors only contained one type of response-critical 
information (i. e. identity or expression) or only response-neutral information. This 
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was done to examine whether any target-distractor interference effects were due to 
expression and identity, or just one of these types of facial information. 
The results were unexpected as Experiment 3 failed to produce reliable response- 
competition effects in all conditions. Of course, this means that this experiment 
fell short of its objective to investigate the encoding of expression and identity 
information. However, these results were particularly perplexing as reliable 
response-competition effects have been obtained previously from nonface 
conjunction objects in a similar design (Lavie, 1997), and also in letter-letter (e. g. 
Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972,1973; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), picture-word (e. g. 
Smith & Magee, 1980) and face-name response-competition tasks (e. g. Jenkins et 
al, 2003; Lavie et al, 2003; Young et al, 1986). This contrast between previous 
studies and the present result suggested that it might be worthwhile to investigate 
the absence of distractor interference in Experiment 3 further. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 examined response-competition between face targets and 
face distractors under conditions that normally allow for distractor interference. 
Thus the studies here compared speeded responses to target faces and nonface 
comparisons, which could be flanked by a face distractor or a nonface stimulus. 
Experiment 4 showed that face distractors interfere with forenames as targets, and 
that forenames also interfere with face targets and forename targets in a sex 
classification task. By contrast, no interference effects were found when a face 
distractor flanked a target face. Subsequent experiments generally replicated this 
pattern of results with famous faces and famous names (Experiment 5) and with 
famous faces and national flags (Experiment 6) in semantic classification tasks- 
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This remarkable absence of face-face interference was explored further in 
Experiments 7&8. In Experiment 7 participants again performed a semantic 
classification task on famous faces and national flags but the number of task- 
irrelevant distractors was now increased from one to four to boost the total of the 
potentially distracting information in each display. As before, the results showed 
response-competition from flag distractors with face and flag targets. However, 
distractor faces were still unable to influence responses to face targets. In fact, 
multiple distractors even failed to produce interference with nonface targets. 
Experiment 8 then explored the temporal conditions under which interference from 
task-irrelevant face distractors is eliminated. The specific aim was to determine 
whether the ongoing processing of a face is sufficient to eliminate interference 
from a face distractor in a subsequent interference display. To this end, 
participants made occupational decisions to a name target (i. e. pop-star vs. 
politician) while ignoring a flanking face distractor, but only if the target-distractor 
display was preceded by a British (contrary to a non-British) face or flag cue. The 
results showed that distractor interference was not eliminated by processing a 
preceding flag cue, even when the flags were presented very briefly and 
immediately prior to the name-face displays. Name-face interference was also 
found following the relatively long presentation of a face cue. However, this 
interference was completely eliminated following a short-lived face cue. Chapter 3 
thus provides considerable evidence that distractorface processing is eliminated in 
interference tasks by another face. This other face may take the form of a 
concurrently presented target (Experiments 4-6), or of additional face distractors 
(Experiment 7), or of a face that immediately precedes an interference display 
(Experiment 8). By contrast, the same faces were subject to reliable interference 
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effects whenever they were paired with a nonface item, and none of the nonface 
comparisons were subject to analogous within-category effects. 
Despite the absence of face-face interference in Chapter 3, visual stimuli may still 
undergo substantial processing, as indicated by priming effects, even when they do 
not give rise to response-competition (Driver & Tipper, 1989). Moreover, Chapter 
3 only examined distractor processing with sex decisions (Experiment 4) and 
semantic decisions (Experiments 5-8). However, sex and identity information can 
be extracted independently from faces, and the retrieval of personal semantic 
information is relatively deep and follows face recognition. Thus, the possibility 
remained that distractor faces were processed at some level, perhaps even 
involving access to facial identity. For these reasons, Chapter 4 employed 
repetition priming to examine the processing of face distractors in two-item 
displays. In Experiments 9& 10, subjects were shown displays of either a face or a 
flag target and a face distractor in a priming phase, followed by a familiarity task 
to primed and unprimed faces. Experiment 11 then presented face distractors 
alongside face targets and face-like and -unlike nonface targets in a similar task, to 
explore the influence of `faceness' on distractor priming. 
Experiment 9 found repetition priming for face distractors when they were 
presented alongside flag targets. This priming effect evidently involved access to 
the distractors' identities, surviving a change in image between prime and test 
phase. By contrast, processing a target face eliminated face distractor priming. 
Experiment 10 then found that distractor priming can be obtained in this condition 
when identical images are used at prime and test. Thus Experiment 10 
demonstrated, for the first time, that face distractors undergo some processing 
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even when they appear alongside a task-relevant face. Experiment 11 then showed 
that cross-image face distractor priming is not only eliminated during face target 
processing, but also by nonface objects that were rated as face-like prior to the 
experiment. Conversely, distractor priming was still obtained alongside face- 
unlike stimuli. Chapter 4 therefore provided the first instance of face distractor 
extinction in a nonface-face display (Experiment 11), but importantly, this 
appeared to reflect the perceived faceness of the target stimuli. 
The findings of Chapters 3&4 may be explained if face processing is subject to 
capacity limits, such that only a single face can be processed at a time. If demand 
of processing resources cannot be met, for example, during the classification of a 
task-relevant face target, processing of another (distractor) face suffers as a result. 
This conclusion converges with a number of recent reports hinting at face 
processing limits, although none of these studies have examined this limit directly. 
Boutet & Chaudhuri (2001) used displays consisting of two overlapping face 
stimuli, a rather artificial situation that our perceptual system is not usually 
confronted with, and found that participants have difficulty in delineating more 
than one face at exposure times of less than 2 seconds. Palermo & Rhodes (2002) 
also used relatively long exposure times of Z 1.5 seconds for three-face displays in 
a divided attention paradigm. This may have permitted the serial processing of 
these faces, again making it difficult to specify an exact limit. On the contrary, 
Jenkins et al (2003) used short display times, but only measured task-irrelevant 
face processing. Without taking task-relevant resources into account, this also 
makes it difficult to draw a direct inference about face processing limits from this 
study. Consequently, the present data provides arguably the most direct evidence 
for face processing limits yet. 
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Although the studies reported in Chapters 3&4 were not explicitly designed to 
examine whether faces may have their own dedicated processing capacity, they 
also bear some relevance to the controversial issue of face-specificity. Several 
researchers have argued for the existence of face-specific neural mechanisms, 
which are held to operate to some extent independently of a more general object 
recognition system (e. g. Farah, 1995; Farah, Levinson & Klein, 1995; Farah, 
Wilson, Drain & Tanaka, 1995; Haxby et al, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott & 
Chun, 1997; McNeill & Warrington, 1993). This dichotomy between face 
processing and nonface processing also receives support from response- 
competition and distractor priming studies. Lavie et al (2003) found that face 
distractors even interfere with name targets under an attentional load that is more 
than sufficient of eliminating response-competition from nonface distractors. 
Jenkins, Burton & Ellis (2002) obtained conceptually similar results in a repetition 
priming task. Jenkins et al (2003) also showed that interference from face 
distractors with name classification could be diluted by the presence of another 
face, but not by general competition from other stimulus classes. By the same 
token, face distractor processing proceeded seemingly unaffected by nonface 
targets in Chapters 3&4. The only exception comes from Experiment 11, in 
which face-like nonface targets behaved similarly to photographs of real faces. 
Moreover, nonface stimuli generally also interfered with face targets (Experiments 
4,6 & 7), and none of the nonface comparisons produced analogous within- 
category processing limits (Experiments 4-8). This could be interpreted as further 
evidence that face processing involves it own specific resources. 
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Alternatively, one could argue that faces constitute a visually more complex and 
homogeneous category of stimuli that is simply more demanding of general 
processing resources than printed names, and images of flags and (face-unlike) 
cars. In that case, comparable processing limits could be obtained for more 
complex nonface stimuli. However, the target RTs and error rates in Experiments 
4-6 suggest that the processing of faces was generally no more difficult than that 
of other stimuli. Furthermore, the same-image priming effects of Experiment 10 
showed that face distractors undergo some processing even when they appear 
alongside a task-relevant face. On its own, this finding might contradict the notion 
of face processing limits and also of a face-specific capacity. However, in the 
absence of cross-image priming in Experiment 9, this same-image face priming 
effect suggests that the distractors did not gain access to any putative face 
recognition system in Experiment 10, but perhaps only registered at a more 
general processing stage. This conclusion receives some support from same-image 
priming effects with unfamiliar faces (Khurana, 2000) and novel shapes 
(DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996), for which no recognizable descriptions could 
have existed prior to the priming phase. In addition, Experiment 11 showed that 
face distractor processing was only extinguished by face-like stimuli, the car 
fronts, but not their face-unlike opposites. These two categories presumably 
possess similar levels of visual complexity and homogeneity, although they were 
not matched for low-level characteristics, such as their component spatial 
frequencies. Yet, given the sheer number of car stimuli used, it would be 
remarkable if low-level features could account for this dissociation. Until further 
work is conducted, it thus seems most plausible that the processing limits from 
Chapters 3&4 were elicited by the face-ness of the stimuli. 
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Experiment 11 also suggests that face processing limits may be elicited by stimuli 
bearing only a remote, albeit measurable, resemblance to real faces. This is not 
unusual amid abundant claims that even artificial face stimuli, sometimes 
consisting of only a few lines, are capable of engaging face processes (e. g. 
Eastwood, Smilek & Merikle, 2001,2003; Mack et al, 2002; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 
1995; Vuilleumier, 2000). Indeed, it has been argued that any dedicated face 
mechanism may have no choice but to process other stimuli with geometrical 
features that are characteristically face-like (e. g. Pinker, 1997; see also Sperber, 
1994). Nonetheless, face-like stimuli should at least be excluded from some face 
processing stages, such as identity analysis. To this point, DeGelder & Rouw 
(2001) recently proposed a dual-route model of face recognition. According to this 
account, face recognition entails a face detection system and a functionally distinct 
identification system. Whereas the latter system requires extensive learning to 
distinguish between different face exemplars, face detection is a cruder, innate 
mechanism. But are face-processing limits then located at a face detection stage or 
do they only affect subsequent processing stages? 
On the one hand, the present face processing limits are of surprising severity. This 
is particularly so as face-face interference was even eliminated in a sex 
classification task, in which the faces preserved external cues such as hairstyle 
(Experiment 4). These salient cues could have been used to categorize the 
distractors without processing actual face information. The absence of cross-image 
distractor priming in Experiments 9& 11, a seemingly highly sensitive measure of 
face processing (e. g. Bruce, Carson, Burton & Kelly, 1997; Brunas, Young & 
Ellis, 1990; Jenkins et al, 2002), also serves to strengthen this impression. Of 
course, similar limits might not apply in tasks that measure the ability to process 
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multiple stimuli, rather than the ability to ignore a distractor. However, Lavie's 
(1995,2000) perceptual load theory of selective attention states that spare capacity 
not consumed by relevant processing should automatically spill over to irrelevant 
distractor processing. As this was the case in all but the face-face conditions, the 
target-distractor paradigms of Chapters 3&4 should provide an accurate measure 
of face processing capacity, at least subsequent to face detection. 
On the other hand, there are indications that several faces might be subject to some 
parallel processing. Jenkins et al (2003) found that an additional, unfamiliar face 
distractor reduced interference from a famous face distractor during the 
occupational classification of a target name. These dilution effects were face- 
specific, which suggests that both distractors were registered as faces at some 
level. This notion also receives some tentative support from the finding that four 
face distractors not only failed to interfere with the classification of face targets 
but also the nonface targets (images of flags) in Experiment 7. At first sight, it is 
hard to see why this might have happened. After all, when available, face- 
processing capacity always seemed to spill over to the distractors in two-item 
displays (Experiments 4-6,8-11). Moreover, if participants had recognized just a 
single of the four distractors, then they might have produced the same strong 
nonface-face interference effects of other experiments. However, it may be that the 
four face distractors were competing for limited processing resources. This 
competition could have remained unresolved due to their equally task-irrelevant 
status, thereby preventing the recognition and necessary semantic analysis of any 
of the distractors. Intriguingly, this would imply that the present processing limits 
do not extend to face detection. Of course, this reasoning is clearly speculative, 
being largely post-hoc. Future work should therefore assess capacity limits in face 
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detection, and in particular whether several task-irrelevant faces are detected 
alongside a nonface target. 
Nonetheless, Experiments 4-6 provide some indication that faces really may be 
strong competitors for processing resources, if only in displays that contain a 
single face stimulus. In each of these experiments, faces interfered more with 
nonface targets than nonface distractors interfered with faces. This pattern could 
be explained if faces are encoded into a form that particularly suits sex and 
semantic categorization tasks. Names, for instance, are notoriously difficult to 
retrieve from faces, and previous studies that have shown this face advantage in 
semantic tasks have also found the reverse pattern in naming tasks (Young et al, 
1986). However, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory as solitary face 
distractors still interfered more with national flags during nationality decisions 
than flags interfered with faces (Experiment 6). Surely, flags should be coded 
more readily into nationality than faces, which provide much more information 
than a person's nationality. Consequently, the final empirical chapter examined an 
alternative explanation for these interference patterns, namely whether faces are 
particularly adept at engaging and retaining attentional resources in comparison 
with other stimuli. 
In Experiments 12-14, participants performed a simple classification task, in which 
they were required to focus on a central go/no-go signal before responding to the 
onscreen location of a peripheral line target (i. e. left versus right). The task thus 
required an attentional shift from the location of the go/no-go signal to that of the 
target. The results showed that target classification was delayed by the presence of 
a visual stimulus in the location of the go/no-go signal, such as an upside-down 
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face or an image of a fruit. Importantly however, this effect was most pronounced 
when upright faces were used and occurred regardless of face familiarity (cf. 
Experiment 12 & 13). Experiment 14 replicated this face disadvantage in 
comparison with another class of meaningful nonface stimuli, in this case images 
of national flags, and showed that these results also cannot be attributed to the 
personhood of faces, as performance with the same person's names was 
indistinguishable from the flag condition. A variation of this paradigm was then 
carried out in which the target was always presented at fixation, directly beside the 
go/no-go signal, and the face and nonface stimuli appeared in the periphery 
(Experiment 15). In this study, the face and nonface stimuli thus never appeared in 
a task-relevant location. As in the three preceding experiments, it was found that 
faces delayed target RTs more than other classes of stimuli. 
It is clear from these findings that faces are particularly efficient in retaining 
(Experiments 12-14) and engaging attention (Experiment 15) in comparison to 
other stimuli. This may have contributed to response-competition effects in single- 
distractor displays (Experiments 4-6), and also with multiple distractors 
(Experiment 7). However, it should be noted that these effects are qualitatively 
different from those of the response-competition tasks, in which distractor 
congruency was manipulated to assess any task-irrelevant processing. Thus, to the 
extent that the distractors were processed, these effects arose from conflicting 
information during response production. In Chapter 5, on the other hand, the faces 
(and nonface stimuli) were always response-neutral and presented in the context of 
a simple perceptual task. These tasks therefore assessed faces' ability to vie for 
outright control with the subjects' intentions, regardless of the nature of the 
required response. 
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According to one theory already highlighted in this discussion, faces may draw on 
a specific capacity with its own limits. The findings from Chapter 5 also raise the 
question whether faces have their own dedicated attentional resources. If faces 
draw on a separate processing capacity, then this might produce something akin to 
a capture advantage in multi-item displays, which contain several nonface items 
and only a single face (as in Ro et al, 2001). However, this cannot explain the face 
biases in Chapter 5, in which the face and nonface comparisons were never 
presented within the same display. This also cannot account for the interference 
patterns that were obtained when only a single face and a single nonface item were 
paired (Experiments 4-6). Moreover, there is some evidence that faces and other 
types of visual stimuli are subject to a common selection mechanism at some 
stage, as Jenkins et al (2002) observed impaired explicit memory for face 
distractors under high compared to low task-relevant nonface load. Crucially, this 
occurred in a context in which face distractors showed equivalent repetition 
priming, regardless of task load. Similarly, the error patterns in Chapter 5 indicate 
that presenting the faces did not affect the extent to which the line targets were 
processed, but rather, only the timing of the responses to these targets. Perhaps 
then face processing itself occurs independent of a general capacity, but there are 
some stages involved in controlling responses to and awareness of perceived 
stimuli, and hence explicit memory, that are not. 
So far, this discussion has largely been concerned with face processing limits and 
attention biases to faces. I return now to the encoding of facial information, which 
is another question that this work originally set out to explore (see Experiment 3). 
The specific aim was to determine how functionally dissociable types of facial 
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information, such as expression and identity, are combined within one face 
without being confused with those from another face. Although Experiment 3 
produced little apparent success, the results of subsequent experiments are perhaps 
more decisive, despite not being motivated directly by this issue. Under the 
processing limits of Chapters 3&4, correctly integrating different types of 
information would be a natural consequence of available face processing 
resources. To this point, Experiment 4 demonstrates that face-face interference 
was even absent when face distractors preserved salient face-related response cues 
for a sex categorization task. In view of this particular result, but also the findings 
of Experiments 3-11 in general, it seems unlikely that facial information relating to 
expression, sex or identity was registered from distractors in face-face displays. 
Note that this reasoning does not contradict earlier claims that the face processing 
limits of Chapters 3&4 might not extend to face detection. Some prosopagnosics, 
for example, show impaired face identification but have normal face detection (de 
Gelder & Rouw, 2000). Moreover, Lewis & Edmonds (2003) showed that the eyes 
appear to form the single most important part of face detection. Lewis & Edmonds 
(2003) suggest that the eyes might constitute a characteristic pair of equally sized 
luminance regions that can be extracted quickly from an image. It is conceivable 
that this could occur even when processing limits make finer types of facial 
information unavailable. 
In conclusion, this thesis applies a range of attentional paradigms to establish 
several new facts about face processing. Most importantly, the research carried out 
here provides evidence that face processing is subject to capacity limits, such that 
only a single face can be processed at a time. It also demonstrates attention 
retention and engagement biases for faces, in comparison with other stimulus 
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classes. In doing so, the present findings raise several theoretical issues that need 
to be confirmed by future research. For instance, it may be that the current face 
processing limits do not extend to face detection. It would also be interesting to 
find out whether attention biases to a limited set of faces (as in Chapter 5) are 
long-lived or diminish with increasing repetition. Finally, on a more integrative 
level, one way to extend this research could be to explore possible interactions 
between processing limits and attention biases. It is conceivable, for example, that 
a face bias could be aimed at resolving competition between several 
simultaneously-presented faces, at facilitating the retrieval of identity and semantic 
information from a fixated face, or at monitoring faces for changes in transient 
information such as expression and facial speech. 
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Appendix A 
FACE STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENT 7 
Americam 
Woody Allen 
Groucho Marx 
British: 
Billy Connolly 
John Cleese 
Tom Cruise 
Robert de Neiro 
Elvis Presley 
Eminem 
George W. Bush 
Bill Clinton 
Pete Sampras 
Andre Agassi 
Hugh Grant 
Sean Connery 
Liam Gallagher 
Mick Jagger 
John Major 
Tony Blair 
David Beckham 
Tim Henman 
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Appendix B 
FACE STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENTS 9& 10 
American: 
Al Pacino 
Angelina Jolie 
Ben Affleck 
Brad Pitt 
Britney Spears 
Bruce Willis 
Cameron Diaz 
Courtney Cox 
Leonardo Di Caprio 
Drew Barrymore 
Eminem 
George Clooney 
Halle Berry 
Harrison Ford 
Jack Nicholson 
Janet Jackson 
Jennifer Aniston 
Jennifer Lopez 
Jim Carrey 
Josh Hartnett 
Julia Roberts 
Keanu Reeves 
Kevin Costner 
Kevin Spacey 
Mariah Carey 
Marilyn Monroe 
Matt Damon 
Matt LeBlanc 
Mel Gibson 
Mike Myers 
Nicolas Cage 
Penelope Cruz 
Richard Gere 
Robert Redford 
British: 
Ali G 
Catherine Zeta-Jones 
Chris Evans 
Chris Tarrant 
Cilia Black 
Craig David 
David Beckham 
Davina McCall 
Lady Di 
Duncan James 
Emma Bunton 
Ewan McGregor 
George Michael 
Geri Halliwell 
Graham Norton 
Hugh Grant 
Jarvis Cocker 
Jonathan Ross 
Judy Dench 
Kate Winslet 
Liam Gallagher 
Liz Hurley 
Michael Owen 
Michael Caine 
Michael Palin 
Paul McCartney 
Pierce Brosnan 
Robbie Coltrane 
Robbie Williams 
Roger Moore 
Ronan Keating 
Ross Kemp 
Rowan Atkinson 
Sean Connery 
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Sandra Bullock 
Sarah Jessica-Parker 
Sarah Michelle Gellar 
Tom Cruise 
Val Kilmer 
Will Smith 
Appendix C 
Sporty Spice 
Stephen Gately 
Victoria Beckham 
Vinnie Jones 
Zoe Ball 
Will Young 
FACE STIMULI USED IN EXPERIMENT 11 WERE THE SAME AS FOR 
EXPERIMENTS 9& 10 IN ADDITION TO THE FOLLOWING: 
David Schwimmer 
JohnTravolta 
Justin Timberlake 
Liv Tyler 
Madonna 
Mark Wahlberg 
Pamela Anderson 
Paul Newman 
Tom Hanks 
Woody Allen 
Anne Robinson 
Elton John 
Gareth Gates 
Jamie Oliver 
John Major 
Mick Jagger 
Prince Charles 
Richard Branson 
Sting 
Tony Blair 
207 
